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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is motivated by the goals of understanding in depth which information 
security value aspects are relevant in real-world business environments and 
contributing a value-prioritised information security investment decision model 
suitable for practitioners in the field. Pursuing this goal, we apply a mixed method 
research approach that combines the analysis of the relevant literature, expert 
interviews, practitioner survey data and structural equation modelling and 
multicriteria decision analysis. In the first step, we address the identified 
terminology gap to clarify the meaning of ‘cyber security’ by analysing 
authoritative definition sources in the literature and presenting an improved 
definition distinct from that of ‘information security’. We then investigate the 
influence of repeated information security breaches on an organisation’s stock 
market value to benchmark the wider economic impact of such events. We find 
abnormal returns following a breach event as well as weak statistical significance 
on abnormal returns for later breach events, confirming that data breaches have a 
negative impact on organisations. To understand how security practitioners view 
this topic, we conduct and analyse semi-structured interviews following a 
grounded theory approach. Our research identifies 15 principles aligned with a 
conceptual information security investment framework. The key components of 
this framework such as the business environment, drivers (threat landscape, legal 
and regulatory) and challenges (cost of security, uncertainty) are found to be a 
crucial part of value-prioritised information security investment decisions. We 
verify these findings through a structural model consisting of five latent variables 
representing key areas in value-focused information security investment decisions. 
The model shows that security capabilities have the largest direct effect on the 
value organisations gain from information security investment. In addition, the 
value outcome is strongly influenced by organisation-specific constructs such as 
the threat landscape and regulatory requirements, which must therefore be 
considered when creating security capabilities. By addressing one of the key 
uncertainty issues, we use a probabilistic topic modelling approach to identify 
latent security threat prediction topics from a large pool of security predictions 
publicised in the media. We further verify the prediction outcomes through a 
survey instrument. The results confirm the feasibility of forecasting notable threat 
developments in this context, implying that practitioners can use this approach to 
reduce uncertainty and improve security investment decisions. In the last part of 
the thesis, we present a multicriteria decision model that combines our results on 
 ii 
value-prioritised information security investments in an organisational context. 
Based on predefined criteria and preferences and by utilising stochastic 
multicriteria acceptability analysis as the adopted methodology, our model can deal 
with substantial uncertainty while offering ease of use for practitioners. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In our modern economy, information is rapidly becoming one of the most important 
assets in global markets. It is no longer just a by-product, but rather a driver of new 
and improved business models that generates considerable value. Hence, interest in 
this area is increasing just as rapidly—and not just in legitimate businesses (The 
Economist, 2017). Criminals are quick to spot opportunities and are adapting to these 
new value streams. Indeed, organised crime is embracing and exploiting billions of 
dollars of digital opportunities (Dethlefs, 2015; Hyman, 2013; Ponemon Institute, 
2017). With losses at this magnitude and still rising, the importance of protecting 
information assets is apparent. 
The security of information assets in organisations has been a research subject for 
many years (Badenhorst & Eloff, 1990; Blakley, McDermott, & Geer, 2001; K. D. 
Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007), largely focusing 
on technology and technological risks. This research foundation has helped 
professional institutions build topic-specific bodies of knowledge that guide 
information security practitioners on how to protect information in their 
organisations. However, the question is not just how to protect, but how much 
resources to spend on the protection of information (Hoo, 2000). Despite early 
research on the economic aspects of information security (Ekenberg, Oberoi, & Orci, 
1995), academic research was rather limited until the turn of the millennium when the 
papers by Anderson (2001) and Gordon and Loeb (2002a) raised interest in this topic. 
Today, information security is among the top concerns for policymakers and 
corporate board members. They demand answers from their support structures as to 
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how information security risks can be managed effectively (Clinton, 2014). In 
contrast to, for example, the physical security space, answers on impact and cost are 
not straightforward to ascertain because the rapid developments in information 
security leave subject matter experts with limited historical data to support reliable 
risk models (Shetty et al., 2018). In the absence of such data, information security 
professionals rely on subjective knowledge (i.e. expert judgement), assumptions, 
vendor recommendations and industry best practices to manage information security 
risks. The result is a battle on several fronts. It involves the challenge to understand 
the current and future threats to organisations’ information assets, prioritise those with 
the highest probability to be realised on the highest valued assets and investigate the 
value propositions of countermeasures. Not only is this a highly complex undertaking 
based on estimates and assumptions, it is merely the preamble to proving that the 
selected control investment is worth doing. The security practitioner must therefore 
justify the investment in security controls by showing the value it adds compared with 
the other projects in the organisation competing for the same pot of money.  
In basic terms, security value can be seen as the combination of end result from 
benefits and costs associated with maintaining the security and integrity of the 
organisation (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006). In less simplistic terms, value at 
organisational level is represented through an organisation specific value focused 
view which takes a more abstract form, considering fundamental objectives valued 
by the decision maker (Keeney, 1994). This value view is investigated in detail 
throughout this thesis, particularly in chapters 2 and 5. Taking a resource-based 
position on value (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007) we 
view information security through the service dominant prism with value defined in 
terms of an improvement in system well-being which can be measured in terms of a 
system’s adaptiveness or ability to fit in its environment (Vargo, Maglio, & Akaka, 
2008).  
1.1 Research Questions 
Several academic models have been proposed to assess the value and economic 
benefit of information security investments, each with their various challenges, 
benefits, practicability and scope. As we will find in this research, many of the 
models, particularly those of earlier approaches, are largely theoretical, leaving the 
practical challenges unmentioned or unsolved. While such models do contribute to 
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achieving a better approach towards information security investments, their 
theoretical nature makes them only applicable to a limited subset of information 
security scenarios. In other words, they do not address the real-world challenges or 
scenarios practitioners face as found by our research (Chapter 5). Further, while 
research in this area is developing, leading to ever-improving approaches, it also 
contributes to the proliferation of niche solutions. This makes it difficult for 
practitioners to identify and select a useful methodology to adopt. Moreover, it is 
further complicated by blurred definitions between models focusing on the economic 
aspects of organisational information security (i.e. the micro level) and those dealing 
with cyber security questions at the macro level. Hence, the focus and motivation of 
this research is to provide a value-prioritised information security investment decision 
model suitable for practitioners in the field. 
To address the noted challenges and gaps, the research investigates the following 
overarching questions: 
I. What do we mean by cyber security and how does it differ from information 
security? 
II. Which information security value models are currently proposed to manage and 
evaluate information security investments in organisations? 
III. What are the key factors relevant to information security investments and do these 
diverge, conflict or harmonise across models? 
IV. How do information security practitioners view the topic of information security 
value? What factors are relevant in the real world? 
V. Which of the gaps identified in the research questions would, if addressed or 
resolved, lead to advancement in this space? 
1.2 Objectives 
The goals of the investigation are thus to 
• Define the difference between cyber security and information security to delineate 
security investments beneficial at the micro and macro levels 
• Gain an exhaustive understanding of the information security value aspects 
relevant in real-world environments by following a convergent qualitative 
quantitative mixed method research approach 
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• Investigate and evaluate a way in which to reduce uncertainty in information 
security risk decisions 
• Identify latent structures and apply the results to create a value-prioritised 
information security investment model that is usable, relevant and applicable to 
real-world decision scenarios 
1.3 Methodology 
To achieve the objectives described above, a thorough and robust research approach 
is followed in which we 
• Analyse the current authoritative definitions of cyber security 
• Observe and analyse the economic impact of security incidents on market value 
• Review the models and practices proposed in the academic and professional 
literature to evaluate information security investments at the micro level 
• Gather and analyse primary data on information security value assessment 
through semi-structured interviews and surveys 
• Decompose and analyse existing models and practices highlighting issues, 
dis/advantages and shortcomings to identify gaps or similarities 
• Investigate and reassemble latent structures and key components in the context of 
information security value to create a value-prioritised multicriteria decision 
model 
The overall research followed a general research cycle approach inspired by action 
research (McNiff & Whitehead, 2011). The research cycle was consulted at key points 
during the work to re-evaluate the problem space, adjust the research goals and plan 
as well as reflect on the findings. This led to the adjustment of the plan as well as the 
extension of the research to address specific problem areas such as ambiguous 
terminology and uncertainty in the threat landscape. This research thus represents the 
outcome of a full research cycle. However, the concluding reflection step inevitably 
leads to new ideas for improving the model and the realisation that the information 
security landscape is in constant flux. 
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Figure 1 - Research steps and lifecycle 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the first phase of the research investigated the general 
question of impact, reviewed the state of the proposed models and clarified the cyber 
security terminology. The systematic literature review (SLR) provided the basis for 
the decomposition and categorisation of current economic evaluation approaches and 
frameworks. SLRs provide a structured method for critically examining, interpreting 
and evaluating the entirety of current research evidence in a certain field or area, 
leveraging a strict framework and predefined questions (Kitchenham & Charters, 
2007). On the impact investigation a event study methodology approach was 
followed. Event study is a statistical approach relying on the assumption of efficient 
markets to identify abnormal returns resulting from an event. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
explains that the usefulness of such a study stems from the fact that, given rationality 
in the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security 
prices. To assess the definitions of cyber security, we apply basic text analysis as well 
as semantic similarity methods (Hearst, 1999). We consider initial lexical form of the 
token, lemma form of the word, part-of-speech (POS), weighted specificity of the 
word, semantic representation (Martin & Berry, 2007; G. A. Miller, 1995) and a list 
of syntactic dependencies with the other words in the same sentence (Lintean, 2011). 
To capture as much context as possible, we chose StanfordNLP (De Marneffe, 
MacCartney, & Manning, 2006) as the configuration option for tokenization, POS 
tagging, lemmatizer as well as syntactic parsing. 
In phase two, primary data were obtained through qualitative (semi-structured 
interviews) and quantitative methods (surveys). In our interviews, we investigated 
how practitioners approach information security investments in their work 
environments. As this requires interaction and close cooperation with practitioners in 
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the field, we chose a qualitative research approach to emphasise the lived experience; 
this approach is also suitable for locating meaning and connecting such meaning to 
the social world (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Grounded theory (Glaser, Strauss, & Strutzel, 1968) is a suitable approach for this 
research. Hence, we combined the results of our qualitative analysis with the findings 
of the SLR to gather further primary data from practitioners in a survey that captured 
which aspects of information security value decisions are most relevant from their 
perspective. We then used partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-
SEM) to test a conceptual model derived from our mixed methods research. The core 
of PLS is a family of alternating least squares algorithms that emulate and extend 
principal component analysis as well as canonical correlation analysis (Henseler, 
Hubona, & Ray, 2016). It is an appropriate choice for our research. As described by 
Hair Jr, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016), it is particularly useful for studies of the 
sources of competitive advantage and key success factors as it can predict and identify 
the target constructs. This is desirable because research on information security 
economics is relatively new and the theoretic fundamentals are still under 
development. PLS-SEM is advantageous when the structural model is complex and 
the constructs have many or very few indicators. Also, it can work with non-normally 
distributed data (Roldán & J. Sánchez-Franco, 2012). 
In the third phase of the research, the results of previous work were combined to 
create a multicriteria decision model for value-prioritised information security 
investments.  
Multicriteria decision making can be described as a collection of formal approaches 
adopted to explore complex decision matters considering multiple, typically 
conflicting, criteria of both a quantitative and a qualitative nature. Based on the work 
by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) as well as the seminal paper by Zionts (1979), 
multicriteria decision making is built on decision theory and notably driven by 
Operational Research. Liou and Tzeng (2012) provide an excellent overview of recent 
development in this space; see also Greco, Ehrgott, and Figueira (2016) for an 
extensive survey on this matter. We use Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability 
Analysis (SMAA) to support our model with MCDA utilising the inputs as described 
in the respective chapters. Introduced in (Lahdelma, Hokkanen, & Salminen, 1998) 
SMAA represents a family of MCDA methods for problems where the uncertainty is 
so significant that it should be considered explicitly. 
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1.4 Thesis overview 
This section provides a chapter-by-chapter overview of the thesis and highlights the 
contributions by chapter. Figure 2 illustrates the thesis flow. 
This chapter (chapter 1) introduced the research background, objectives and structure 
of the thesis. It also briefly discussed the research phases, the work conducted in each 
phase and how the work evolved through the research lifecycle. 
To understand which approaches to evaluating information security value in 
organisations have been discussed in the literature, we provide an SLR on this topic 
in chapter 2. We search several academic databases for relevant primary studies and 
extract the key details from the identified studies to answer our research questions.  
In chapter 3, we investigate what cyber security means based on an exhaustive 
review of authoritative definitions to highlight the difference to information security. 
This is an important step, as some practitioners use the term cyber security analogous 
to information security, whereas others see a distinct difference in what these terms 
represent. Understanding the differences in scope and context is thus crucial to 
security value decisions in organisations. It also provides the platform on which to 
answer our research questions and highlights the most representative definition of 
cyber security at the time of this research.  
Chapter 4 investigates the influence of one or more information security breaches on 
an organisation’s stock market value as a way in which to benchmark the wider 
economic impact of such events. We use an event study-based approach where a 
measure of the event’s economic impact can be constructed by using the security 
prices observed over a relatively short period.  
In chapter 5, we turn the focus of the research towards real-world experience in the 
context of information security value. Based on the Grounded Theory approach, we 
analyse the data gathered in a series of interviews with senior practitioners to identify 
the key factors behind value-based information security investment decisions. We 
discuss major drivers, challenges and other key factors and present the findings in a 
contextualised framework.  
As the previous chapters found external uncertainty to be a key challenge to 
practitioners, chapter 6 investigates and proposes an approach to reduce such 
uncertainty in threat landscape developments. Based on a substantial number of 
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published security predictions for a defined time window, we use a topic modelling 
approach to identify the underlying predicted threat developments. We then verify 
post hoc to what extent these predicted threat topics have been realised by surveying 
respondents with varying experience. 
Chapter 7 presents a conceptual model of information security investment decisions 
based on five crucial latent variables (LVs) as well as their measurement variables 
and significant relationships. It applies the results of our literature review and 
qualitative interview analysis to a survey with the goal of collecting expert data for 
analysis by using the PLS-SEM approach.  
Chapter 8 examines how the research findings can be combined to enable structured 
multicriteria decision making in the context of value-prioritised information security 
investments. It extensively discusses our problem structuring approach as well as the 
identified measurement criteria and preferences and describes our use of stochastic 
multicriteria acceptability analysis (SMAA). We provide a discussion and two brief 
case studies to illustrate the application of the presented model.  
Chapter 9 revisits the research questions and provides concluding thoughts on the 
research presented in this thesis. In addition, future work and forward-looking 
research opportunities are briefly discussed. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
9 
 
Figure 2 - Overview and flow of the thesis 
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2 SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW ON 
THE ECONOMIC VALUATION OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
In this chapter, we systematically review the literature on approaches to economic 
valuation of information security in organisations. Its aims are to guide practitioners 
looking to understand the current state of research, provide researchers in the field 
with an overview of the directions previous work has taken and offer newcomers to 
this area an understanding of the economic assessment of information security 
investments in organisations. While there is an emerging research base investigating 
suitable approaches measuring the value of investments in information security, it 
remains difficult for practitioners to identify key approaches in current research. To 
address this issue, we conducted a systematic literature review on approaches used to 
evaluate investments in information security within organisations. Following a 
defined review protocol, we searched several databases for relevant primary studies 
and extracted key details from the identified studies to answer our research questions. 
The contributions of this work include a catalogue of existing approaches and trends 
that would help researchers and practitioners navigate existing work; categorisation 
and mapping of approaches according to their key elements and components; and a 
summary of key challenges and benefits of existing work, which should help focus 
future research efforts. 
As mentioned previously, research on the security of information assets in 
organisations has largely focused on technology and technological risks. While early 
research on the economic impact of information security risks was conducted 
(Ekenberg et al., 1995), academic research was rather limited until the turn of the 
millennium when the studies by Anderson (2001) and Gordon and Loeb (2002a) 
raised interest in this topic. This effort is closely aligned with research in the fast-
moving area of information security risks in general, which represents a challenging 
problem in its own right (Hoo, 2000). The present situation shows a dilemma, as 
understanding the risks involved in an investment is a key requirement to assessing 
the expected benefits of the investment; as Hertz (1979) states, “the courage to act 
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boldly in the face of apparent uncertainty can be greatly bolstered by the clarity of 
portrayal of the risks and possible rewards”. 
This has led to a situation in which security professionals tasked with the protection 
of information assets have to justify security investments with little access to widely 
adopted financial methods given the lack of a tangible return on investment (ROI) 
since security measures aim to reduce loss as opposed to generate revenue. The result 
is a battle on various fronts. It involves the challenge of understanding the current and 
future threats to organisations’ information assets, prioritising those with the highest 
probability to be realised on the highest valued assets and investigating appropriate 
countermeasures. Not only is this a highly complex undertaking based on estimates 
and assumptions; it is merely the preamble to a budget approval process. The security 
professional is faced with the challenge of transforming the identified risks into 
financial formulas to justify investment in controls by showing value and priority 
compared with other projects within the organisation competing for the same pot of 
money. 
2.1 Related work 
Gordon and Loeb (2006) find limited evidence of the effectiveness of an information 
security cost/benefit approach in organisations, concluding, “However, on the open-
ended questions, a few respondents noted the budgeted expenditure level on 
information security for their firms is largely driven by such items as the past year’s 
budget, best practices in the industry, or a mustdo approach”. Along similar lines, 
Hoo (2000) argues that decisions favour security only when the security advocate (i.e. 
the security practitioner) commands significant respect from senior management. 
Likewise, Moore, Dynes, and Chang (2015) find that while calculating ROI is 
feasible, even helpful, in certain situations, it is unsuitable in many cases. Wood and 
Parker (2004) go a step further by advising against using traditional financial analysis 
at all, arguing that it is difficult and counterproductive to try to apply these tools in 
the context of information security. On the contrary, investment decisions in security 
based on anecdotal evidence tend to backfire, as security measures tend to look like 
redundant outlay regardless of whether they work (the lack of loss events impacts the 
value perception of the protective measure) or not (loss occurs despite the 
investment). This is clearly not an ideal situation for a maturing information security 
profession. It may even raise questions about the ability of the Chief Information 
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Security Officer to do his/her job properly or, in the worst case, calls for an audit to 
verify whether security budgets may have been misappropriated (Gordon, Loeb, 
Sohail, Tseng, & Zhou, 2008). Even in the absence of malice or incompetence, budget 
allocation is a cause of tension. Srinidhi, Yan, and Tayi (2015) find that managers 
overinvest in specific security-enhancing assets to reduce security breaches during 
their tenure as this is in their best interest. H. S. B. Herath and Herath (2014) discuss 
this classical agency issue in more detail and provide guidance allowing firms to 
decide whether conducting an IT security audit is worthwhile. 
An ever-increasing amount of research activity in the information security field at 
large makes it difficult to identify relevant research addressing the value challenge. 
Although various works have provided preliminary views of the topic (Eisenga, 
Jones, & Rodriguez, 2012; European Network and Information Security Agency, 
2012; Kesswani & Kumar, 2015; Neubauer & Hartl, 2009), with some detailed 
analysis (Demetz & Bachlechner, 2013; Huang & Behara, 2013), they tend to fall 
short of offering a comprehensive view of the literature.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, the research 
methodology is discussed. This includes the study’s research questions, search 
protocol and inclusion and exclusion criteria. Section 2.3 provides the data extraction 
and synthesis process of the primary studies identifying trends and developments in 
the field. Based on the data collected, the research questions are then addressed in 
detail in the remainder of section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines work in related areas and 
we discuss possible study limitations and threats to validity in section 2.5. In the last 
section, we round off the chapter with a summary and conclusions. 
2.2 SLR research method 
SLRs provide a structured method for critically examining, interpreting and 
evaluating the entirety of current research evidence in a certain field or area, 
leveraging a strict framework and predefined questions. As described by Cook, 
Mulrow, and Haynes (1997) a systematic literature review involves the application of 
scientific strategies, in ways that limit bias, to the assembly, critical appraisal, and 
synthesis of all relevant studies that address a specific question. Due to its defined 
protocol and structured approach this type of review is well suited for the task and 
has several benefits over other types of literature reviews as described in (Budgen & 
Brereton, 2006). For this thesis, we followed the guidance provided by Kitchenham 
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and Charters (2007), Brereton, Kitchenham, Budgen, Turner, and Khalil (2007), 
Biolchini, Mian, Ana, and Travassos (2005) as well as Cronin, Ryan, and Coughlan 
(2008) and note its challenges and limitations. A multiple step approach that 
resembles the phases described by Kitchenham and Charters (2007) was then 
followed to conduct the SLR.  
To aid the process, a high-level flowchart was created during the protocol definition 
phase (Figure 3).
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2.2.1 Chapter Research questions 
As shown in Figure 3, the SLR process starts with the definition of the research 
questions the study is aiming to answer. For this study, five research questions were 
identified, as shown in Table 1. 
 
RQ1 What approaches are described in the literature to support decision 
processes for information security investments (in organisations) taking 
economic factors into consideration? 
The intention is to understand which approaches are proposed to value 
information security investments inside organisations. 
RQ2 Are there any common key elements across the identified approaches? 
The intention is to understand whether any common elements or factors 
are covered by the identified approaches. 
RQ3 What are the main issues faced by these approaches as reported in the 
literature? 
The assumption is that no approach is perfect; hence, under this 
question, we try to capture the issues and limitations reported by 
authors. 
RQ4 Who is publishing on this topic? 
The intention is to understand the size and distribution of the research 
community. 
RQ5 Is there any tendency towards the use of a specific approach? 
The aim is to find out whether there are any favoured approaches when 
it comes to economically valuing information security investments in 
organisations. 
Table 1 - Research questions 
2.2.2 Search construction 
To capture relevant material, the search was inspired by the work of Beecham, 
Baddoo, Hall, Robinson, and Sharp (2006), albeit modified to accommodate the 
requirements of this particular SLR. The selection of keywords was based on a review 
of relevant studies in the field and the authors’ experience. During the protocol 
development phase, these keywords were refined based on the preliminary search 
results. Test searches conducted led to the identification of more potential keywords 
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such as ROI and net present value (NPV). However, these were not used to avoid 
potential bias based on too narrow search terms in an already sparsely researched 
field. Additionally, the preliminary search results with these keywords did not 
noticeably improve or return further relevant material. The search was thus 
constructed based on the keywords in Table 2. 
 
Keyword list 
Information Security, IT Security, InfoSec, investment, investing, economy, cost, 
benefit, finance, spending, analysis, analyse, analyze, framework, model, decision, 
justification 
Table 2 - Keyword list 
These keywords were relationally grouped and each group linked by using Boolean 
logic. Terms were clustered into groups to reduce search strings, as groups form 
relevant compound nouns (e.g. InfoSec investment framework). Search terms were 
shortened by using wildcards (asterisks) where possible and sensible. For example, 
the use of an asterisk search with ‘invest*’ did not just return ‘investment’ and 
‘investing’ but also ‘investigation’ and ‘investigating’, which are commonly used in 
relation to computer science but less useful in this context (Table 3). 
 
Group 1 “Information Security” OR “IT Security” OR InfoSec 
Group 2 Investment OR investing OR econom* OR (cost AND 
benefit) OR finance* OR spend* 
Group 3 Analy* OR framework OR model OR decision OR 
justification 
Table 3 - Search groups 
The search construct was then tailored to suit each of the source databases following 
the specific search requirements/syntax of the database provider. 
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2.2.3 Search scope 
The search mainly utilised electronic databases to identify the relevant literature. 
Source databases were considered based on their relevance to the field of computer 
science and information security. To return results from the databases in Table 4, the 
search function provided by each website was used. 
 
Source Description 
EBSCOhost http://www.ebscohost.com  
Web of Knowledge http://apps.webofknowledge.com/  
ScienceDirect http://www.sciencedirect.com  
IEEE_Xplore http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/  
Table 4 - Source databases 
2.2.4 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The initial results obtained through the search process were further filtered based on 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria below. 
Inclusion criteria: 
• IC1: Papers and studies investigating approaches and metrics supporting 
economic decision processes pertaining to information security investments in 
organisations 
• IC2: Papers and studies available in English or German 
Exclusion criteria: 
• EC1: Papers and studies investigating largely or exclusively non-economic 
approaches of information security (e.g. purely risk- or technology-based) 
• EC2: Short papers, articles or studies that do not provide sufficient new insights 
or ideas 
• EC3: Papers, articles or studies that are not peer-reviewed (e.g. white papers) 
Where multiple papers were identified by utilising the same or a similar approach, the 
most representative paper (favouring more detailed and more recent publications) was 
selected unless other major contributions reported in other papers warranted inclusion 
(e.g. additional arguments supporting an approach). All search terms were designed 
to capture papers and studies published in English; however, publications in German 
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were considered and included if returned as a search result or found to be a relevant 
reference in a paper. The selection process entailed applying the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria to the title and abstract of the paper. When this proved inconclusive, 
the paper was retrieved in full and reviewed. 
2.2.5 Search process implementation 
Following the SLR framework in Figure 3, the search and extraction process was 
conducted as below: 
• Define the search terms and logic appropriate for the individual databases 
• Review the raw results and reduce by removing obviously unrelated material 
• Export the search results to a management solution (Thomson Reuters Endnote) 
• Create subfolders for each database searched and move imported references 
accordingly 
• Remove duplicate papers based on author(s), year, title and reference type 
ignoring spacing and punctuation (Endnote functionality) 
• Apply selection criteria and move selected papers into a new subfolder 
• Retrieve full paper for data extraction 
• Review the references in the selected studies for further relevant material 
2.2.6 Search results 
The search for papers was conducted in 2014 following the protocol defined earlier. 
Owing to the differences between databases, some modifications to the search string 
were necessary to optimise the search results. Table 5 shows the search construct 
unique to each database. Some databases provided additional refinement options that 
were leveraged as described in the comments section. 
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Source Search details Comments # 
EBSCOhost ("information security" 
OR "IT Security" OR 
InfoSec) N90 
(investment OR 
investing OR econom* 
OR cost OR benefit 
OR spend*) AND 
(analysis OR analyse 
OR analyze OR model 
OR framework OR 
decision OR 
justification) 
(Business Source 
Complete, 
Communication & 
Mass Media Complete, 
Library, Information 
Science & Technology 
Abstracts with limiters 
applied - Scholarly 
(Peer Reviewed) 
Journals) 
143 
Web of 
Knowledge 
(("information 
security" OR "IT 
Security" OR InfoSec) 
NEAR ((investment 
OR investing OR 
econom* OR (cost 
NEAR benefit) OR 
spend*) NEAR 
(analysis OR analyse 
OR analyze OR model 
OR framework OR 
decision OR 
justification))) 
 
Refined by: Research 
Areas=( COMPUTER 
SCIENCE OR 
BUSINESS 
ECONOMICS OR 
INFORMATION 
SCIENCE LIBRARY 
SCIENCE OR 
OPERATIONS 
RESEARCH 
MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE )  
Timespan=All Years.  
Search 
language=English, 
German 
Search scope was set to 
‘Topic’ which includes 
Title, Abstract, Author 
Keywords and 
Keywords Plus® 
263 
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ScienceDirect ("information security" 
OR "IT Security" OR 
InfoSec) 
W/10((investment OR 
investing OR econom* 
OR cost OR benefit 
OR spend*) 
W/10(analysis OR 
analyse OR analyze 
OR model OR 
framework OR 
decision OR 
justification)) 
 
[Journals(Business, 
Management and 
Accounting, Computer 
Science, Economics, 
Econometrics and 
Finance)] 
281 
IEEE_Xplore ("Abstract":(Security 
OR InfoSec) NEAR 
(investment OR 
economic OR cost OR 
benefit OR spend) 
AND (analysis OR 
analyse OR analyze 
OR model OR 
framework OR 
decision OR 
justification) ) 
Metadata 92 
Table 5 - Search constructs and results 
After removing obviously unrelated papers by conducting a one-pass review of the 
raw search results as seen in Table 5, the count of papers reduced from 779 results to 
270 papers of potential relevance. These were distributed across the databases (Table 
6). 
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Source Initial paper selection 
EBSCOhost 105 
Web of Knowledge 139 
ScienceDirect 25 
IEEE_Xplore 1 
Table 6 - Overview of the initial paper selection 
Having only one paper attributed to the IEEE_Xplore database does not necessarily 
mean that no other IEEE published papers on the topic existed; it only indicates that 
only one study was not returned by the other sources. In the next step, the results 
across all four databases were further consolidated and duplicate references manually 
checked and removed, which reduced the reference count to 261.  
The selection process of the papers to be considered for data extraction included a 
manual step exporting the initial selection to Microsoft Excel for easier handling. 
Each paper was listed with a unique ID and its reference information exported from 
EndNote. According to the defined inclusion criteria in section 3.4, a ‘single 
reviewer/two-pass’ review was conducted to decide whether to include a paper in the 
review (Yes), exclude it (No) or review it in more detail (additional research required 
[ARR]) before making the decision. Further information was added to the ‘Duplicate’ 
(if the paper is a duplicate that was not identified as such by EndNote) and ‘Comment’ 
fields where required. The ‘Included’ field is defined as Boolean and identifies the 
paper as either included (Y) or not included (N) in the data extraction phase. After the 
completion of this process, 22 papers were selected for data extraction. The 
examination of the references listed in the selected papers resulted in an additional 
five papers identified to be relevant. Three of these were selected for data extraction, 
bringing the total number of primary studies to 25. 
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2.3 Data extraction and synthesis 
The data extraction process was conducted on 25 papers as described. This section 
lists all the extracted details under various headings, as follows: 
• ‘ID’ represents the unique numeric identifier assigned to each primary study 
• ‘Reference’ provides the citation of the paper 
• ‘Publication outlet’ provides information on the publication outlet in which the 
primary study was published 
• ‘Approach’ provides a short description of the area of research as reported in the 
primary study  
• ‘Approach details’ provide a short description of the approach itself, as 
highlighted in the primary study 
• ‘Key elements’ list the key elements of the approach as reported in the primary 
study 
• ‘Reported benefits’ list the advantages of the approach as reported in the primary 
study 
• ‘Reported challenges’ list the challenges of the approach as reported in the 
primary study 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
13 Arora, 
Hall, 
Piato, 
Ramsey, 
and Telang 
(2004) 
IT Professional Risk-based 
return on 
investment 
RROI 
measures how 
effectively 
resources are 
used to avoid 
or reduce risk 
Net bypass 
rate for all 
security 
solutions 
Incident risk, 
residual risk 
and baseline 
scenario 
Easier to use 
than Net 
Present Value 
(NPV) 
Appropriate for 
identifying the 
amount of 
investment 
Not appropriate 
for comparing the 
value of 
alternative 
solutions 
Obtaining true 
cost (observed 
damage) 
Estimating 
bypass rates 
Interaction 
impact between 
deployed 
solutions 
Representing 
catastrophic 
losses 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
23 Bistarelli, 
Dall'Aglio, 
and Peretti 
(2007) 
Formal 
Aspects in 
Security and 
Trust 
Strategic 
games on 
defence trees 
Game theory 
strategies 
based on 
defence trees 
enriched with 
economic 
indexes as 
payoffs 
(utility) 
Return on 
security 
investment 
(ROSI) 
Return on 
attack (ROA) 
Defence trees 
Identification 
of security 
countermeasur
e investment 
level up to 
marginal 
returns 
boundary 
Lack of reliable 
statistical data to 
use in a 
quantitative 
analysis 
Ambiguity 
around the 
calculation of the 
risk-mitigated 
attribute 
28 Bodin, 
Gordon, 
and Loeb 
(2005) 
Communicatio
ns of the ACM 
Analytic 
Hierarchy 
Process 
(AHP) 
Using the 
ratings method 
variant of the 
AHP to 
determine the 
optimal 
budget 
allocation for 
AHP criteria 
tree 
Fixed budget 
Supports 
multicriteria 
decision 
problems 
involving both 
quantitative 
and qualitative 
criteria 
Does not 
consider 
quantitative 
concerns 
Strong 
dependency on 
proper criteria 
definition and 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
maintaining 
and enhancing 
security 
Valuable tool 
for decision 
making and 
option ranking 
weighting 
31 Bojanc 
and 
Jerman-
Blažič 
(2008) 
International 
Journal of 
Information 
Management 
Combined 
use of 
multiple 
indexes 
Calculating 
multiple 
indexes for 
each 
investment 
option and 
consolidating 
the results for 
decision 
support 
Risk metrics 
ROI/ROSI 
NPV 
Internal rate 
of return 
(IRR) 
IRR is 
particularly 
useful for 
multi-year 
investments 
NPV describes 
the cash value 
of expected 
returns 
Each index used 
individually does 
not present an 
appropriate 
solution 
ROI and IRR are 
not project 
magnitude 
indicators 
ROI does not 
consider the time 
value of money 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
41 Huseyin 
Cavusoglu
, Birendra 
Mishra, 
and 
Srinivasan 
Raghunath
an (2004). 
Communicatio
ns of the ACM 
Game tree 
based on 
solution 
quality 
parameters 
Game theory 
strategies 
based on 
security 
solution 
quality 
parameters in 
terms of risk 
mitigation 
Damage cost 
estimate 
Mitigation 
quality 
parameters 
Threat 
parameter 
estimates 
Understand 
how the 
parameters 
affect the 
optimal 
investment/cos
t 
Assess the 
marginal effect 
of a decrease 
or increase in 
one parameter 
on total cost 
Uncertainty 
about the 
parameter 
estimates used 
for the model 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
43 Cavusoglu
, 
Raghunath
an, and 
Yue 
(2008) 
Journal of 
Management 
Information 
Systems 
Decision-
theoretic and 
game-
theoretic  
Comparing the 
results of 
sequential and 
simultaneous 
game-theoretic 
and decision-
theoretic 
approaches 
Threat 
parameter 
estimates 
Vulnerability 
parameter 
estimates 
Sequential 
games 
Simultaneous 
games 
Strategy 
decisions 
 
Game-theoretic 
approach 
achieves a 
superior result 
over decision 
theory in most 
cases 
Uncertainty 
about the 
parameter 
estimates used 
for the model, 
particularly for 
the game-
theoretic 
approach 
The game-
theoretic 
approach is 
assumed to be 
more complex 
High levels of 
uncertainty 
reduce the 
payoffs under the 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
game-theoretic 
approach 
Only relevant for 
targeted attack 
scenarios 
54 A. Davis 
(2005) 
Network 
Security 
Practical 
Return on 
Security 
Investment 
Set a policy 
defining the 
use of ROSI 
and adopt a 
consistent 
approach to 
calculating it 
Cost of 
controls 
Cost of 
incidents 
Financial 
benefits 
Definition/po
licy when to 
use ROSI 
Clear view of 
the value and 
benefits of 
security 
initiatives 
Making 
information 
security more 
accountable 
and transparent 
Quality of the 
data estimates 
used for the 
model 
Calculations can 
be too complex 
ROSI is not well 
understood in 
businesses 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
80 Gordon 
and Loeb 
(2002a) 
ACM 
Transactions 
on Information 
and Systems 
Security 
Optimal 
investment 
amount to 
protect a 
given set of 
information 
Leveraging 
information 
sets with 
security 
breach 
probability 
functions to 
calculate the 
optimal 
investments in 
information 
security  
Breach loss 
Threat 
probability 
Vulnerability 
probability 
Cost of 
control 
Considers how 
vulnerability 
and loss affect 
optimal 
security 
investment 
Supports the 
decision on 
what 
vulnerability 
level to focus 
investments 
Provides an 
upper limit for 
the optimal 
investment 
Not intended to 
cover 
catastrophic 
events/loss 
Uncertainty 
about the threat, 
vulnerability and 
loss estimates 
Agency cost not 
considered 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
95 Hausken 
(2006a) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
and Public 
Policy 
Income, 
interdepende
nce and 
substitution 
effects 
affecting 
incentives 
for security 
investment 
Optimal 
strategies 
regarding 
security 
investment, 
taking account 
of the income 
effect, 
interdependen
ce and 
substitution 
between 
attacker and 
defender as 
well as among 
defenders 
Asset value 
Inefficiency 
factor 
Attackers’ 
resources 
Average 
levels of 
attack 
Multistage 
games 
 
Rate of return 
from security 
investment 
(marginal rate 
of substitution) 
Appropriate 
investment 
based on the 
identified 
attacker 
Appropriate 
investment 
based on the 
substitution 
and 
interdependenc
e effects 
among firms 
Time factors not 
considered 
Assumptions 
made on key 
parameters 
Chapter 2: Systematic literature review on the economic valuation of information security 
31 
I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
99 H. S. B. 
Herath and 
Herath 
(2008) 
Journal of 
Management 
Information 
Systems. 
Real Options 
Analysis 
with 
Bayesian 
post-audit 
Real options 
model for 
information 
security 
investments, 
using 
Bayesian 
inferences for 
valuation 
and post-
auditing 
Total cost 
Expected 
benefits 
Volatility 
parameters 
(Bayesian) 
Revised 
parameter 
estimates lead 
to a reduction 
in upward bias 
and the 
incorporation 
of up-to-date 
information 
Reduces the 
possibility of a 
biased forecast 
Shows how to 
integrate 
security-
specific 
features 
Focused 
decision-theoretic 
approaches/situat
ions 
Focuses on 
technical 
dependence, not 
market 
dependence 
Difficult to 
obtain prior 
estimates of the 
mean and 
standard 
deviation from 
the sample data 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
properly in the 
valuation 
Incorporates 
available 
information 
into the 
decision 
making process 
in a systematic 
manner 
10
7 
Iheagwara, 
Blyth, 
Kevin, and 
Kinn 
(2004) 
Information 
and Software 
Technology 
Cascading 
Threat 
Multiplier 
tied into 
ROSI 
Use a standard 
risk analysis 
framework 
and extend it 
by introducing 
the cascading 
threat 
multiplier to 
Asset value 
Exposure 
factor 
Rate of 
occurrence 
Underlying 
exposed 
assets 
Assists in 
formulating the 
analytical 
framework for 
asset valuation 
and risk 
calculation 
A more 
Cascading threat 
multiplier is 
somewhat 
subjective 
Chapter 2: Systematic literature review on the economic valuation of information security 
33 
I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
arrive at 
accurate ROI 
calculations 
Secondary 
exposure 
factor 
comprehensive 
valuation 
methodology 
that includes 
intangible 
factors into the 
asset valuation 
variable 
calculation 
11
4 
Jingyue 
and 
Xiaomeng 
(2007) 
2007 
International 
Conference on 
Software 
Engineering 
Advances 
Real options 
theory 
(ROT) 
Apply ROT to 
make the right 
security 
investment 
decisions 
Binomial 
options 
pricing model 
Underlying 
volatility 
 
Comprehends 
uncertainty and 
responds to the 
dynamics of 
business needs 
When and how 
to implement 
to maximise 
the likelihood 
Assumes profit-
maximising 
decisions 
Key parameters 
need to be 
estimated or 
simulated based 
on historical data 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
of desirable 
outcomes 
Determines the 
most value-
adding strategy  
12
3 
Khansa 
and 
Liginlal 
(2009) 
European 
Journal of 
Operational 
Research 
Security 
process 
innovation 
incorporatin
g ROT 
Model of 
invest-to-learn 
and switching 
options 
generated 
upon early 
investment in 
flexible 
security 
process 
innovation 
Volatility 
estimate 
Intensity of 
malicious 
attacks 
Switching 
cost 
Binomial 
lattice 
Value 
definition of 
switching 
solutions 
decision 
Invest-to-learn 
option 
Considers 
switching 
between only two 
solutions 
Competitor 
impact not 
included in the 
model 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
16
5 
Purser 
(2004) 
Computers & 
Security 
Total ROI Risk 
mitigation is 
included as a 
factor in the 
ROI 
calculation 
Revenue 
Cost saving 
Value of 
change in risk 
Includes the 
financial 
impact of the 
change in risk 
Requires a 
strategic 
approach and 
careful planning 
Must be 
business-driven 
18
6 
Sheen 
(2010) 
Proceedings of 
the 9th 
WSEAS 
International 
Conference on 
Instrumentatio
n Measurement 
Circuits and 
Systems 
(IMCAS 
2010). 
Instrumentatio
Fuzzy 
economic 
decision 
models 
NPV and 
discounted 
ROI models 
leveraging 
fuzzy values 
for 
cost/benefit 
analysis 
Triangular 
fuzzy 
numbers 
NPV 
Discounted 
ROI 
Interest rate 
Inflation rate 
Operating 
cost/revenue 
Considers the 
opportunity 
cost of capital 
Eliminates the 
need for 
complicated 
sensitivity 
analysis studies 
associated with 
input 
parameter 
variations 
None reported 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
n, 
Measurement, 
Circuits and 
Systems 
Takes the 
degree of 
confidence of 
decision 
makers’ 
opinions into 
consideration 
19
1 
Shirtz and 
Elovici 
(2011) 
Information 
Management 
& Computer 
Security 
Decision 
support 
methodology 
for allocating 
information 
security 
remedies 
based on the 
end-effect 
perspective 
Calculate the 
optimal subset 
of remedies 
for a given 
budget and the 
most cost-
effective 
subset of 
remedies that 
comply with 
the 
List of end-
effects 
Potential 
damage 
Protection 
level for each 
end-effect 
Cost and 
performance 
of remedies 
Does not use 
probabilities of 
undesired 
information 
security events 
Complies with 
the set budget 
constraints and 
desired 
security level 
for each end-
Only mutually 
exclusive end-
effects 
considered 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
organisation’s 
policy 
effect 
21
3 
Tatsumi 
and Goto 
(2010) 
 
Economics of 
Information 
Security and 
Privacy 
ROT Analytically 
modelling 
continuous 
real options 
applied to 
information 
security 
Volatility 
estimate 
Drift factor 
Total 
expected 
benefits 
Intensity 
threat 
 
Guidance on 
investment 
timing 
Difficulties 
predicting threat 
timing/occurrenc
e 
Difficult to 
formulate an 
attacker’s 
objective 
function 
23
7 
Willemson 
(2010) 
Proceedings of 
the Fifth 
International 
Conference on 
Availability, 
Reliability, and 
Extending 
Gordon and 
Loeb 
Restricting the 
class of 
possible 
remaining 
vulnerability 
functions and 
Gordon and 
Loeb model 
New family of 
remaining 
vulnerability 
functions 
satisfying all 
conditions 
None reported 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
Security 
(ARES 2010) 
generalising 
by stating 
simple 
functional 
constraints 
Generalising 
all the 
currently 
known 
example 
function 
families 
24
4 
Yong Jick, 
Kauffman, 
and 
Sougstad 
(2011) 
Decision 
Support 
Systems 
Financial 
economics-
based value-
at-risk 
methods and 
operational 
risk 
modelling 
Profit 
optimisation 
model for 
customer 
information 
security 
investments 
based on 
value-at- 
risk methods 
and 
Value at risk 
Profit at risk 
Revenue 
Total costs 
Loss 
estimates 
Decision 
making process 
using 
operational risk 
management 
and value-at-
risk methods in 
financial 
economics 
Risk/return 
trade-offs for 
Classes of risks 
that cannot be 
estimated (Black 
Swan) 
Considers only 
quantity of added 
services, not cost 
Uncertainty 
about the 
estimates of the 
frequency and 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
operational 
risk modelling 
from financial 
economics 
information 
security 
enhancement 
investments 
magnitude of 
future losses 
25
2 
Zikai and 
Haitao 
(2008) 
2008 IEEE 
International 
Conference on 
Networking, 
Sensing and 
Control 
(ICNSC '08) 
Flexible 
optimal 
information 
security 
investment 
strategy 
Information 
security risks 
are 
transformed 
into an 
opportunity 
cost and then a 
multi-object 
optimisation 
model is built 
based on the 
opportunity 
cost and direct 
information 
Opportunity 
cost loss of 
CIA 
Direct cost 
Impact factor 
Helps make 
more confident 
justifications 
for security 
spend 
Data loss is hard 
to estimate by 
using equations 
How to combine 
uncertainty in 
this model 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
security 
investment 
25
4 
Huang and 
Behara 
(2013) 
International 
Journal of 
Production 
Economics 
Information 
security 
fixed budget 
investment 
allocation 
Investment 
model 
defending 
against 
concurrent 
heterogeneous 
attacks taking 
budget 
constraints 
into 
consideration 
Breach 
probability 
based on the 
scale-free 
networks 
concept 
Potential loss 
of class 
Cross-over 
coefficient 
 
Considers 
budget 
constraints 
Incorporates 
concurrent 
attacks 
Adopts the 
concept of 
scale-free 
networks 
Considers the 
cross-over 
effects of 
investments 
Uncertainty 
about the 
assumptions for 
variables and 
functions 
Attack category 
classification can 
be imperfect 
Total budget 
consumption 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
25
7 
Capko, 
Aksentijev
ic, and 
Tijan 
(2014) 
2014 37th 
International 
Convention on 
Information 
and 
Communicatio
n Technology, 
Electronics and 
Microelectroni
cs (MIPRO) 
Cash flow 
analysis and 
IRR 
Practical 
application of 
cash flow 
analysis for 
information 
security 
solutions 
Initial 
investment 
Opportunity 
cost of capital 
end-of-life 
value and 
depreciation 
method 
Tax 
consideration
s 
Working 
capital 
consideration
s 
Cash flow 
analysis model 
used to 
calculate NPV, 
IRR and RoC 
Determining the 
input parameters, 
especially 
avoided 
cost/damage 
Cannot be used 
to analyse 
investment in 
multiple 
solutions 
 
M
1 
Cremonini 
(2005). 
n/a Return-On-
Attack 
(ROA) 
Improve ROI-
based 
evaluations by 
Attackers’ 
gain 
Attackers’ 
Identify the 
solution that 
mostly 
None reported 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
integrating 
them with an 
ROA index to 
measure the 
convenience 
of attacks 
efficiency (or 
EFF) 
Cost of attack 
discourages 
attackers in 
their intrusion 
attempts 
Able to 
consider the 
time factor 
M
2 
Faisst, 
Prokein, 
and 
Wegmann 
(2007) 
Zeitschrift für 
Betriebswirtsc
haft 
Dynamic 
security 
investment 
calculation 
Model 
offering 
decision 
support for 
dynamic 
security 
investment 
calculations 
based on NPV 
considerations 
Reduction in 
expected 
damage 
Reduction in 
opportunity 
cost 
Operating 
cost 
Interest rates 
 
Despite the 
uncertainty of 
key factors, a 
statement on 
investment 
benefits can be 
arrived at 
Optimal time 
of investment 
Takes budget 
and equity 
Interdependency 
between security 
controls and 
assets not 
considered 
Difficult to 
estimate the 
frequency and 
scale of 
malicious events 
Operational 
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I
D 
Reference Publication 
outlet 
Approach Approach 
details 
Key 
elements 
Reported 
benefits 
Reported 
challenges 
capital 
constraints into 
consideration  
budget/cost not 
sufficiently 
considered 
M
4 
Matsuura 
(2009) 
Managing 
Information 
Risk and the 
Economics of 
Security 
Extending 
Gordon and 
Loeb by 
productivity 
spaces 
Optimal 
security 
investment 
considering 
Gordon and 
Loeb and 
productivity 
spaces 
(vulnerability 
and threat 
reduction) 
Gordon and 
Loeb model 
components 
Security 
threat 
probability 
function 
Identify 
security 
investment 
based on the 
value of 
productivities 
 
Failure to assess 
the threat 
productivity can 
lead to the wrong 
choice 
Uncertainty 
about the 
estimates of the 
key variables 
Table 7 - Extracted data of the selected papers
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2.3.1 Results for RQ1 
In the items listed under ‘Key elements’ in Table 7 are those considered to be the 
important elements the primary study is highlighting, relying on or proposing as 
novel, crucial or providing key contributions to the respective approach. Likewise, 
the items listed under ‘Reported Benefits’ are those that the primary study is listing 
as the particular benefits of the proposed approach. Following the data extraction 
process, we aligned each approach described in the primary study with nine high-
level approach categories. We summarised both elements and benefits into a wider 
elements category and repeated the same with the reported challenges. The categories 
were then used as the basis to answer the research questions in Table 1. Figure 4 
shows the simple relationships. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Overview of the extracted data and relations 
The extracted data showed that a number of approaches were discussed in the 
research. Although fewer primary studies were identified than initially expected, the 
breadth of approaches covered was noteworthy. An attempt was made to categorise 
each paper according to its approach to construct a simplified overview. After careful 
consideration, as noted earlier, nine high-level approach categories were identified 
that accommodate the individual approaches described in the primary studies. These 
categories were assumed to strike a balance between being too constraining on the 
variety of approaches described in the primary studies and avoiding too many 
approach categories that would hinder a meaningful summarisation. Table 8 describes 
the nine approach categories. 
Chapter 2: Systematic literature review on the economic valuation of information security 
45 
 
Approach 
category 
Description with reference 
AHP The Analytic Hierarchy Process is a structured method of 
breaking down complex problems to aggregate sub-problem 
solutions into a conclusion (Saaty, 1994) 
DSS Decision support systems (DSSs) present a structured method 
to understand and improve decision processes and support the 
decision maker to make decisions more effectively (Alavi & 
Henderson, 1981; Keen, 1980)  
Game Theory Game theory describes the study of strategic decision making 
in situations of competition or conflict, leveraging 
mathematical models (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1964) 
NPV Net Present Value is a valuation formula that calculates the 
present value of the future cash flows of an investment (Ross, 
1995) 
ROA Return On Attack is an extension of ROI where an attacker’s 
gain as well its cost (losses) are considered in the model 
(Cremonini, 2005) 
ROI Return On Investment is a valuation formula that evaluates 
the efficiency of an investment based on cost and expected 
benefit (Phillips & Phillips, 2010)  
ROI, NPV Papers that utilise a balanced mix of ROI and NPV to provide 
guidance on economic information security decisions 
ROT Real Options Theory describes a quantitative means to 
evaluate the flexibility inherent in the decision making 
process (L. T. Miller & Park, 2002) 
UM Utility maximization describes a concept in which a subject 
attempts to derive the greatest possible value from an 
investment (Strotz, 1955) 
Table 8 - Explanation of the categories 
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Table 9 provides an overview of the categorisation of each primary study. 
ID Author(s) Year Approach 
category 
13 Arora, A., Hall, D., Piato, C. A., 
Ramsey, D., Telang, R. 
2004 ROI 
23 Bistarelli, S., Dall'Aglio, M., Peretti, P. 2007 Game Theory 
28 Bodin, L. D., Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. 
P. 
2005 AHP 
31 Bojanc, R., Jerman-Blažič, B. 2008 ROI, NPV 
41 Cavusoglu, H., Mishra, B., 
Raghunathan, S. 
2004 Game Theory 
43 Cavusoglu, H., Raghunathan, S., Yue, 
W. T. 
2008 Game Theory 
54 Davis, A. 2005 ROI 
80 Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P. 2002 UM 
95 Hausken, K. 2006 UM 
99 Herath, H. S. B., Herath, T. C. 2008 ROT 
107 Iheagwara, C., Blyth, A., Kevin, T., 
Kinn, D. 
2004 ROI 
114 Jingyue, L., Xiaomeng, S. 2007 ROT 
123 Khansa, L., Liginlal, D. 2009 ROT 
165 Purser, S.A. 2004 ROI 
186 Sheen, J.N. 2010 ROI, NPV 
191 Shirtz, D., Elovici, Y. 2011 DSS 
213 Tatsumi, K.-i., Goto, M. 2010 ROT 
237 Willemson, J. 2010 UM 
244 Yong Jick, L., Kauffman, R. J., 
Sougstad, R. 
2011 DSS 
252 Zikai, W., Haitao, S. 2008 DSS 
254 Huang, C. Derrick, Behara, Ravi S 2013 UM 
257 Capko, Z., Aksentijevic, S., Tijan, E. 2014 NPV 
M1 Cremonini, M. 2005 ROA 
M2 Faisst, U., Prokein, O., Wegmann, N. 2007 NPV 
M4 Matsuura, K. 2009 UM 
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assessing the impact of information sharing when a firm is deciding on its security 
investment timing. The authors find that sharing reduces a firm’s uncertainty about 
cyber security investment and decreases the value of the deferment option associated 
with such investment. 
2.3.2 Results for RQ2 
Overall, 90 key elements were extracted from the primary studies with several 
elements mentioned across multiple works. To better understand which elements are 
considered to be crucial to this research topic, we attempted to collate the individual 
elements into topical element categories. Table 10 describes the element alignment in 
each category. 
 
Element 
category 
Description 
Benefit Elements that have direct beneficial attributes such as cost 
reduction/revenue or are explicitly described as benefits in the 
primary study 
Cost Elements that are a direct or indirect cost such as operating 
cost, opportunity cost and switching cost 
Function Elements that are constructs such as decision trees, mitigation 
quality parameters and fuzzy numbers 
Impact Elements that describe impact in the context of the approach, 
such as potential damage and the list of end-effects 
Resource Elements considered to be resources such as fixed budgets, 
asset values and attackers’ resources 
Threat Elements that describe or measure threats in the context of the 
approach, such as threat probability, attackers’ efficiency and 
the rate of occurrence 
Volatility Elements that are specifically described as volatility elements 
in the primary study 
Vulnerability Elements that describe vulnerability in the context of the 
approach, such as the exposure factor, vulnerability parameter 
estimate and bypass rate 
Table 10 - Element category details 
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Table 11 describes more in detail how the extracted elements for all papers aligned 
with these element categories. 
 
Element 
category 
Elements 
Benefit Cost saving (ROI), Expected benefits (ROT), Financial 
benefits (ROI), Interest rates (NPV, ROI), Reduction in 
expected damage (NPV), Reduction in opportunity cost 
(NPV), Revenue (DSS, ROI), Total expected benefits (ROT), 
Value of change in risk (ROI) 
Cost Cost and performance of remedies (DSS), Cost of attack 
(ROA), Cost of control (ROI, UM), Cost of incidents (ROI), 
Damage cost estimate (GT), Direct cost (DSS), Inflation rate 
(ROI, NPV), Operating cost (NPV), Operating cost/revenue 
(NPV), Opportunity cost loss of CIA (DSS), Opportunity 
cost of capital (NPV), Potential loss of class (UM), Residual 
risk (ROI), Switching cost (ROT), Total cost (DSS, ROT) 
Function AHP criteria tree (AHP), Baseline scenario (ROI), Binomial 
options pricing model (ROT), Binomial lattice (ROT), Cross-
over coefficient (UM), Defence trees (GT), Definition/policy 
when to use ROSI (ROI), Depreciation method (NPV), 
Discounted ROI (ROI/NPV), Drift factor (ROT), Inefficiency 
factor (GT), IRR (ROI/NPV), Mitigation quality parameters 
(GT), Multistage games (GT), NPV (ROI/NPV), Protection 
level for each end-effect (DSS), ROI/ROSI (ROI/NPV), 
ROA (GT), Risk metrics (ROI/NPV), Security threat 
probability function (UM), Sequential games (GT), 
Simultaneous games (GT), Strategy decisions (GT), Tax 
considerations (NPV), Triangular fuzzy numbers 
(ROI/NPV), Working capital considerations (NPV) 
Impact Attackers’ gain (ROA), Breach loss (UM), Impact factor 
(DSS), List of end-effects (DSS), Loss estimates (DSS), 
Potential damage (DSS), Profit at risk (DSS), Value at risk 
(DSS) 
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Resource Asset value (GT, ROI), Attackers’ resources (GT), End-of-
life value (NPV), Fixed budget (AHP), Initial investment 
(NPV) 
Threat Attackers’ efficiency (ROA), Average levels of attack (GT), 
Breach probability based on the scale-free networks concept 
(UM), Incident risk (ROI), Intensity of malicious attacks 
(ROT), Intensity threat (ROT), Rate of occurrence (ROI), 
Threat parameter estimates (GT), Threat probability (UM) 
Volatility Underlying volatility (ROT), Volatility estimate (ROT), 
Volatility parameter (ROT) 
Vulnerability Exposure factor (ROI), Net bypass rate for all security 
solutions (ROI), Secondary exposure factor (ROI), 
Underlying exposed assets (ROI), Vulnerability parameter 
estimates (GT), Vulnerability probability (UM) 
Table 11 - Overview of the elements and their use across approaches 
Roughly one-third of the elements are abstract constructs such as decision trees, 
mitigation quality parameters and fuzzy numbers and these were included in the 
‘Function’ element category representing the largest section. Looking at the other 
categories, cost, benefit and threat are the main contributing factors as per our primary 
studies. This is not surprising as these are inherently linked to risk and value 
considerations in information security. Mapping these element categories to the 
reported approaches reveals an even more interesting picture, as Figure 6 shows. 
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Figure 7 illustrates that ‘Accurate estimates’ and ‘Complexity to apply’ are the key 
challenges across most approaches. When interpreting these data, however, it is 
important to note that a higher count of primary studies for a given approach is likely 
to produce an increased count of challenges for that approach. This reason may be 
why AHP, for example, shows a low amount of challenges compared with GT and 
ROI. ROI lists complexity as key challenge, which could be interpreted that this 
approach may not scale well; alternatively, it could be argued that it is one of the most 
researched approaches and thus better understood in terms of challenges. 
2.3.4 Results for RQ4 and RQ5 
To understand whether research in this area is progressed by only a particular 
institution or region, or whether there is a wider research community, we examined 
the authors of the primary studies (i.e. all authors and co-authors affiliations as well 
as their geographic locations). As shown in Figure 8, there is a strong research base 
in the United States (particularly Maryland and Texas) with notable contributions 
from Croatia, Italy, Norway, Japan, Germany and China. The strong presence of 
primary studies by US researchers is not a surprise, as according to the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria for this SLR, our results are biased by language. We 
cannot comment on whether there is a strong research community covering this topic 
publishing in languages other than English or German. Further, these data only 
answer the specific question set for our SLR and only consider primary studies fitting 
the strict criteria described in section 2.2.4. They do not consider supplemental or 
tangential papers published on this topic. 
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Figure 8 - Geographical distribution of the primary studies 
Lastly, to answer RQ5, our assessment of the primary studies did not identify a clear 
research trend (Figure 9). While UM leads in publications on this topic, it does not 
dominate the domain. The lack of novel ROI-focused publications after 2005 is 
something of interest, as this suggests a decline in original contributions to this 
research approach. Publications on ROT are mainly observed between 2007 and 2010 
but we continue to see research activity in this area. Notably, Gordon et al. (2015) 
extend the ROT approach from the aspect of sharing cyber security-related 
information among firms, thus addressing some of the reported challenges on this 
approach (e.g. difficulties predicting threat timing/occurrence and key parameters 
needing to be estimated or simulated based on historical data). 
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which is akin to the tragedy of the cyber sharing commons. It is in the best interest of 
firms to consume, but not necessarily share, cyber intelligence to improve their 
security position. This potentially redirects attackers to other firms and therefore 
reduces the other firm’s contest success (Hausken, 2007). With little market incentive 
to move away from such practices, governments are starting to encourage 
organisations to do ‘the right thing’ by applying a Thaler and Sunstein (2003) 
libertarian paternalism approach as evidenced in the US Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2015 (The White House, 2015). 
The question of the working approaches and strategies for information security 
investments remains, however. In their empirical study, Rowe and Gallaher (2006) 
introduce a conceptual approach to consider the trade-offs between various 
investment and implementation strategies. Their conclusion provides a 
macroeconomic view stating that policymakers and organisations would benefit from 
a robust analysis of the differences between the social and private costs of cyber 
security. Although not an empirical study, the model proposed by Bojanc and Jerman-
Blažič (2012) provides an interesting approach for the evaluation of investments in 
security based on the quantitative analysis of security risks. The authors evaluate the 
profitability of security measures based on ROI, NPV and IRR and use the output to 
compare individual measures with each other. Based on an empirical study of S&P 
500 firms, Gordon and Loeb (2006) conclude that there seems to be a movement 
towards using more economic analysis to evaluate information security activities. 
Although a particular interest in NPV can be seen, they also note that the budgeted 
expenditure level on information security is largely driven by such items as the past 
year’s budget, best practices in the industry and a must-do approach. Wei, Tanaka, 
and Matsuura (2007) conduct an empirical analysis of information security 
investments by surveying the vulnerability of Japanese enterprises to computer 
viruses. By taking the number of security measures as a proxy variable of security 
investment, they confirm that the effects of information security investment help 
reduce vulnerability. 
An alternative approach would be to consider risk transfer options, such as those 
provided by cyber insurance. Miaoui, Boudriga, and Abaoub (2015) propose an 
approach to distribute investments between controls to protect against security 
attacks, insurance to transfer the residual risk of loss and forensic readiness to 
maximise capability to collect digital evidence. The authors consider the 
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interdependence of the investment strategies of their model when computing the 
optimal total investment. Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti, and Sadhukhan 
(2013) propose a way in which to help firms decide on the utility of cyber insurance 
products and to what extent they can use them. The authors discuss using copula-
based Bayesian belief networks to assess and quantify cyber risk as decision support 
for using cyber insurance products as a risk management tool. This is related to the 
previous work by H. S. B. Herath and Herath (2011), who describe a copula-based 
simulation for determining the annual net premiums of cyber insurance policies by 
adopting an empirical approach using Archimedean copulas. 
2.5 Study limitations and threats to validity 
This study suffers from the limitations inherent to SLRs as described by Kitchenham 
and Charters (2007). This includes limitations on search comprehensiveness and 
material selection. Owing to the volume of papers returned and analysed, the study 
might have missed a relevant paper (because of an error or oversight) at any stage of 
the search process. However, given the way in which the research questions were 
designed, and as the analysis was based on a set of papers, the impact of any potential 
omissions on the study’s findings and conclusions should be limited. 
While the search terms were carefully crafted, search term definition is a potential 
limitation as relevant papers might have been missed. This is particularly true for 
papers not published in English. To mitigate this shortcoming, forward and backward 
reference checking was conducted on the key publications to identify any potentially 
missed studies. As is customary with SLRs, for papers to be considered to be primary 
studies, they have to be published in a peer-reviewed outlet. This placed further 
restrictions on the selection process, as material published, for example, as white 
papers (which is common in industry) could not be selected. 
2.6 Chapter summary 
This SLR aimed to examine economic information security decision making 
processes. Following standard SLR processes, we identified 25 highly relevant papers 
describing approaches supporting decision processes for information security 
investments taking economic factors into consideration. We aligned the reported 
approaches into nine categories and identified research in UM, game theory and ROT 
to be areas in which novel ideas are prevalent. We extracted the key elements for each 
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primary study as mentioned by the authors and collated the individual elements into 
categories. Based on these element categories, we analysed which elements authors 
consider to be the most relevant for their approaches, finding that both ROI and NPV 
show strong reliance on ‘Benefit’ and ‘Cost’ elements, whereas game theory has high 
reliance on ‘Function’ elements because of its focused game strategies. We further 
noted that DSS studies are driven by measurable elements, namely ‘Cost’ and 
‘Impact’. Many of these primary studies discuss the challenges pertaining to their 
approaches, which we also extracted and summarised; ‘Accurate estimates’ and 
‘Complexity to apply’ the approach were key challenges across most studies. Looking 
at the sources of research, a considerable number of our primary studies are accredited 
to researchers affiliated with US-based institutions. By contrast, representation of the 
APAC region is limited but this could be due to the language restrictions applied (IC2) 
for this SLR. Lastly, we analysed the publication timeline for the selected primary 
studies and found no clear trend towards one particular information security 
investment valuation approach. We did observe a decline in ROI and ROT 
publications, whereas UM publications are notably present across the timeline. This 
finding is supported by our analysis of citation counts: studies of UM and GT are 
visibly more influential than other approaches. 
Taking the findings of this SLR into consideration, a reasonable assumption can be 
made, namely that challenges originating from uncertainty about the estimates of key 
variables is a problem that requires a prior solution. The increase in research into 
impact of information sharing seems to support this. With this in mind, we extended 
our research into one of the most challenging areas of information security 
uncertainty, namely developments in the global threat landscape (see chapter 6). 
In the next chapter, we assess another area of security that regularly attracts the 
attention of researchers, practitioners and the media alike: the impact on organisations 
if a compromise of information processing systems or data occurs. In particular, we 
analyse the impact of data breach events on stock prices and extend the research into 
the impact of repeated data breach events. 
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3 ANALYSIS OF CYBER SECURITY 
DEFINITIONS 
Cyber Security has emerged in recent years as a widely used term, with increased 
adoption by practitioners and politicians alike. However, as with many fashionable 
jargon, there seems to be very little understanding of what the term really entails. 
Although this is not an issue when the term is used in an informal context, it can 
potentially cause serious problems when used as part of a new organizational strategy 
or business objective. In this chapter, we study the existing literature to identify the 
main definitions provided for the term cyber security by authoritative sources. We 
then conduct various lexical and semantic analysis techniques to better understand the 
scope and context of these definitions, along with their relevance. Based on the 
analysis conducted, we propose a new improved definition that we prove is most 
representative of the term. Lastly, we draw comparison to work by von Solms and 
van Niekerk (2013) who investigated the meaning of information security and 
highlight key differences between the topical areas.  
During our research discussions, we quickly realised the ambiguity of the 
fundamental term and context when practitioners talk about the value aspects of 
information security. We found that some practitioners use the term ‘cyber security’ 
instead of ‘information security’, some use the terms in an analogous manner and 
others see a distinct difference in what these terms represent. Given the considerable 
overlap, we investigated the definition of cyber security to avoid ambiguity being 
carried forward into our later work. The terminology used to discuss the security 
aspects of digital devices and information has changed considerably in recent years. 
At the beginning of the century, terms such as computer security, IT security and 
information security were regularly used in this context. While these terms have 
nuanced differences understood by professionals working in this space, they were 
tangible enough to be meaningful to the wider populace. General conversations could 
take place and plans could be made based on a common understanding of what these 
terms imply. However, towards the end of the first decade, the popularity of the use 
of the term cyber security gained considerably when U.S. President Barack Obama 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ?????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ? ??????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
?????????
?
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???? ????????? ????????? ?????????? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ?????????? ????
????????????????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???????????? ?????? ????? ???? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
“What may seem like small steps in logic, after the fact, can be a long, time-
consuming process of trial and error groping, while creating and refining 
concepts and definitions to express ideas in clear and unmistakable terms which 
allow substantive issues to be debated in terms that opposing parties can agree 
on, so that they can at least disagree on substance, rather than be frustrated by 
semantics”. 
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However, the separated version (i.e. ‘cyber security’) shows higher absolute numbers, 
and this is the spelling used throughout the remainder of the thesis unless referring to 
primary source material. 
Recognising the lack of a consistent meaning of the term cyber security as a 
considerable issue (Baylon, 2014; Congressional Research Service, 2014; Creasey, 
2013; Internet Society, 2012), we first review the professional, academic and 
governmental literature to identify the most prevalent definitions used, assess the key 
components of these definitions and review any contentious points that exist between 
the proposed definitions. In the second and third steps, we identify the best match 
definition and contribute an improved one. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we examine 
existing research in this field and discuss the challenges of current definitions. Section 
3.2 describes the approach followed for our SLR of the topic. We continue to analyse 
the definition set from a semantic perspective in sections 3.3 and 3.4 with a proposal 
for an improved definition in section 3.5. In sections 3.6 and 3.7, we review the 
limitations of our approach and provide concluding thoughts. 
3.1 Related work 
The lack of a uniformly accepted definition of cyber security has been recognised 
across professional (Barzilay, 2013; Stubley, 2013; Walls, Perkins, & Weiss, 2013), 
governmental (Falessi, Gavrila, Klejnstrup Ritter, & Moulinos, 2012; Government of 
Montenegro, 2013; Wamala, 2011) and academic (Baylon, 2014; Giles & Hagestad, 
2013) work. Walls et al. (2013) approach the topic from the perspective of a 
professional services provider (Gartner Inc.) and thus focus on providing guidance 
for strategic decision makers. They highlight the key challenge of the ambiguity 
introduced by the thoughtless use of the term cyber security where nuanced 
definitions such as information security and IT security are more appropriate and 
descriptive. They suggest that the term cyber security only be used in the context of 
security practices related to the combination of offensive and defensive actions 
involving or relying upon information technology and/or operational technology 
environments and systems. The authors state that this marks a superset of security 
practices such as information security, IT security and other related practices. 
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Stubley (2013) takes a different view by simplifying cyber security to information 
security based on a short analysis of the ‘cyber’ component, which he defines as the 
use of IT and computers. On the contrary, Barzilay (2013) argues that cyber security 
must be defined through cyber risk, concluding that cyber security is a sub-discipline 
of information security. In official guidance, ISACA (2014) takes yet another 
position, stating that cyber security is emerging within the fields of information 
security and traditional security. Enterprises should thus distinguish between standard 
(lower-level) information security and cyber security; the difference is in the scope, 
motive, opportunity and method of the attack. 
In their analysis of the national cyber security strategies of European Union (EU) 
member states, Falessi et al. (2012) explain that there is no universally accepted or 
straightforward definition of cyber security. They find that some people regard cyber 
security as overlapping with information security, but no definitive conclusion is 
provided. This view is shared by Wamala (2011), who claims that cyber security is a 
branch of information security. This paper highlights the risk of using uncertain 
terminology and aims to clarify the relative positions of cyber security and 
information security. It links cyber security with the global characteristic of the 
Internet, as such distinguishing it from information security that, according to the 
author, rarely traverses jurisdictions. Wamala goes further in this definition claiming 
that cyber security focuses more on integrity and availability, whereas information 
security is mainly concerned with confidentiality. He concludes that cyber security is 
information security with jurisdictional uncertainty and attribution issues. 
The Government of Montenegro (2013) agrees that clear definitions in this area are 
lacking and dedicates a full section in its cyber security strategy to this topic. While 
it presents definitions that comply with the basic meanings as understood in EU 
countries, it unfortunately does not actually provide a conclusion on the term cyber 
security, but rather cites various definitions from other sources. 
Baylon (2014) discusses the topic from a multinational cooperation perspective, 
highlighting that the lack of consensus on the definition of key terminology in the 
cyber and space security domains poses a major challenge to international treaties and 
arms control agreements. In particular, the different interpretations of cyber security 
between western countries and both Russia and China cause complications in this 
context. Baylon states that the term cyber security as such does not exist in Russian 
legislation or official doctrines. Instead, the concept of information security is 
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prevalent. However, in this context, information represents a meaning extending 
outside the digital space that widens conversations into the information space in 
general. The author categorises this into the Eastern approach, looking at cyber 
security emphasising ‘social cohesion’, and the Western approach, perceiving cyber 
security through a ‘national security prism’. Godwin III, Kulpin, Rauscher, and 
Yaschenko (2014) concur with this challenge and provide binationally (United 
States/Russia) agreed terminology for key phrases pertaining to cyber space. Among 
these, the term cyber security is defined as having a considerably different 
interpretation to those found in the official cyber security strategies of most western 
countries. Giles and Hagestad (2013) extend this by contrasting the key terms and 
principles in this space as understood in the United States, China and Russia. They 
find a notably different understanding and approach among these countries and 
conclude that in the absence of a mutually agreed terminology, any potential for 
finding shared views on the nature and governance of cyber space remains distant. 
Academic research has also noted the obvious challenges in this developing problem 
space. Luiijf, Besseling, and de Graaf (2013) study the cyber security strategies of 19 
countries and discuss their differences in terminology in some detail. They find that 
only eight nations define the term cyber security in their national cyber security 
strategies, whereas six nations do not provide any such definition. The authors note 
that of the 10 cyber security strategies that have the term cyber security defined by 
implication, description or definition, the understanding of what it means varies 
greatly. This view is shared by Craigen, Diakun-Thibault, and Purse (2014), who find 
that the term is used broadly and that its definitions are highly variable, context-
bound, often subjective and, at times, uninformative. Based on a shortlist of nine 
definitions and feedback from a multidisciplinary group, the authors work towards a 
unified definition by identifying the five dominant themes of cyber security. 
3.2 Systematic Review Approach 
To better understand the variety of relevant definitions of cyber security in use, we 
followed the semi-SLR approach described below (Mäntylä, Adams, Khomh, 
Engström, & Petersen, 2014). Following the collection of definitions, we applied text 
analysis methods on the resulting dataset - focusing on semantic similarity analysis - 
to identify harmonising definitions. This approach resulted in a ranking of definition 
similarity across the dataset; in other words, we established which definitions from 
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the whole dataset most accurately represent the definition of cyber security. Based on 
the further analysis of the highest scoring definitions, we then created a new definition 
comprising the key terms identified. This new definition was then compared with the 
original dataset to verify its best match status across the dataset. 
3.2.1 Chapter Research question 
We started by defining our research questions at a high level. 
 
RQ1 What definitions of cyber security are used by authoritative sources? 
The intention is to understand how cyber security is currently defined by 
sources of authority (academic, professional, government) 
RQ2 Are there differences in the definitions? 
The intention is to understand whether the definitions are similar or 
considerably different 
RQ3 Is there a best match definition of cyber security? 
The assumption is that various definitions have been proposed; hence, we are 
trying to identify the best match definition across the dataset 
RQ4 Are we able to contribute a new best match definition of cyber security? 
This is based on a text analysis approach 
Table 13 - Research questions 
To answer our research questions, we first needed to identify the relevant definitions. 
For this, we applied a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria to our literature search as 
follows.  
Inclusion criteria: 
• IC1: Sources with a clear intention of providing an explicit definition of cyber 
security 
• IC2: Sources available in English or with a translation readily available 
Exclusion criteria: 
• EC1: Sources that provide no clear or only implicit definitions of cyber security 
• EC2: Sources that lack the rigour (peer review) or authority (governmental or 
professional bodies) to define cyber security 
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These criteria, particularly EC2, were applied throughout the search process (Cornell 
University, 2016). In the first instance, Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science database 
was used to identify the relevant academic sources. The search scope covered a 
timespan of ‘All years’ with a search construct of TOPIC: ((‘cyber security’ OR 
Cybersecurity) NEAR definition). This produced merely 13 hits of which only one 
source met our criteria. Modifying the search query to include variations of the term 
‘definition’ (meaning, interpretation) did not produce any additional relevant results. 
Our search efforts in other databases such as Science Direct (25 results) were met 
with similar challenges. 
To capture a wider range of sources, we thus extended our search efforts to the general 
purpose search engine Google.com, limiting the search parameters as follows ([ 
cybersecurity AROUND(3) definition ] OR [ "cyber security" AROUND(3) 
definition ]). A manual review of the top search results returned by Google was then 
conducted to capture the most relevant sources. Based on the sources identified, 
further backward and forward reference crawling was conducted (using Google 
Scholar) to capture additional material relevant to our research question. In addition, 
source lists provided by ENISA1 and NATO2 were reviewed manually. Our literature 
review finally identified 28 sources that met our inclusion and exclusion criteria, as 
shown in Table 14 in no particular order. 
 
# Source Title 
1 Committee on National 
Security Systems 
National Information Assurance (IA) 
Glossary 
2 National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Careers 
and Studies 
Explore Terms: A Glossary of 
Common Cybersecurity Terminology 
3 International 
Telecommunication 
SERIES X: Data networks, open 
system communications and security 
                                                 
 
1  https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-
ncsss. 
2 https://ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.html. 
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Union 
4 Gartner Definition: Cybersecurity 
5 The Institution of 
Engineering and 
Technology 
Resilience and Cyber Security of 
Technology in the Built Environment 
6 British Standards 
Institute 
Guidelines for cybersecurity 
7 Australian 
Government 
Cyber Security Strategy 
8 Federal Chancellery of 
the Republic of Austria 
Austrian Cyber Security Strategy 
9 Government of 
Belgium 
Cyber Security Strategy 
1
0 
Government of Finland Finland's Cyber Security Strategy 
1
1 
French Network and 
Information Security 
Agency 
Information systems defence and 
security France’s strategy 
1
2 
Federal Ministry of the 
Interior 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany 
1
3 
Government of 
Hungary 
National Cyber Security Strategy of 
Hungary 
1
4 
The Netherlands, 
Ministry of Security 
and Justice 
The National Cyber Security Strategy 
(NCSS) 2 
1
5 
New Zealand 
Government 
New Zealand’s Cyber Security 
Strategy 
1
6 
Norwegian Ministries Cyber Security Strategy for Norway 
1
7 
Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
Developing National Information 
Security Strategy for the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 
1
8 
Republic of South 
Africa 
Cybersecurity Policy of South Africa 
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1
9 
Republic of Turkey National Cyber Security Strategy and 
2013-2014 Action Plan 
2
0 
National Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology 
Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
2
1 
Spanish Cyber 
Security Institute 
National Cyber Security, a 
commitment for everybody 
2
2 
Republic of Poland Cyberspace protection policy of the 
Republic of Poland 
2
3 
Government of 
Jamaica 
National Cyber Security Strategy 
2
4 
Craigen, Dan 
Diakun-Thibault, 
Nadia 
Purse, Randy 
Defining Cybersecurity 
2
5 
Merriam-Webster Definition of Cybersecurity 
2
6 
Oxford Dictionary Definition of Cybersecurity 
2
7 
Amoroso, Edward Cyber Security 
2
8 
EastWest Institute Critical Terminology Foundations 2 
Table 14 - Definition of the sources 
Of the 28 identified sources, one definition was considered to be from academia, five 
were contributed by industry and 22 definitions were from governments or 
government-aligned bodies. As expected, there is considerable overlap in their 
definitions used, with some including parts of definitions stated by another source 
(e.g. #3 and #18). The definition text was extracted from the source material in the 
context in which it was written. Details of the identified definitions are provided in 
the Appendices. 
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3.3 Basic definition analysis 
To better understand the dataset, an initial exploratory text analysis (Hearst, 1999) 
was conducted to discover information inherent to the definitions. We started by 
applying basic information extraction procedures (Weiss, Indurkhya, Zhang, & 
Damerau, 2004) utilising the text mining framework tm_map (Meyer, Hornik, & 
Feinerer, 2008) in the software environment for statistical computing “R”. Before the 
definition data were loaded into “R”, minimal manual normalisation was applied to 
standardise the character encoding and remove unnecessary line breaks. The 
definition corpus was then prepared with the common preprocessing functions 
provided by tm_map to convert content into lower case, strip whitespaces and remove 
punctuation and stop words (English). In addition, stemming was applied (Porter, 
1997) to reduce the number of distinct word types in the text corpus and increase the 
frequency of the occurrence of some individual types (Weiss et al., 2004). 
With the corpus prepared, we then created a simple document-term matrix (Salton, 
1963) that allowed us to gain basic insights into how our sources define cyber 
security. As illustrated in Figure 12, the root form of security, cyber security, cyber 
and cyber space is prevalent in the corpus as expected. However, we also gleaned an 
indication of related words fundamental to the definition pool. 
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Following the maxim that “a person without data is just another person with an 
opinion” 3 , we designed an approach that would allow us to identify the most 
representative definition within our pool. The assumption is that our dataset includes 
most of the authoritative definitions of cyber security and as such covers all the 
relevant aspects of the concept proposed by the sources (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). This 
means we can identify the definition encompassing the majority of the relevant 
components through lexical and semantic similarity analysis to ascertain the 
definition most alike to every other definition in the dataset. We used the range of 
advanced similarity measures described in the next section to achieve this. 
3.4 Definition similarity analysis 
Semantic similarity is a well-established area of research with a range of practical 
applications (Androutsopoulos & Malakasiotis, 2010; Couto, Silva, & Coutinho, 
2007; Graesser, Olney, Haynes, & Chipman, 2005; Yuhua, Bandar, & McLean, 
2003). For the purpose of this research, we investigated work on short text -and 
sentence-based similarity measures. We initially planned to use the best method for 
sentence-based similarity measures, as proposed by subject matter experts on this 
topic, but found that this is a developing area with various methods proposed. Hence, 
instead of choosing one method to calculate similarity, we used a variety of methods 
to balance their advantages and disadvantages. The result is the average similarity 
score described in this section. We found the SEMILAR toolkit (Rus, Lintean, 
Banjade, Niraula, & Stefanescu, 2013) to be ideal for this, as it vastly simplified the 
task of calculating similarity by using multiple algorithms and options. The authors 
describe the toolkit as “a one-stop-shop for investigating, annotating, and authoring 
methods for the semantic similarity of texts of any level of granularity”. We used the 
toolkit to conduct both the preprocessing phase and the similarity computing phase 
for our dataset. 
As with our basic analysis, we conducted common preprocessing tasks on our dataset 
but with some notable differences. The first step was the tokenisation of the text to 
obtain the ordered set of lexical tokens. Based on our configuration, SEMILAR 
                                                 
 
3 Attributed to Edward Deming. 
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Telecommunicati
on Union 
system communications and security 
1
5 
New Zealand 
Government 
New Zealand’s Cyber Security 
Strategy 
0.405 
Table 15 - Top five most representative definitions 
According to our semantic similarity approach, the most representative definition in 
our dataset of authoritative definitions is the following part of the South African cyber 
security strategy: “Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, 
security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best 
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organisation and assets”. 
Although definition #18 is part of a more exhaustive definition proposed by the 
International Telecommunication Union (2008), it comes out top because of its 
relative conciseness. On the flip side, brevity is not crucial to a representative 
definition (in the context of the pool of our authoritative definitions) as illustrated by 
definitions #16, #17 and #28. These are concise but lack sufficient descriptive depth 
to capture the meaning of cyber security, both objectively, as shown in the 
comparison, and subjectively (although this leaves plenty of room for argument). It 
is important to point out that we did not identify this to be the most relevant definition 
through expert opinion but rather through unbiased similarity analysis based on an 
authoritative set of definitions. This is important to distinguish as this approach rules 
out any bias introduced by subject matter expert view and opinions. The described 
analysis is not affected by potential agendas of individuals or recency bias, instead it 
presents an impartial view on the most relevant components of previously agreed 
authoritative definitions. It represents the unbiased essence of the worlds subject 
matter experts work on what defines cyber security. Definition #18 thus best captures 
the essence of all the authoritative definitions in the dataset. 
3.5 Towards an improved definition 
After identifying the most representative definitions of cyber security, the next step 
was to construct an improved definition to be measured under the same conditions to 
compare similarity scores. By using KH Coder (Higuchi, 2015), a computer-assisted 
qualitative analysis tool for content analysis and text mining, we investigated the 
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previously mentioned top five definitions (#18, #11, #21, #3, #15) under the 
assumption that they contain the most relevant attributes. To establish the key 
underlying concepts needed to create an improved definition, we used co-occurrence 
network analysis (Rice & Danowski, 1993). In textual analysis, co-occurrence 
networks show words with similar appearance patterns and thus high degrees of co-
occurrence. The approach is based on the idea that a word’s meaning is related to the 
concepts to which it is connected. It also has the benefit that no coder bias is 
introduced other than to determine which words are examined (Ryan & Bernard, 
2003). However, applying the function on our definition set produced a crowded 
output difficult to navigate even though it was already limited to five paragraphs and 
a minimum spanning tree had been applied. By filtering for term frequency (TF ≥ 2) 
when producing the co-occurrence network graph, we reduced the information 
presented to a (human) manageable level while preserving the important context. 
Figure 18 shows the minimum spanning tree network graph model with 32 nodes and 
25 edges extracted. The graph highlights the underlying concepts inherent to the 
words used in the definition set. In addition to the minimum spanning tree, we added 
community detection to further emphasise the connected components. The node size 
illustrates the term frequency and detected communities are highlighted in different 
colours. Based on the dataset, we found that the ‘random walk’ or ‘walktrap’ 
algorithm (Pons & Latapy, 2005) provided the subjectively best community detection 
approach. Combined with the minimum spanning tree, this explains not only the key 
concepts but also how words are grouped into communities and which communities 
are closer to each other (signified by the dotted lines). 
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Security Agency 
2
1 
Spanish Cyber 
Security Institute 
National Cyber Security, a 
commitment for everybody 
0.416 
3 International 
Telecommunicati
on Union 
SERIES X: Data networks, open 
system communications and security 
0.412 
1
5 
New Zealand 
Government 
New Zealand’s Cyber Security 
Strategy 
0.409 
Table 16 - Top results for an improved definition 
3.6 Study limitations and challenges to validity 
In the previous section, we proposed a new definition for cyber security which tops 
the ranking of most relevant definitions among authoritative sources. However, as 
with many similar research exercises, there is no claim to completeness or infallibility 
of our work. Our study is affected by the limitations inherent to literature reviews 
described by Kitchenham and Charters (2007), such as those related to search 
comprehensiveness and material selection. To mitigate these shortcomings, forward 
and backward reference checking was conducted on the key publications to discover 
potentially relevant sources. Nonetheless, our efforts may have missed sources that 
we would have otherwise considered to be authoritative and relevant (although the 
number of definitions covered in this study should ensure relevance). The inclusion 
criteria may also lead to limited results from potentially relevant work towards a more 
comprehensive understanding of the cyber security space in general, or definitions 
still under development at the time of the research (CyBOK, 2018; Rashid et al., 
2018). This is a limitation of the approach followed and should be addressed through 
a repeat study and extending the scope of such a study. Another inherent limitation to 
literature reviews is the language barrier, as this work only covered definitions 
provided in English.  
Although we achieved our objective of creating a representative definition of cyber 
security, our approach was limited by manual sentence generation constraints. An 
automated approach, iterating all possible combinations of our nodes and 
communities leveraging natural language generation (Sauper & Barzilay, 2009), may 
have produced another, perhaps more relevant definition. This was beyond the scope 
of this thesis but will be considered for future work. 
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Lastly, considering the pace at which social communities create, adopt and modify 
their understanding of developing areas such as ‘cyber’ and ‘cyber space’, our 
definition is representative at the time of the research. It is expected that this definition 
will become less fitting or relevant as social, political and technological developments 
in this space progress. Nonetheless, our proposed model for evaluating definitions 
will prove useful and remain relevant in the future. 
3.7 Chapter summary 
For this research, we set out to analyse the landscape of authoritative sources defining 
the term cyber security. As part of this work, we conducted a semi structured literature 
review to identify relevant sources. Through our efforts outlined in section 3.2, we 
found 28 authoritative sources fulfilling our inclusion criteria and these were included 
for further analysis in the context of our research questions. This not only provided 
the platform to answer our research questions but also contributed an exhaustive set 
of authoritative sources for further research in this field. These sources represent the 
collection of the most informed definitions of the term at the current point in time. 
They are based on subject matter expert contributions from government officials, 
professionals and academics. Extensive efforts have gone into the creation of many 
of these definitions as described by Craigen et al. (2014). As described previously, 
the intention of this research is to present a condensed view of the relevant aspects 
across the definition pool towards a most representative definition. This approach also 
means that components of potentially incorrect definitions are included in the 
improved definition presented in this research. However, due to the large pool of 
authoritative sources, and the strict selection of authoritative definition sources as 
outlined in section 3.2, such issues are minimised.  
We found the majority of the definition sources to be related to governmental 
institutions with several additional relevant sources from industry and academia 
(RQ1). Our review of the primary sources unveiled a clear lack of congruence as to 
the meaning and scope of the term. Even contradictory claims regarding scope were 
identified for several primary studies (RQ2). To better understand the differences in 
the definition set (RQ2) and identify the most relevant definition (RQ3), we applied 
basic (section 3.3) and advanced (section 3.4) semantic similarity analysis methods 
to the dataset. To our knowledge, this is the first endeavour to use this novel and non-
biased approach to identify the most representative definition in a set (for cyber 
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security). We showed that the South African definition achieved the highest similarity 
score and as such was the most representative definition of cyber security under the 
conditions of this work. To answer RQ4, we analysed the dataset further by using co-
occurrence, semantic networks and community detection methods. By isolating the 
key components and communities in the definition set, we produced an improved 
definition of cyber security (section 3.5). Our new definition was shown to be the 
most representative definition according to the methodology used. This clarity on key 
aspects of the cyber security definition allows practitioners and other parties relying 
on unambiguous meaning of terms to confidently discuss the problem space. While 
we recognise the potential for the further improvement of this approach (section 3.6), 
we believe that the methodology and improved definition are noteworthy 
contributions to the field. The approach is useful to practitioners and researchers alike 
as it provides a way to quickly come to an unbiased agreed definition of the term in 
questions. Specific for cyber security, this exercise can be repeated with relative ease, 
including additional definitions. The improved definition as presented by this 
research is useful for practitioners who require a clear definition of what cyber 
security means, either for business, government or legal reasons. Our definition 
consists of the most relevant components across 28 authoritative definitions and is as 
such highly representative. 
This brings us back to our original question of how information security and cyber 
security relate. Similarly to von Solms and van Niekerk (2013), we found confusion 
around the definitions of these terms. However, whereas those authors explore the 
definition of information security in depth, we focused our work on the definition of 
cyber security. In conclusion, both studies arrived at roughly the same point; 
information security and cyber security are related, but not analogous. Von Solms and 
van Niekerk see cyber security as a matter of interest to society at large, including 
critical national infrastructure. This description fits our proposed definition closely. 
It is also evident that the scope of cyber security resembles that of systemic or 
macroeconomic concerns. If we compare this with the assessment by von Solms and 
van Niekerk (2013) that “the aim of information security is to ensure business 
continuity and minimise business damage by limiting the impact of security 
incidents”, we note a much tighter focus on the organisational (microeconomic) level. 
This is an important distinction, as macroeconomic security aspects, including 
externalities and network effects, are not typically considered in a corporate security 
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investments context. Consequently, our research is geared towards the information 
security value aspects within the organisational context and is not simply transferable 
to a systemic cyber security context as defined in the previous sections. 
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4 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY BREACHES 
To understand the value that information security can add to organisations, in this 
chapter we examine the impact of publicly reported information security incidents on 
the share prices of organisations. We used an event studies based approach where a 
measure of the event’s economic impact can be constructed using security prices 
observed over a relatively short period of time. We use the source dataset available 
from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) to identify breached organisations in 
scope and retrieve their respective share prices from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Based on the results, we argue that although no strong conclusions could be made 
given the current data constraints, there was enough evidence to show that such 
correlation exists, especially for recurring security breaches. We envisage that as 
more breach event data become more widely available due to compliance and 
regulatory changes, this approach has the potential to emerge as an important tool for 
information security managers to help support investment decisions. 
4.1 Related work 
Organisations store an ever-increasing amount of information about their business 
partners, employees and customers and have a responsibility to protect this data. Thus, 
the protection of digital information has been and continues to be a growing concern 
across all areas of business. Related attacks are not only increasing in number and 
diversity, but also becoming more damaging and disruptive (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2012). Despite increasing efforts to implement security 
controls to prevent information security breaches, we continue to see news of 
organisations suffering from such incidents (Passeri, 2013). As described by Cutler, 
Poterba, and Summers (1989), asset prices are generally attributable to changes in the 
fundamental value of the asset and as such react to announcements about corporate 
control, regulatory policy and market conditions that plausibly affect fundamentals. 
Under the assumption of an efficient market (Fama, 1970), and the rejection of the 
random walk hypothesis (Lo & MacKinlay, 1988), we assume that new information 
Chapter 4: Economic impact of information security breaches 
86 
relevant to a traded equity becoming public knowledge has the potential to affect the 
market value of that equity (deBondt & Thaler, 1985; Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 
1969). This assumption has been the focus of various studies, as discussed below. 
In all stages of the data lifecycle, namely data collection, data use, data storage, data 
retention and data destruction, sufficient protection must be provided against 
unauthorised use (Grama, 2010). Yet, we continue to see instances where this duty of 
care appears to fail as data is disclosed to unauthorised parties. While data breach is 
a widely discussed topic, there is little guidance in the literature on its definition. In 
this study, we follow the International Standards Organisation (2014), which defines 
a data breach as a compromise of security that leads to the accidental or unlawful 
destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of or access to protected data 
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed. In their cost of data breach study, the 
Ponemon Institute (2014) finds that those breaches caused by malicious or criminal 
attacks incur a significantly high monetary cost. Consequently, in our research, we 
focus on information security breaches caused by malicious or criminal attacks. As it 
is notoriously difficult to obtain information on direct and indirect value loss resulting 
from an information security breach, a study of the market reaction to such an incident 
is the best proxy for the economic consequences. A common approach is the use of 
event studies, where a measure of the event’s economic impact can be constructed by 
using the security prices observed over a relatively short period (MacKinlay, 1997). 
At the core of an event study is the measurement of an abnormal stock return during 
the observation window. The observation window typically includes the period 
leading up to the observed event, the event itself and the post-event period. The 
application of event studies in this form is well documented in academic research on 
corporate events such as earnings announcements, stock splits (Fama et al., 1969) and 
mergers and acquisitions (Duso, Gugler, & Yurtoglu, 2010). 
Previous studies have adopted an event study methodology to investigate the effect 
of information security incidents on market value, including the works by Kannan, 
Rees, and Sridhar (2007), Yayla and Hu (2011), H. Cavusoglu, B. Mishra, and S. 
Raghunathan (2004), Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Lei (2003), Gatzlaff and 
McCullough (2010) and Garg, Curtis, and Halper (2003). On the contrary, T. Wang, 
Rees, and Kannan (2007) apply an event study methodology to financial reporting 
data rather than public breach announcements. Telang and Wattal (2007) apply the 
methodology to a precursory event (i.e. the announcement of software vulnerabilities) 
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to observe the effect on stakeholders in this context. Andoh-Baidoo, Amoako-
Gyampah, and Osei-Bryson (2010) extend previous event study results with decision 
tree induction to further examine the relationship between the independent variables. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section revisits the 
research methodology used. Sections 4.3 to 4.6 present the chapter research questions 
as well as the dataset used for the validation. In section 4.7, the experiment is 
described. The results are then discussed in section 4.8. The study limitations and 
potential threats to validity are covered in section 4.9. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
in section 4.9. 
4.2 Event study methodology 
Measuring, or even estimating, the true impact of information security breach events 
on the economic well-being of organisations is challenging. Industry reports such as 
the Ponemon study (Ponemon Institute, 2014) aim to approximate the value loss by 
considering various factors such as the expenditure on detection, escalation, 
notification, after-the-fact (ex-post) response, analysis of the economic impact of lost 
or diminished customer trust and confidence measured by customer turnover or churn. 
They also acknowledge the limitations of this approach. A possible alternative 
developed in the field of economics is the event study methodology. An event study 
is a statistical approach relying on the assumption of efficient markets to identify the 
abnormal returns resulting from an event. MacKinlay (1997) explains that the 
usefulness of such a study stems from the fact that the effects of an event will be 
reflected immediately in security prices given rationality in the market. Although this 
relies on the assumption of an efficient or rational market, which is not without its 
problems (Malkiel, 2003), the results produced are perceived to be a fair ‘cause–
effect’ approximation. 
At the core of an event study is an asset measurable over time (e.g. equity value) and 
an event suspected to affect the value of that asset. Practical issues such as data 
availability for a chosen asset should be considered early on. Obtaining the necessary 
dataset to complete the study may be difficult (where data are not publicly accessible) 
or infeasible because of cost and resource constraints. To conduct such a study, the 
time of the event must be defined and a time window constructed around it. This 
window includes the period leading up to the event (estimation window), a narrow 
event window and a post-event window to measure the impact. The selection of the 
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event window needs to strike a balance between being too narrow, potentially missing 
leading or trailing reaction, and too broad, risking misleading results through 
confounding events and other long-term event study issues (Kothari & Warner, 2004). 
With these basic requirements in place, normal asset returns can be calculated 
throughout the estimation window as well as potential abnormal returns in the event 
window by using two common approaches: the constant mean return model and the 
market model. A detailed description of the intricacies and varieties of these models 
is outside the scope of this thesis. Further details can be found in Brown and Warner 
(1985) and Kothari and Warner (2004). 
4.3 Chapter research questions and approach 
Although the event study methodology has been applied to study the economic impact 
of information security events, research remains limited compared with other areas, 
particularly considering the increasing interest in and prevalence of publicly reported 
information security breaches. This study therefore aims to extend existing research 
by investigating the stock price reaction of organisations that have been affected by 
more than one information security event. The study seeks to answer two main 
research questions: 
• RQ1: Do publicly reported information security breaches impact the stock prices 
of the affected organisations? 
• RQ2: Is there a difference in stock price impact, compared with a previous breach 
in that organisation, if organisations experience a subsequent information security 
breach event? 
These questions are formulated as the following two hypotheses: 
• H1 – Publicly reported information security breaches do not lead to abnormal 
returns for the stock price of the affected organisation. 
• H2 – There is no difference in the stock price reaction between the first measured 
breach event and a subsequent breach event for an organisation. 
Through RQ2, we examine the reaction of market participants if the same 
organisation is breached repeatedly. We try to clarify whether investors penalise 
organisations in such cases (i.e. those that fail to provide tangible improvements in 
information security), show indifferent behaviour or even react positively. To answer 
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4.4 Event data sample selection 
In this analysis, the requirements for the underlying event dataset are rather high, as 
the simple selection of organisations that suffered a security breach is insufficient to 
answer H2. The datasets available from the Open Security Foundation’s DatalossDB4 
and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC)5 were considered. While the data available 
from DatalossDB are likely to be the most exhaustive repository available, their use 
for academic research is ambiguous because of copyright issues (Widup, 2012). On 
the contrary, the PRC data pose no such issue but are not as exhaustive and almost 
exclusively focus on US-based entities. However, this limitation was not an issue for 
our work and, accordingly, the PRC dataset was chosen for our experiment. 
The PRC database provides information on data breaches reported since 2005 
categorised as Business, Educational, Government and Military, Healthcare and Non-
profit Organisations. Breach information is then categorised as Unintended 
disclosure, Hacking or malware, Payment card fraud, Physical loss, Portable device, 
Stationary devices and Unknown or other. For this study, the full dataset for the 
Business category (i.e. excluding EDU, GOV, MED and NGO) was retrieved. The 
dataset was reviewed for repeat breaches and filtered for events classified as ‘HACK’, 
‘DISC’ or ‘UNKN’. The other categories (‘CARD’, ‘STAT’ and ‘PHYS’) were not 
considered because this study focuses on information security breach events. The 
remaining 180 events were screened based on the following criteria: 
• Public company listed on a stock exchange 
• Price data available6 
• Not acquired, merged or ceased trading 
• No overlapping event windows for repeated breaches or duplicate events 
• No notable confounding events close to the event window7 
                                                 
 
4 http://datalossdb.org/. 
5 http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach. 
6 Data source – Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
7 Data source – Recorded Future (https://www.recordedfuture.com/). 
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After applying the selection criteria, 25 organisations were filtered, each with two 
breach events. These breach events do not necessarily represent the first breach events 
for an organisation, or even the second or latest because of the limitations of the data 
available in the PRC database. The data sample for this study thus consists of a breach 
event that happened at an earlier stage and another that happened at a later stage in 
the trading history of an organisation (Table 17). 
Selection steps 
No. of 
records 
Total events retrieved from the PRC data 1490 
Events for organisations affected twice or 
more 409 
Events categorised as DISC, HACK or 
UNKN 180 
Events meeting the suitability criteria 50 
Table 17 - PRC dataset 
4.5 Price data selection 
To calculate the potential abnormal returns, the stock price time series for each 
organisation in the event pool was required. Various sources for such information are 
available ranging from free services such as Google Finance and Yahoo! Finance to 
commercial providers such as Bloomberg, the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
and Thomson Reuters. Many previous studies prefer the data provided by the Center 
for Research in Securities Prices, whereas this study used Thomson Reuters 
DataStream, which has comparable quality (Ince & Porter, 2006). To retrieve the 
relevant time series data, we needed the correct identifier for the equities examined 
as well as an appropriate time window. The time window for the price data was 
defined as 121 days before the event date to 30 days after based on previous studies 
examining short horizon event effects utilising a similar estimation window 
(Dyckman, Philbrick, & Stephan, 1984; Patell, 1976). This approach maximises the 
estimation time window, while avoiding overlap with an information security breach 
event affecting the same asset earlier in time. The setup of this study prevented an 
extension of the pre-event time window without introducing overlapping estimation 
windows between events. To analyse the events following the market model time 
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series, data from Standards & Poor’s 500 Composite were retrieved. The S&P 500 
was selected as this is listed as the local market index for the majority of the examined 
assets. 
4.6 Data preparation and analysis method 
Before conducting the analysis, sense checks and some formatting had to be 
conducted for the collected data. Two data issues were investigated: (i) when events 
fell on non-trading days and (ii) gaps (missing information) in the pricing data. Once 
checks were completed, the raw data were formatted as comma-separated values 
(CSV) following a predefined layout. To analyse the data, a standard market model 
methodology was chosen following Dyckman et al. (1984), who show that the market 
model offers more powerful tests than the mean-adjusted returns model and market-
adjusted returns model for detecting abnormal performance. The market model is 
defined in equation (1): 
Ri,τ = αi + βi RM,τ + εi,τ with E[εi,τ] = 0 and VAR[εi,τ] = σεi
2   (1) 
where R i,τ and RM,τ are the period returns for the asset and market, respectively. The 
alpha (αi), beta (βi), variance (σεi2 ) and prediction error (εi,τ) values follow MacKinlay 
(1997). 
For this study, ordinary least squares (OLS) was chosen as the estimation procedure 
over the procedure proposed by Scholes and Williams (1977). This is based on results 
from Dyckman et al. (1984) that showed that the Scholes–Williams method of 
estimating risk does not enhance the ability to detect abnormal performance when 
using daily data. Brown and Warner (1985) further comment that bias in beta events 
does not necessarily imply misspecification. All the calculations were carried out by 
using a simple return mode (versus continuously compounded - log return mode). The 
time windows of relevance were set as -121 to -3 days (estimation window) as 
explained in section 4.4 and -2 to 2 days (event window). We recognise that Dyckman 
et al. (1984) establish that the extension of the event window has a disproportionally 
negative effect on a model’s ability to identify impact. However, an event window of 
5 days (-2,-1,0,1,2) was chosen to account for any uncertainty around the event date. 
Uncertainty could emerge from many factors including the fact that security breach 
event dates are difficult to pinpoint because of factors such as news dispersion and 
the speed of adjustment to the information revealed. This type of information typically 
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follows a dispersion process starting with limited coverage (e.g. information security-
specific press) followed by wider coverage in technology outlets before it breaks to 
major news media outlets. 
4.7 Experiment 
As outlined in the previous section, the dataset covers 25 organisations with two 
security breach events each. The overall set of 50 events was separated into two 
groups, where Group 1 contained the earlier event of each pair and Group 2 the later 
event (Table 18, Table 19). 
Symbol Organisation Event date Group 
@AAPL Apple 9/4/2012 1 
@CMCSA Comcast 3/16/2009 1 
@DRIV Digital River Inc. 6/4/2010 1 
@FOXA Fox Entertainment Group 7/23/2007 1 
@GOOG Google 4/27/2007 1 
@HKFI Hancock Fabrics 11/23/2009 1 
@SRCE 1st Source Bank 6/10/2008 1 
EXPN Experian 3/29/2007 1 
H:ING ING 2/12/2010 1 
REL LexisNexis 7/13/2009 1 
U:C Citigroup 9/21/2007 1 
U:CFR Frost Bank 5/19/2006 1 
U:CVS CVS 6/21/2005 1 
U:EFX Equifax 2/11/2010 1 
U:HIG Hartford 9/12/2007 1 
U:JPM JP Morgan 1/30/2011 1 
U:LNC Lincoln Financial Group 7/26/2011 1 
U:MWW Monster.com 8/23/2007 1 
U:NYT The New York Times 1/30/2013 1 
U:ldos Leidos 7/20/2007 1 
U:T AT&T 8/29/2006 1 
U:TMUS T-Mobile 6/7/2009 1 
U:VZ Verizon 8/12/2005 1 
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U:WFC Wells Fargo 8/12/2008 1 
U:WYN Wyndham Hotels & Resorts 2/16/2009 1 
Table 18 - Group overview - Group 1 
 
Symbol Organisation Event date Group 
@AAPL Apple 2/19/2013 2 
@CMCSA NBC Universal 2/22/2013 2 
@DRIV Digital River Inc. 12/22/2010 2 
@FOXA Fox Entertainment Group 5/10/2011 2 
@GOOG Google 3/7/2009 2 
@HKFI Hancock Fabrics 3/5/2010 2 
@SRCE 1st Source Bank 11/19/2010 2 
EXPN Experian 4/5/2012 2 
H:ING ING 10/12/2010 2 
REL LexisNexis 6/8/2011 2 
U:C Citigroup 6/9/2011 2 
U:CFR Frost Bank 11/7/2007 2 
U:CVS CVS 3/24/2012 2 
U:EFX Equifax 10/10/2012 2 
U:HIG Hartford 4/6/2011 2 
U:JPM JP Morgan 3/28/2013 2 
U:LNC Lincoln Financial Group 9/16/2012 2 
U:MWW Monster.com 1/23/2009 2 
U:NYT The New York Times 8/27/2013 2 
U:ldos Leidos 1/18/2008 2 
U:T AT&T 6/9/2010 2 
U:TMUS T-Mobile 1/16/2012 2 
U:VZ Verizon 8/25/2006 2 
U:WFC Wells Fargo 10/20/2011 2 
U:WYN Wyndham Hotels & Resorts 2/28/2010 2 
Table 19 - Group overview - Group 2 
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Figure 27 - Box plot of the individual CARs between the groups 
By comparing the CAARs for each group calculated in the previous section, Group 1 
showed a considerably stronger negative return (Group 1 -2.38%, Group 2 -0.16%). 
However, as noted earlier, this was driven by an outlier. To better understand the 
impact of the identified outlier, we temporarily removed the outlier in Group 1 from 
the dataset. This led to a move towards normality and resulted in a return of -1.55%; 
yet, a noticeably stronger negative reaction for Group 1 remained. As discussed 
earlier, the data in Group 1 are not normally distributed, which reduces the usefulness 
of parametric testing. To understand the extent to which the data are non-normal, a 
Shapiro–Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) was applied to both groups (Table 23). 
 
Shapiro–Wilk 
test  
Group 1 Group 2 
W 0.671252696 0.963874 
p-value 3.06201E-06 0.496879 
alpha 0.05 0.05 
normal no yes 
Table 23 - Shapiro–Wilk test results 
While a paired sample t-test was conducted, it was not taken into consideration. 
Instead, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for paired samples (Wilcoxon, 
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1945) was used to assess the significance of the differences in the dataset. The result 
showed a p-value of 0.074 for the two-tailed test, we thus could not reject H2. 
4.8 Results 
For the CAARs in Group 1, we found a loss of 2.38% aligned with the event date 
(p=0.0037), using the standardised cross-sectional test proposed by Boehmer et al. 
(1991). This result in the parametric test is therefore likely to be driven by an outlier 
as described in the previous section. The non-parametric result under GSIGN testing, 
on the contrary, found significance approaching the 95% confidence level 
(p=0.0575). Considering the tendency of both test results, we thus reject H1 for this 
group. For Group 2, we found a CAAR close to zero (-0.16%, not significant). Then, 
by applying the model to the whole event pool, we found a CAAR of -1.27% that 
showed significance for the non-parametric test (p=0.0325) but not the parametric test 
(p=0.1632), leading us towards rejecting H1. 
H2 is addressed by comparing the cumulative abnormal residuals for Groups 1 and 2. 
The results of the Shapiro–Wilk test showed that the data in Group 1 are non-normal, 
suggesting the use of a non-parametric test such as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to 
conduct the statistical evaluation. Although the difference in the absolute CAARs 
between Group 1 and Group 2 seemed to provide grounds to reject H2, the statistical 
test did not support this initial notion. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed only 
marginal significance (p=0.074) for the two-tailed test, which is considered to be 
insufficient to reject H2 in the context of this study. In other words, we found only 
weak statistical evidence that the market reacts differently to a subsequent breach 
event affecting the same organisation. 
4.9 Threats to validity and study limitations 
Based on the results of this analysis, we weakly conclude that there is an impact on 
the stock prices of organisations that suffer a publicly announced information security 
breach. The weakness in explanatory power is driven by several of the limitations 
inherent to event studies in general and this study in particular. The event study 
methodology relies on the assumption of an efficient market with rational players. In 
reality, this assumption does not necessarily hold in terms of either efficiency 
(Malkiel, 2003) or rationality (deBondt & Thaler, 1985; Dichev & Janes, 2003). 
Kothari and Warner (2004) caution that predictions about securities’ unconditional 
Chapter 4: Economic impact of information security breaches 
101 
expected returns are imprecise. Consequently, the greater the imprecision in the 
predicted returns (error factor), the lower is the explanatory power of the model on 
which it is based. In particular, for short-term event studies, knowing the precise event 
date is crucial. Uncertainty about the exact event date is an issue, and a compromise 
between data availability and dataset quality had to be made in this study. Yet, even 
if the precise date of the event is known, there is still uncertainty about the speed of 
information dissemination across market participants. 
Further limitations stem from potentially unrelated events (confounding events) 
around the event dates, which are difficult to reliably identify ex post. In addition, 
challenges specific to RQ2 affected the time window between the first and second 
measured breach events. Following such an event, organisations not only work to 
mitigate the original breach cause but also invest in improvements and trust-building 
initiatives such as replacing key executive positions (e.g. Chief Executive Officer, 
Chief Technology Officer, Chief Security Officer). The potential influence of such 
activities on the subsequent breach event was not considered in this study. These 
potential issues as well as the outlier in the sample pool were magnified by the small 
sample size available for this study, thereby reducing the significance of the statistical 
tests. Hence, the presented results can be seen as an indication of impact tendency. 
Nonetheless, a tendency towards significance was identified and this could be 
emphasised if we only considered one-tailed test results. 
4.10 Chapter summary 
Understanding the role of information security in the context of the economic well-
being of an organisation is a difficult yet important proposition (Anderson, 2001; 
Gordon & Loeb, 2002b). Research in this area has examined the approaches used by 
economists and applied promising methods to answer questions on the economic 
value of information security. One such approach, the event study methodology, was 
applied in this work. We relied on the assumption of an efficient market to measure 
the potential abnormal effects caused by an information security relevant event, using 
event data from the PRC database split into two groups. For the first group, consisting 
of each organisation’s earlier breach event, we found an indication of a significant 
negative reaction (parametric p-value = 0.0037, non-parametric p-value = 0.0575). 
For the second group containing the latter breach events, there was no significant 
reaction (parametric p-value = 0.98, non-parametric p-value = 0.26). The combined 
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event pool showed a tendency towards significance based on the parametric test (p-
value = 0.1632) and non-parametric test (p-value = 0.0325) findings. Hence, we 
weakly concluded that information security events affect the economic well-being of 
organisations, as expressed by the corresponding stock prices based on the parameters 
of this study. For RQ2, we observed a difference in the reactions of the two study 
groups with a p-value approaching significance (p-value = 0.074 for the non-
parametric test). 
In summary, the selected methodology for evaluating the economic impact of 
information security breach events is promising. If some of the limitations discussed 
were addressed, such as the sample size and precise identification of event dates, the 
methodology could provide valuable input to support economic decision making 
within enterprise risk management programmes. This might become possible in the 
future if public information on data breaches becomes more widely available and 
more detailed, as laws and regulations become more explicit on the reporting of such 
incidents (Dipietro, 2013; Smedinghoff, 2006). This will provide a larger pool of 
useful data to which the methodology could be applied. A larger sample size would 
also allow more sophisticated analysis to be conducted and help draw more reliable 
conclusions. 
Whereas this chapter provided an external view of the economic impact of 
information security breach events on organisations, the next chapter offers a broader 
insiders’ view based on a qualitative analysis of senior security practitioner 
interviews. Building on the findings from the SLR (chapter 2) as well as the general 
questions on information security value and impact, we used a semi-structured 
interview to gather input from experienced practitioners.  
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5 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY VALUE IN 
ORGANISATIONS 
Based on the Grounded Theory approach, in this chapter we analyse the data gathered 
in a series of interviews with senior professionals in order to identify key factors in 
the context of information security investment decisions. We present our findings 
condensed into a simplified but highly useful framework that security practitioners 
can utilise for critical review or improvements of investment decisions in their own 
environments. Extensive details for each category as extracted through a qualitative 
data analysis are provided along with a category network analysis that highlights 
strong relationships within the framework. Information security economics research, 
particularly earlier approaches, tends to be firmly rooted in the theoretical model 
space as we found in chapter 2, leaving the key challenges practitioners face 
unmentioned or unsolved. Although such models enhance approaches to examining 
information security investments, they often suffer from their overly theoretical 
methodology and, as such, are not well suited for real-world application. In this 
chapter, we identify how organisations prioritise and evaluate information security 
investment. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews, a qualitative analysis 
approach is adopted to understand the key factors, core challenges and common 
practices experienced by information security practitioners. In particular, we 
investigate the following questions: 
• How are information security investments in organisations approached by 
practitioners? 
• What key factors and challenges are considered by practitioners in relation to 
information security investments?  
• How do information security management systems and information security 
governance models support practitioners in this regard? 
• How are traditional accounting metrics such as NPV and ROI used? 
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, related work 
is presented. Section 5.2 discusses the research methodology and design as well as 
the interview framework including the sample strategy, data collection procedures, 
coding approach and analysis. Section 5.3 presents the results of the data analysis 
including participants’ responses. Section 5.4 offers additional details on the 
relationships between the categories. Finally, in sections 5.5 and 5.6, the limitations 
of the approach presented in this study are thoroughly reviewed and concluding 
thoughts are provided. 
5.1 Related work 
Cyber crime-related loss is a serious issue threatening the economic well-being of 
most organisations (Anderson et al., 2013; Armin, Thompson, & Kijewski, 2016; 
Hyman, 2013). As such, organisations are either actively discussing how to deal with 
this situation or are already taking actions in the form of information security risk 
management programmes and aligned investments. In this context, Hoo (2000) quite 
rightly asked the difficult question as to how much is enough. As expected, there is 
no single right answer to this. Rather, Hoo stresses the need for quantitative computer 
security risk management to become more acute. Inevitably, the follow-up question 
will be how to sensibly allocate funds in order to maximise risk management benefits. 
Although this topic is still a relatively new field of research, a range of options for 
approaching the problem have been suggested over the past two decades (Eisenga et 
al., 2012; Kesswani & Kumar, 2015; Neubauer & Hartl, 2009; Sawik, 2013). Some 
solutions are more popular among researchers than others. For example, Cavusoglu 
et al. (2008) argue that investments in IT security should be managed differently from 
other investments by organisations. Their research proposes a game-theoretic 
approach that is illustrated to outperform an alternative decision theoretic-based 
approach. Bistarelli et al. (2007) discuss the use of defence trees to assess the 
effectiveness and economic profitability of countermeasures, leveraging economic 
indexes as a utility function. Furthermore, Garvey, Moynihan, and Servi (2013) refer 
to utility functions in their portfolio-based investigation that examines the delicate 
relationship of investments in countermeasures, the benefits provided to the 
organisation’s security and their effects on its ability to achieve its mission. Srinidhi, 
Yan, and Tayi (2008), likewise, consider the ability of organisations to achieve their 
core mission in the context of information security investments. They analyse internal 
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cash flows and the allocation of external funds to revenue-generating and security-
assuring processes in the presence of security breaches, borrowing and financial 
distress costs over multiple periods. Similarly, Huang and Behara (2013) investigate 
the allocation of constrained information security budgets, finding that organisations 
with a limited security budget are better off allocating most or all of it towards 
measures to counter a certain class of attack.  
To understand how practitioners in the field approach investment decisions, Moore et 
al. (2015) explore the ways in which organisations identify, prioritise and invest to 
manage risks in this context. Following a qualitative analysis approach, seven key 
points distilled from interviews with executives knowledgeable in this area are 
presented. The researchers conclude that a contradiction exists between high 
confidence in security frameworks guidance and the continued stream of breach 
reports. With regard to researching investment decisions in an IT governance context, 
Xue, Liang, and Boulton (2008) conduct a series of semi-structured interviews in an 
healthcare environment. The researchers highlight several findings and contextual 
factors relevant to IT governance processes in organisations, which play a key role in 
investment decisions. Rantapuska and Ihanainen (2008) follow a similar methodology 
to research how managers use knowledge when making investment decisions in this 
area. They report four contributing factors (problem, product, provider, solution) and 
conclude that investment decision making should reflect some of the features of 
organisational learning, where various forms of knowledge are used for a shared 
organisational purpose. 
5.2 Research methodology and design 
Understanding the way in which security investments are made in real work 
environments requires interaction and close cooperation with practitioners in the 
field. For this purpose, a qualitative research approach was chosen, as this allows for 
the collection of rich and vivid primary data from research subjects, which in turn 
emphasises the lived experience and is suitable for locating meaning and connecting 
such meaning to the social world (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Grounded Theory (Glaser et al., 1968), in particular, is a suitable approach for this 
research. Based on a constructivist paradigm, this theory acknowledges that meaning 
is constructed by individuals and is not simply something merely waiting to be 
discovered. Whereas Glaser favours a ‘blank slate’ inductive approach under which 
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the researcher has little or no knowledge of the topic, the Straussian (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) approach is better suited for the purpose of this paper, especially as 
Strauss advocates reviewing the relevant literature ahead of the study to stimulate 
theoretical sensitivity. To paraphrase Wolcott (1982), while there is benefit to being 
openminded and looking for questions as well as answers, it is impossible to conduct 
research without an understanding of what to look for. Specifically, semi-structured 
interviews were used to collect the primary data in this research. Interviews are 
typically an effective method of encouraging subject matter experts to talk about their 
experiences and opinions. They also provide an opportunity for the researcher to gain 
insights into the way in which people think about, feel about and relate to a topic. 
This work adhered to ethical research standards and was approved by the University 
of East London under UREC 1516 128. All participants were issued with written 
information on the research project and research team. The purpose of the research 
was share with all participants describing the aim of the study being the analysis of 
current practices and approaches to information security investment evaluation in 
organisations to understand key factors and core challenges as experienced by 
information security professionals. It was explained that the results of the study will 
be analysed in conjunction with previous work (Systematic Literature Review, 
chapter 2) with the goal to create and verify an improved model assisting security 
practitioners in evaluating information security investments. In addition, guidance on 
confidentiality, data handling and storage as well as the voluntary nature of 
participation was provided in writing. Ahead of the interview, we addressed all 
concerns and emphasised participants’ right to withdraw at any point in the interview 
process. Along with ethical research requirements, COREQ guidance (Tong, 
Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007) was followed when designing the research framework. 
Accordingly, information on the research team, affiliation and qualifications were 
made available to all participants. Furthermore, potential interviewees were chosen 
following a purposive approach (with a snowballing effect in some cases). Eighteen 
participants were interviewed as described below. One interview had to be removed 
from the dataset after completion, leaving a pool of 17 interviews for the analysis. 
Participants were mainly based in the United Kingdom (13), with five residing in the 
United States. All interview questions (Appendix 5-1) were developed by the research 
team and pretested in trial runs. In several instances, the research team followed up 
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Figure 31 - Category co-occurrence matrix 
5.3.1 Business environment 
Businesses exist in a complex world with a multitude of factors influencing the plans 
and strategies of individual companies. Throughout the interview process, 
participants considered the business environment in which they are working to be a 
significant factor affecting their security investment approach. Their responses 
highlighted the importance of the industry and type of business to the information 
security strategy, with legal and regulatory requirements being an underlying theme. 
In general, business environments are used as a proxy for security-relevant factors. 
They explain the areas particularly important to the organisation. For example, an 
online retailer cares more about the availability of its web services than a bricks-and-
mortar business would. Likewise, such a business would be more concerned about 
the potential reputational impact should a breach occur, which further impacts the 
way in which information security spending is prioritised. 
Aligning security spending with business goals is a point that repeatedly came up 
during the interviews. We observed an inherent understanding that information 
security must form part of the value chain working towards the broader business goals 
while solving, often abstract, security-specific problems simultaneously. This comes 
with various challenges and has a strong impact on prioritisation, as discussed in a 
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later section. Participants reported that business culture and politics influence their 
approach to information security. It is crucial to understand a company’s risk 
tolerance levels and attitude towards security controls. Along similar lines, it was 
mentioned that it is worth paying attention to something that is best described as 
‘office politics’. When selecting technology and controls, careful consideration 
should be given to the preferences and expectations of key employees and 
departments (“There’s often a kind of acceptability to an organisation, so if network 
teams are completely fixated on CISCO, then proposing a CISCO project will go 
down well”). An interesting development, especially in competitive sectors, was 
described where organisations strive to be on par or better in their security approaches 
than their competitors. In this type of organisational culture, investments in 
information security are not simply viewed as a cost factor. Similar to other areas that 
depend on highly skilled staff, information security departments rely on the right 
people to accomplish the job. Participants emphasised that one of the key components 
for delivering value is to have competent staff with the right skillset making the right 
decisions. Having a team of skilled professionals with backgrounds in various sectors 
has a positive impact on the performance of the information security programme. 
There was wide agreement that constant training and retaining skilled staff are 
important for success. At the same time, it was highlighted that the cost of finding 
and retaining skilled staff is a challenge. 
Principle 1: The business environment provides the platform on which security 
investment value decisions are rooted. Without appropriately considering it, 
security programmes will fail to add value. 
5.3.2 Driving factors 
As driving forces, legal and regulatory requirements were mentioned frequently 
across all sectors. Typically, these requirements define the minimum security stance 
in which an organisation invests. Organisations are growing conscious of cost 
implications, often in the form of fines if they are found to be in non-compliance of 
the regulations in their sector. However, such requirements are also used to simplify 
investment justification. Interviewees stated that security teams might use regulatory 
requirements to sidestep investment approval processes by linking their investment 
request to a ‘must-do’ requirement of a regulation. Although this may seem to be an 
insolent shortcut, it can be with the best intention to, say, get ahead of anticipated but 
not yet enforced regulatory changes. As described by one participant, it is hard to 
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know all applicable regulations for a global organisation, let alone stay abreast of 
upcoming changes. Security teams who implement security controls that anticipate 
and prepare an organisation for upcoming requirements are seen as adding 
considerable value to the business. Legal and regulatory requirements also play a role 
when it comes to competitive advantage, especially in highly regulated sectors with 
strict mandates for security controls, where security is a key differentiator that can be 
used to gain competitive advantage. Regulations set the minimum security 
requirements, with all the inconvenience for customers that comes with it; thus, 
organisations try their best to make a user’s experience as seamless as possible 
(“Security is now probably one of the key differentiators within our sector … you 
know where customers will go, who they’ll bank with and who they’ll trust”). 
Principle 2: Legal and regulatory requirements are a key driver of information 
security investments. Such requirements are important investment justifications 
and provide an opportunity to positively differentiate an organisation from its 
competitors. 
Closely related to legal and regulatory requirements are risk framework requirements. 
For some sectors, these are externally imposed; however, many organisations 
voluntarily subscribe to information security-specific frameworks such as ISO/IEC 
27001 (British Standards Institute, 2013) and the ISF Standard of Good Practice 
(Information Security Forum, 2016) to support their security programmes or achieve 
certification. As a consequence, these become a driver of investments. Participants 
described how information security management systems support their work in this 
context. These frameworks help identify gaps and weaknesses, provide a list of 
controls to consider and, to a certain extent, provide guidance on minimum 
investment levels. However, participants noted that these frameworks contribute little 
guidance on economically sensible investment in their environments. When asked if 
they thought that that should be the case, reserved responses were received. Many 
believe that it would be too difficult to include economic decision support as part of 
such a framework. Some expressed doubt that it would make any difference, as 
finance departments would not recognise information security frameworks as 
authoritative in the context of sensible investment guidance. Instead, larger 
organisations or regulated industries look to overarching operational risk or enterprise 
risk functions for this. One participant described how his information security 
management system was joined up with operational risk frameworks that factor in 
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economic aspects. He explains that “it’s almost like security as a function has kind of 
mushroomed into these sub-functions with operational risk that contributes an 
economic view or financial driver”. This was seen as beneficial since mature 
operational risk functions have established metrics and language that are well 
understood by finance departments and other non-technology stakeholders. 
Principle 3: Security risk management frameworks drive information security 
investment decisions but provide little guidance on economically sensible 
investments. Integration or alignment with an operational or enterprise risk 
function helps add an economic dimension in this context. 
Information security is increasingly seen as a competitive advantage for both the 
business-to-consumer and business-to-business markets. Security in the former is a 
differentiator when paired with a seamless user experience and innovative solutions. 
Participants described their efforts to weave the required security controls into their 
services in a way that emphasised innovative approaches while enhancing customer 
experience. This is not done in isolation. Information security professionals 
collaborate closely with their business counterparts to seek feedback on what the 
market demands or favours. In the business-to-business space, the focus is on 
generating trust, with participants highlighting the importance of business 
relationships with partners, suppliers and business customers. Several high profile 
security breaches have been directly related to third-party service providers (Target 
Inc (2013) was a breach mentioned by several participants). Participants described 
how their area was becoming a key factor in supplier selection and consequently is 
perceived as a competitive advantage, even in sectors with limited regulatory 
oversight. Although security requirements are increasingly defined in contracts, 
surpassing expectations adds value, as it increases customer trust. Organisations are 
aware of the value of these investments in the continued success of their businesses 
(“We are providing valued services and we are a trusted supplier. If you lose that 
trust, and that can happen in an instant, it takes a long time to build it up, so you 
never want to let it go”).  
Reducing the cost of operations or enabling an organisation to achieve savings on 
operations is another important aspect. Participants described a clear link between 
security controls and the quality of service improvements, which resulted in 
operational cost savings. An example was described where costly production line 
outages could be tied to security weaknesses in the delivery process. After 
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implementing the appropriate security controls, outages declined considerably, 
resulting in improved availability and lower response costs. Some organisations take 
deferred costs into consideration; in this context, security controls enable an 
organisation to defer operational costs for a certain time so that they can focus 
resources on urgent opportunities. In many markets, it is important to be able to act 
swiftly to achieve or retain the first-mover advantage. If the resources of organisations 
are tied up with clearing technical debt or other legacy issues, momentum may be 
lost. By selecting appropriate controls, information security allows corporations to 
defer such operational costs to a later point while managing the risk accordingly. 
Principle 4: Information security investments offer competitive advantage when 
they support businesses safely innovate, increase market agility and enhance 
customer trust. 
Security incidents and developments in the threat landscape are common reasons for 
information security investments. In particular, security incidents appear to be a 
strong driver of investing in security, unfortunately after the horse has bolted. One 
participant commented on this rather cynically: “The level of thinking on this topic is 
so immature that your best chance to be seen as a successful chief security officer is 
to have incidents and manage them well. There is no credit in avoiding them — if you 
have a clean sheet, nobody’s interested”. Post-incident reviews provide useful 
insights into the gaps and weaknesses in the current security stance and steer 
investment budgets towards the projects addressing these issues. Incident metrics play 
a key role in measuring the effectiveness of the programme as discussed later; they 
also help an organisation estimate the cost of the incident and, in turn, provide input 
to value discussions. Understanding the current threat landscape and ongoing 
developments is thus an essential aspect in a security management process. Knowing 
the relevant threats to their sector in general and to their organisation in particular, 
even down to the business unit level, enables security functions to direct their efforts 
(and as such investments) to where they add the most value. Participants try to keep 
pace with such a fast-changing threat landscape, often by proactively monitoring 
relevant threats and collaborating with other organisations. This includes not only 
exchanging information on threats and threat actors but also providing useful and 
effective security controls. 
Principle 5: Security incidents have an immediate effect on security investments 
and the value perception of information security. Understanding threat trends is 
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crucial for the direction of security programmes and should steer investment 
accordingly. 
5.3.3 Challenges and constraints 
Of the challenges and constraints faced by information security professionals, one of 
the most pressing is the budget allocated to the information security department. Some 
participants reported that their budgets do not increase as fast as compliance 
requirements demand. This prevents their security programme from covering as much 
compliance ground as required, let alone focusing on additional, real security threats. 
Responses indicated that simple financial models are occasionally used to prioritise 
security investments. However, most respondents are suspicious of the usefulness of 
such models. A general scepticism towards the way in which budgets are allocated in 
organisations was found. In most cases, organisations follow a conventional 
budgeting approach (Drury, 2013) where budgets are allocated annually based on a 
percentage of another budget, commonly IT. This traditional budgeting approach is 
viewed as problematic as it does not sufficiently account for the fast-paced changes 
in threat landscapes. In no case was an activity-based or zero-based budgeting 
approach reported. 
Principle 6: Conventional budgeting approaches cause information security 
departments to direct their funds towards a ‘minimum protection/maximum 
compliance’ strategy rather than initiatives that contribute the most value to the 
organisation. 
At the other end of the spectrum, participants reported that their challenge is not so 
much the available budget, but the capacity of organisations to absorb change. The 
main concern was negative user experience with a security control (“If something is 
viewed as an obstructive control that will encourage people to work around it, then 
that is something that is likely to dissuade us more than any sort of economic or other 
consideration”). Business stakeholders care about customer priorities, ease of use, 
product adoption rates and legal compliance; security must contribute value to these 
priorities. Security controls are not worth investing in if they are perceived to be 
cumbersome or obstructive. Participants commented that it is not always 
straightforward to anticipate the views of customers and thus they work closely with 
business stakeholders for better guidance. At times, this results in conflicting 
requirements. Customers, particularly in the business-to-business market, have high 
expectations of information security. This is a challenge for organisations trying to 
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strike a balance between client requirements and the ‘right level’ of security costing. 
As aptly put by one of the participants, the business side always wants to have the 
new application faster, whereas the security side always wants it to be more secure. 
This leaves security teams with the challenge of proving that security controls add 
sufficient value to make it worthwhile implementing them. This point is discussed in 
more detail in a later section on security metrics. 
Principle 7: Security controls must be accepted by users and customers to add 
value. For this, security teams must work with business stakeholders to 
understand what ‘acceptable’ means in a given context. 
Asking participants about security costs provided a range of views. A good 
understanding of financial aspects, mostly distinguishing between operating expenses 
(OpEx) and capital expenses (CapEx), was observed. Costs related to staffing were a 
concern, with the lack of affordable talent and resulting lengthy hiring processes being 
a common challenge. This has an immediate impact on solution selection as well as 
the cost structure of investments. Participants reported that they are unable to find 
skilled people to implement, support or use the preferred solution. Costs for the 
specialised training of security staff are factored into this as well. Generally speaking, 
solutions with lower staff and training costs were seen as more favourable. Similarly, 
external consultants are often hired to supplement staff to be able to add value more 
quickly. In some cases, consultants are used to achieve a more favourable cost 
structure (CapEx vs. OpEx), which serves the accounting preferences of the 
organisation better. The direct costs considered for security solutions are 
unsurprising. Participants mentioned the initial purchase price, license cost, 
implementation, configuration and ongoing maintenance costs, overhead cost for 
project management resources, customer or user communications, training cost, 
datacentre space, power and HVAC (heating, ventilation, air conditioning) cost as 
well as professional services cost. Some responses extended this by considering the 
integration cost with existing solutions and the sunk cost for non-performing controls. 
The majority of participants explained that they consider the potential impact of the 
control on the performance of existing systems, including the expected future 
downtime requirements for updates and maintenance. In a similar vein, it was 
mentioned that rewriting and testing ‘disaster recovery and business continuity’ plans 
may be an indirect cost. Several participants considered the opportunity cost in 
various forms including avoiding lost customer contract opportunities through 
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proactive security investment, weighing the impact of a security solution 
implementation on other business resources (and thus tying up resources that would 
have contributed to revenue-generating projects) and calculating the value of 
temporarily supplementing the workforce to free up higher value resources to work 
on other business projects. It is assumed that this keen awareness of the opportunity 
cost is due to the unusually high amount of competing requirements and risks related 
to a firm’s security stance. 
As discussed previously, security incidents are a strong driver of investments in 
security. The potential cost of compromises plays a major part in the economic 
calculations in this context. Some of these costs are relatively straightforward to 
capture, such as the cost of legal counsel, cost of public relations damage control, cost 
of credit monitoring for affected customers, cost of specialised incident response and 
forensic consultants, regulatory fines, contractual fines, cost of lawsuits, staff 
overtime cost, direct losses due to service outage and insurance premium increases. 
The views on the loss of intellectual property were mixed; some responses suggested 
it to be a direct cost, while others saw it more on the indirect side as it is difficult to 
know what financial value a particular property would have had without the 
compromise occurring. Similarly, with regard to reputational loss, there were varying 
views. One participant argued that it could be approximated through metrics such as 
‘abnormal customer churn rate’, whereas others recommended not using soft costs 
such as reputational loss at all. In general, there was a feeling that information security 
should seek help from other functions such as public relations, legal and operational 
risk to ascertain a better input on the economic impact of large events. Those who 
considered indirect costs in their calculations suggested looking at the loss of market 
share (e.g. abnormal churn rate), loss of prospective customers (e.g. abnormal 
customer conversion rates) and loss of trust by customers. A company’s share price 
is a measure often mentioned in this regard and some responses suggested looking at 
share prices pre- and post-breach as a proxy for the cost of compromise. However, 
some suggested avoiding share prices as a metric. One particularly interesting point 
mentioned during the interviews was to consider the impact of security breaches on 
staff morale and the costs resulting from demotivation, distractions, distrust and 
private concerns seen with deeply intrusive compromises such as those faced by Sony 
Pictures Entertainment (Hess, 2015). 
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Principle 8: Human resources costs and incident-related costs are crucial to value 
equations for information security. Practitioners must consider a range of 
relevant cost factors, both direct and indirect, to approximate the incurred loss 
with a priority on realistic impact figures. 
Participants explained that the immaturity of the information security profession is a 
challenge itself. Practitioners look to mature areas such as the operational risk and 
enterprise risk functions for guidance and note a lack of evidence-based decision 
making in their own space. This has a knock-on effect on the comparison and 
selection of controls and ultimately how the value of investments can be evaluated. 
In their view, this leads to information security being perceived as an opinion-based 
rather than evidence-based profession. One participant summarised it as follows: “It 
is a very immature industry and there isn’t really a proper understanding as to what 
should be done and how much it should cost. It's an area where there’s lots of room 
for snake oil salesmen trying to tell you how to solve problems but in fact they 
themselves don’t understand how”. 
Part of this is the omnipresence of uncertainty and lack of data in most areas of 
information security. Although risk management is expected to deal with uncertainty, 
the responses show that the lack of data permeates all aspects of the profession. There 
is uncertainty about the likelihood of an incident happening and the likely impact and 
resulting cost. Likewise, there is uncertainty about if, or to what extent, security 
controls would prevent, reduce or even notice an attack. As a consequence, security 
professionals are uncertain about whether their security controls work or are a 
sensible investment at all. Therefore, organisations resort to expert opinion. However, 
such expert estimations are often unreliable, either because they are biased or because 
they are simply too broad to provide meaningful input into decision making processes. 
To address this issue, participants noted that historical data might be useful to reduce 
uncertainty in some respects, whereas others cautioned that the fast changes in the 
threat landscape make historical data a poor indicator. 
Principle 9: The lack of decision support processes and absence of evidence-based 
approaches are problematic. Uncertainty about key factors such as developments 
in the threat landscape, effectiveness of security controls and reliability of such 
data must be addressed as a priority. 
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5.3.4 Information security capability 
This subsection discusses the core categories related to information security 
capabilities in organisations. Considering the environment, drivers and challenges, 
the information security function assesses the available inputs to create and 
implement risk management programmes (Mishra, 2015). Based on the interview 
responses, four categories related to the thought processes of practitioners when 
selecting a control were identified: Efficiency & Effectiveness, Likelihood & Impact, 
Latest Trends and Supporting Data Sources. 
In section 5.3.3, the lack of data was found to be one of the major challenges. 
Information security practitioners reduce uncertainty by filling white spaces with data 
from a variety of supporting sources. At a governance level, organisations adopt 
benchmarks to assess gaps in their security stance, the current maturity level and the 
right amount of spending. Benchmarking against standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 
allows them to identify areas where controls differ from the expectations of control 
frameworks. This provides authoritative guidance on the control areas where 
investments are likely to add value to an organisation. In a further step, benchmarking 
maturity levels across control areas provides similar guidance albeit more nuanced to 
adjust for sector- and organisation-specific risks. 
An important part of many benchmarks is the comparison with peer organisations. 
Participants confirmed that peer comparison and industry best practice are vital to 
their investment approach. They look to peers to understand which controls contribute 
the most value for those environments, especially in cases of publicised breaches. The 
information shared by or about the impacted organisation is used as a valuable data 
point for risk and cost calculations. In addition, practitioners look to industry bodies, 
vendors, analysts and professional membership organisations for data to help them 
refine their programme and guide control selection towards the best value option. 
Cyber insurance might also be employed to estimate the value of controls, using the 
proxy of insurance premiums. Increasingly important components in this context are 
threat intelligence sharing and collaboration services (Serrano, Dandurand, & Brown, 
2014; Vázquez, Acosta, Spirito, Brown, & Reid, 2012). Sources can be commercial 
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(e.g. Digital Shadows8), open source (e.g. Alienvault OTX9), government-led (e.g. 
NCSC CISP10) and membership-based (e.g. FS-ISAC11) with varying goals and 
benefits. However, the underlying benefit is largely the same, namely to increase the 
visibility of security threats or trends and consequently reduce uncertainty. 
Practitioners use threat intelligence to evaluate the threat source, the likelihood and 
impact of attacks, the effectiveness of controls and future threat landscape 
developments. 
The richest data sources may be internal security metrics. Participants frequently 
referred to the importance of metrics, including having defined metrics and aligning 
them with business goals, which is challenging in many cases. Information security 
professionals traditionally struggle to translate security metrics into business metrics. 
Interviewees suggested keeping it as simple as possible with a focus on repeatable 
and clear measurements. Business stakeholders are often familiar with metrics related 
to service availability, which makes these metrics good candidates for use. However, 
even simple project management metrics tracking the delivery of milestones are 
common. Furthermore, most of the metrics mentioned are related to security incidents 
or compromise scenarios. Participants discussed the absolute number of 
compromises/incidents, time to discovery, man-hours spent on incident resolution 
and the dwell time of adversaries following a breach. Other examples were related to 
the number of vulnerabilities in products, which can be tied to when market metrics 
interest business stakeholders. Participants also reported metrics to assess 
effectiveness, such as the percentage of prevented malware infection and proportion 
of blocked malware attacks. 
Principle 10: Governance benchmarks, internal metrics and peer comparison data 
are key instruments for refining value-oriented security programmes. 
Collaborative threat intelligence is an increasingly important source to reduce 
uncertainty. 
                                                 
 
8 https://www.digitalshadows.com/. 
9 https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange. 
10 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cisp. 
11 https://www.fsisac.com/. 
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Metrics on security control effectiveness are useful but not commonly available. Few 
organisations even carry out proof-of-concept or proof-of-value exercises before 
making an investment decision and these are often limited to assessing whether the 
solution is doing what the vendor claims or if it causes problems in the IT 
environment. This is more so a concern for organisations with a large amount of 
legacy technology in their environments, which may result in additional effectiveness 
challenges. Participants explained about the difficulty of defining meaningful key 
performance indicators to measure effectiveness, particularly for non-technical 
controls such as security awareness. Effectiveness describes how reliable the 
protection is, how a control works against threats and how completely it mitigates a 
risk or solves a problem. Considerations of efficiency focus on the service delivery of 
the control (i.e. how it compares with other controls in terms of the associated costs). 
In this context, the financial and operational preferences of the organisation play an 
important role. Trade-offs such as CapEx versus OpEx, buy versus build, on premises 
versus cloud and permanent staff versus outsourced are also considered. 
Closely related to the discussion on the effectiveness of controls is the topic of the 
likelihood and potential impact of a successful attack. Participants pointed out the 
importance of understanding the likelihood and impact of an attack against 
organisational assets. Both factors provide valuable input into control selection from 
a risk management and economic perspective; however, respondents also cautioned 
that assessing either is difficult. In many cases, organisations use external information 
as described in the data sources section. However, some opinions were that such 
expert-driven data are too subjective, potentially biased and often too broad. Larger 
organisations rely on inputs from operational risk functions, which are more 
experienced in this space, particularly on impact figures. Smaller organisations 
reportedly prefer a simplified approach with the assumption that a control will 
effectively reduce both impact and likelihood to a negligible level upon deployment. 
Principle 11: Security control effectiveness metrics are rarely available or 
independently gathered. Security programmes need to address this gap due to its 
importance for assessing the value of controls. 
The purpose of controls in an information security programme is to support the wider 
risk management goal. Depending on the business environment, recommendations 
for controls range from focusing on known and proven solutions to following new 
and innovative approaches. In general, the control must solve the problem identified 
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in the most effective and efficient way. Prioritising defective controls in the first 
instance to improve the visibility of the environment was agreed upon by participants. 
They also highlighted that controls with multiple benefits as well as those that provide 
a better experience for users are preferred. As mentioned in the challenges and 
constraints section, the seamless integration of security controls with user experience 
is a business advantage. Moreover, controls are preferred if they fit with the skillsets 
of current support staff. An interesting aspect is the role that trends in the security 
industry play. Controls that are attractive to support staff due to their innovative or 
novel character can have a higher priority than tried and tested controls. Highly skilled 
and talented employees enjoy working in a dynamic environment that provides 
opportunities to interact with innovative technologies. This increases work 
satisfaction and talent retention, thus adding value indirectly. 
Principle 12: Controls that provide multiple benefits at a comparable cost enable 
seamless user experience, attract and retain talent and are preferred due to the 
value they add to an organisation overall. 
5.3.5 Decisions and prioritisation 
Prioritising investments is not a simple checklist exercise; it is intertwined with all 
the aspects and categories discussed. Information risk is not the only factor 
considered; business requirements weigh heavily in this decision. One of the first 
questions asked is how a control supports business goals. However, this is not an 
abstract question; it is directed to understand how suitable risk management controls 
affect the core assets and customer service. As discussed previously, investment 
drivers strongly influence this process. Legal and regulatory requirements, either 
current or anticipated future developments, serve as a strong prioritisation factor. 
Customer requirements and competitive advantage are also considered in the decision 
process. The weaknesses and gaps identified through benchmarking exercises, against 
frameworks or peers, provide further input into the process as well, while third-party 
involvement, through audits or penetration tests, serve as an additional input in the 
prioritisation process. Saving opportunities or synergies also play a role. 
From a challenges perspective, practitioners look closely at the resources they have 
available to deliver their programme and consider what is realistically achievable. 
Insufficient human or financial resources may influence the controls deployed by the 
security function. The capacity of an organisation to absorb change influences its 
decisions on the timing and types of security controls. Security incidents have a 
Chapter 5: Qualitative analysis of information security value in organisations 
123 
special role in this context as stated by several participants. Major incidents have an 
immediate impact on the prioritisation of security investments. They trigger a review 
of previous prioritisation decisions, leading to adjustments as necessitated by the 
incident. In line with these prioritisation aspects, all participants described a more or 
less formalised decision process followed in their environment. Only one participant 
who followed a fully formal investment decision approach was found. This particular 
approach is based on the AHP technique (Saaty, 1994). 
Principle 13: Security investment decisions and prioritisation are not a checklist 
exercise but rather a reflective cycle accounting for the weighed factors from 
drivers, challenges, the business environment and security capabilities to produce 
a value-prioritised control selection. 
5.3.6 Corporate finance considerations 
As with any other investment, information security investments must follow the rules 
of corporate finance. Information security practitioners are aware of the accounting 
preferences in their organisations and consider financial aspects (e.g. CapEx, OpEx, 
cash flow) in their decisions. However, financial formulas are rarely used to justify 
investment. In nearly all cases, participants reported that they were not expected to 
use valuation or performance models such as ROI, NPV and IRR, or any other similar 
model. In those cases where it was requested, the process tended to be sidestepped by 
relying on more mature risk departments to help with the expected justification. 
Indeed, the numbers might even be ‘massaged’ to meet an imposed hurdle rate. This 
is relatively easy as the translation of security metrics into financial variables leaves 
plenty of room for interpretation. 
Practitioners do not feel that they have sufficient reliable data to make formal 
investment calculations and finance departments have little incentive to question such 
numbers based on security details. The result is a fixed budget compromise based on 
trust in the experience of the security practitioner. Information security departments 
can then freely decide how to spend the money allocated to them. As long as there is 
no overspending, the finance department requires no further justification. For further 
budget requirements or in cases where additional justification is needed, participants 
apply a business case approach, notably when a specific business project or business 
problem is addressed. For instance, a large contract requires enhanced security 
controls to retain the customer’s business. In these situations, the value calculation 
becomes considerably easier as the cost (loss of contract, cost of security controls) 
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and the benefit (future revenue) are readily available. However, this is not an ROI 
calculation for the security control, but rather for a complete customer solution. 
Security is only an enabling factor to the whole package. Nonetheless, how much the 
security control contributes to the overall business value remains difficult to calculate. 
Participants expressed the importance that security practitioners are respected and 
trusted in their role. It is assumed that because of the many unknowns and lack of 
reliable data, business decision makers question whether they trust the practitioner to 
do the right thing, rather than asking whether it is a beneficial investment. However, 
this does not mean that there is no scrutiny on how money is invested and participants 
anticipate that the scrutiny of security investment decisions will increase considerably 
in the future. One participant likened the development to that previously seen with 
IT: “I think we will see increased scrutiny on the efficiency side just the way the IT 
programme has. Years ago, whatever the IT people needed, you gave them. Once we 
started to understand IT was not magic and it needed to show business value, that 
began the change and I definitely see that happening in security as well”. 
Similarly, some participants explained that, in their opinions, too many security 
investments were considered to be a failure, as they did not deliver what the project 
set out to accomplish. Especially where large sums are invested in security controls 
that failed to prevent widely publicised breaches the question as to what the value of 
those investments is to the organisation is raised. Considering this, participants 
reported that there are already signs of organisations not wanting to continue spending 
big on information security. Instead, they try to figure out the minimum amount that 
they can get away with. This trend is mitigated by the requirements imposed through 
existing and incoming legislation and regulation exercising libertarian paternalism 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2003); In this context, participants refer to the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems 
and PCI/DSS in particular. 
Principle 14: Financial valuation or performance models are rarely used to justify 
security investments. With increasing scrutiny on security spending, practitioners 
must adopt an economic value approach or be relegated to a compliance and 
audit function. 
  
Chapter 5: Qualitative analysis of information security value in organisations 
125 
5.3.7 Measure value 
The primary focus of participants is managing and measuring information security 
risk in their organisation. The categories discussed provide fundamental input 
towards achieving that goal. The basic input variables are the business environment, 
especially the resulting risk profile for a sector or organisation, drivers, challenges 
and risk tolerance set by senior management. Accordingly, success is measured in a 
variety of ways ranging from how well risks are identified, including typical 
components such as threat actor, threat likelihood, potential impact, weaknesses and 
gaps, to how complete an identified risk is mitigated. In cases where security incidents 
are a driver, time becomes an additional metric as practitioners try to gain control 
over the situation as swiftly as possible. In most cases, the measurement of choice is 
qualitative risk assessments, ideally based on established methodologies. However, 
participants pointed out that qualitative risk assessments are subjective and may lack 
reproducibility of outcomes. To support their efforts, information security 
professionals cooperate with other experienced risk functions such as operational risk. 
These functions can provide highly relevant business data for risk models on 
exposure, impact and risk clustering. Most participants adopt risk reduction metrics 
to measure the value of information security programmes. However, measuring the 
outcomes or value of ‘soft’ security controls such as security awareness training 
compared with technical controls is more difficult. Both these points may explain the 
tendency to deploy technical controls (which are easier to measure) over educational 
controls (which are often seen as more effective). While the primary focus is to 
manage and measure information security risk, practitioners do work with related 
metrics such as reducing regulatory audit findings, tracking the progression of 
security projects and reducing the incident scope and effectiveness of technical 
controls to track success and measure value along the way. Some organisations use 
the reduction in insurance premiums to measure the value of their security controls. 
One participant pointed out instances where value could be measured by linking 
government incentives to security programmes as an additional value aspect. 
However, more commonly, value is measured by understanding risk reduction in a 
qualitative manner. Consequently, limited evidence of security investments being 
evaluated for value from a financial perspective was found.  
Principle 15: Practitioners use all available inputs as described in the previous 
principles to manage information security risks in an organisation. This primary 
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focus is complemented by a constant measurement cycle of success and value, 
often pegged to the risk tolerance levels set by senior management. 
5.4 Relationship between categories 
Figure 32 illustrates the relations between these categories (represented by the 
thickness of the edges) through a network graph where the categories are presented 
as nodes scaled by their prominence in our interviews. Edge thickness indicates how 
connected categories were in the responses of our participants. In particular, we 
observe strong edges in the result categories (manage risk [C18], measure value 
[C19]) and the filter/control categories (corporate finance considerations [C8], 
decision & prioritisation [C11]). This fits well with our security investment mind map 
(Figure 30) that shows which information flows towards these categories. In the 
business environment context, business culture and politics [C2] influences decisions 
and prioritisation as well as the cost of security [C9]. Business strategy and goals 
[C3] likewise influence decision and prioritisation but also play a key role in 
corporate finance considerations and security control [C22] selection. Interestingly, 
the categories we consider to be drivers show fewer ‘thick’ edges but are well 
connected overall. This is especially true for the threat landscape [C28], which is 
connected to the majority of nodes with some notable relation to security controls, 
efficiency & effectiveness [C12] and risk frameworks [C20]. This finding indicates 
the importance of this category for the value assessment of security investments. 
Similarly, we find legal and regulatory [C16] to be well connected with a particular 
strong edge towards the measure value category. Further, the cost of security 
dominates the challenges aspect with the expected strong ties to corporate finance 
considerations and decision & prioritisation. The thick edge to manage risk is a 
reminder of practitioners’ stance on cost-effective risk management practices. 
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threat landscape, risk frameworks and customer requirements. If we can assume that 
security controls are the channel through which information security risk management 
goals are met in an organisation, the described relationship network helps us further 
map a priority landscape for investment evaluations and value discussions.  
By analysing the relationships of decision and prioritisation, we find that the business 
environment categories as well as compliance drivers (legal and regulatory [C16], 
information security management systems [14]) weigh heavy with practitioners. 
Together with challenges on costs, lack of data and service impact [C24], they form 
part of the security controls selection process that aims to manage risk as evidenced 
by the strong edge between the categories. The corporate finance considerations 
category is similar in this aspect but shows a stronger relationship with metrics and 
value-related areas (budget, cost of security, business strategy, measure value). 
Lastly, the measure value category is well connected, indicating that our participants 
discussed value measures in a range of contexts. However, several stronger edges 
point to categories of particular interest. As discussed previously, managing risk 
[C18], which is often expressed in the context of business strategy and goals, is highly 
relevant for security value discussions. The cost of security and corporate finance 
considerations likewise have a direct impact on the value security controls provide to 
an organisation. In this context, we also found that customer experience–efficiency 
and effectiveness is an important relationship to consider. In line with our detailed 
qualitative analysis in section 5.3, the network graph also points towards legal and 
regulatory, competitive edge, threat landscape and risk frameworks as key categories 
for measuring the value of information security investments. 
5.5 Study limitations and challenges to validity 
As with any qualitative study, these results depend on the perspective of the data taken 
by the researcher, experience from which conclusions are drawn and underlying 
information gathered in the field. There is no single true category or interpretation to 
be discovered, but rather as many ways of seeing the data as one can invent (Dey, 
2003). Consequently, the results reflect the uniqueness of the research data and 
situation of each contributing participant. To ensure the validity of the findings, great 
care was taken with the research methodology, as described in section 5.2. Although 
the primary data pool of 18 participants does not make for the largest study, the 
information gathered was found to be rich and approaching saturation quickly due to 
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the niche topic. Furthermore, the study was limited by geographic representation, as 
its focus was on western businesses, particularly those in the United States and United 
Kingdom. The findings presented in this chapter are thus a generalised conclusion 
valid in the context of the qualitative analysis. No claim of correctness outside of this 
can be made; however, the theoretical fundament for further research to verify and 
extend the findings has been set. On this basis, the next chapter aims to verify and 
extend the results by adopting quantitative methodologies. 
5.6 Chapter summary 
By following a Grounded Theory approach to analyse the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with information security practitioners, we identified several key 
categories considered when evaluating security investments and the value of 
information security programmes. Building on the qualitative analysis of the 
interviews, an axial coding approach was used to identify the major categories in the 
data. Through this deconstruction and reassembly process, a clearer understanding of 
the practitioner’s mind map on this topic was obtained, allowing the researchers to 
construct a schematic overview of the security investment evaluation approach. We 
present a simplified but highly relevant framework of the organisational context in 
which investment decisions for information security are made in a professional 
environment. We found that information security investments follow a decision 
support process initiated by ‘driving factors’ and adjusted by ‘challenges and 
constraints’. Based on these driving factors and challenges, professionals select an 
appropriate security capability, which is then refined through corporate decision 
filters. We established that the main purpose of our participants’ information security 
programme is to add value to the organisation, commonly in the form of managed 
risk. Our framework highlights that this process is heavily influenced by the 
underlying business environment that defines what value means to a certain 
organisation. In addition, the detailed analysis was condensed into 15 principles 
aligned with the proposed evaluation framework, providing an indication of the 
importance of each area. The research provides extended insights into the evaluation 
processes of security investments in the context of organisational value frameworks 
by practitioners. Security practitioners rarely apply accounting performance metrics 
such as NPV, ROI and IRR. Rather, investments tend to be allocated through means 
of annually assigned budgets attached to risk-based performance metrics without 
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further hurdle rate requirements. Notable exceptions to this practice where ad hoc 
requirements arise from incidents or specific business demands were found. In such 
situations, security investments were evaluated by using a business case approach 
focused on the value added. In general, decisions on security investments are made in 
the context of a highly complex organisational system relying on a range of unique 
business environment factors (section 5.3.1) closely resembling a multicriteria 
decision approach. These investments are not viewed as an isolated activity but as 
intertwined with wider business requirements, challenges and drivers to deliver value 
in this context. Business environment-related factors, particularly the information 
security function’s strategy, goals and culture, deliver considerable value to an 
organisation. We highlighted several drivers and challenges that practitioners take 
into consideration when handling this topic. In particular, several key drivers (threat 
landscape, legal and regulatory, risk frameworks) and challenges (cost of security, 
uncertainty, lack of data) were found to be a crucial part of security investment 
strategies. 
The analysis presented on this topic offers several distinct benefits: 
• It serves as a baseline to practitioners to create or improve their approach to assess 
the value of information security in organisations. In addition, it serves academics 
by offering real-world data on the key factors in this context. 
• It allows those organisations that have reached a higher maturity level to critically 
review their current processes against the findings in this study, taking special 
note of the identified principles. 
• It provides a common ground for discourse among the professionals involved in 
security investment decision making to better understand the drivers, challenges 
and priorities in this context. 
• It provides input on current developments in security value measurement to 
inform information security governance bodies. 
Building on this, we combine the findings of this detailed qualitative analysis with 
the key concepts extracted from chapter 2 to verify the key factors quantitatively 
(chapter 7). By utilising a survey instrument, the factors in the investment decision 
process are evaluated for latent constructs and confirmed as structural models based 
on the framework constructed in this chapter. 
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Following on from the challenges of threat landscape uncertainty highlighted both in 
chapter 2 and in this chapter, we investigate that problem space more closely next. 
Chapter 6 describes a way in which to utilise external subject matter expertise to 
reduce uncertainty in future information security threat developments. While this 
does not address the large area of uncertainty in information security in its entirety, it 
does investigate one of the most common challenges faced by practitioners when 
making strategic decisions. 
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6 ANTICIPATING DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THREAT LANDSCAPES  
Rapid changes in security threat landscapes cause uncertainty for IT operations and 
security professionals and may force changes to organisations’ security strategy. Data 
that help reduce ambiguity or even predict future developments in this regard can thus 
be of considerable value. In this chapter, we describe a methodology and tool to 
achieve a reduction in uncertainty related to threat developments. We illustrate how 
this has been successfully applied and verified for one particular year. Based on over 
200 security predictions published in 2015, we use a topic modelling approach to 
identify 17 underlying predicted threat developments. To verify the extent to which 
these predicted threat topics were realized throughout 2016, we solicited backward 
looking opinions from respondents with varying experience of IT and information 
security in a survey at the start of 2017. In addition, we reviewed secondary sources 
to corroborate the survey results. Based on the presented findings, we conclude that 
the security predictions made in 2015 for 2016 did foresee notable developments in 
that year. The identified latent predictions were related to hacking political 
campaigns, large-scale data breaches of personal data and health records, increasing 
threats from various types of malware, specifically ransomware, and large-scale 
DDoS attacks. The findings of this chapter are relevant as they can be applied as an 
approach to improve the effectiveness of organisations’ information security strategy. 
The approach allows practitioners to repeat this exercise themselves on an annual 
basis to gain the then latest prediction output as decision support input for their 
information security strategy. 
Information security challenges have received greater priority from the media, 
organisations and governments in recent years (HM Government, 2016; The White 
House, 2015; World Economic Forum, 2015). Yet, despite the increased focus on this 
area, breach notifications and new threats continue to cause considerable economic 
(Chandler, 2016) and socio-political (Crabtree, 2017) impacts. Advances in technical 
security controls and an increasingly paternalistic stance by regulators and 
governments in the context of information security standards are forcing cyber 
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criminals to become innovative. This in turn is causing rapid advances in threat 
landscape developments, leaving security professionals uncertain as to how this 
should be reflected in their security strategies. Managing risks in such an uncertain 
setting is challenging, and thus inputs that help reduce ambiguity or even predict 
future developments can be of immediate economic value.  
6.1 Related work 
An increasing body of research across multiple domains is developing around the 
advantages and disadvantages of predictions and forecasts (Armstrong, 1980; 
Armstrong, Green, & Graefe, 2015; Denrell & Fang, 2010; Leoni, 2008). Indeed, 
views on the general value of forecasting range from critical to cynical (Dubner, 2011; 
Harford, 2016). Hence, the cyber security predictions published annually by security 
vendors, strategy-minded practitioners, industry bodies and laypeople should be 
considered with a critical thinking and bias consciousness mindset (Kallus, 2014). 
This is especially true when data from multiple expert forecasters have been 
combined to improve their results (Ungar, Mellers, Satopää, Tetlock, & Baron, 2012). 
However, although some predictions are simply marketing noise aiming to garner 
attention, the majority are made by subject matter experts with vast experience in this 
area. Hence, such predictions should be considered to be useful information rather 
than simply marketing if they are read with a critical thinking and bias consciousness 
mindset. 
Researchers have begun to propose innovative ways in which to address uncertainty 
in the information security industry. Pandey and Snekkenes (2014) examine the 
applicability of a prediction market approach for forecasting and assessing 
information security events. While they conclude that prediction markets can estimate 
long-term threats efficiently and effectively, they concede that further research on the 
design of such information security prediction markets is needed. Y. Liu et al. (2015) 
investigate the feasibility of forecasting security breaches based on the externally 
observable properties of organisations’ networks, relying on technical measures to 
assess the likelihood of breach attempts affecting single organisations. Bagchi and 
Udo (2003) use a modified Gompertz model to forecast increases in known threat 
vectors based on the sparse data collected on previous incidents. They establish a 
growth pattern linking the use of certain technologies to an increase in associated 
cyber crimes, finding that the proposed model is adequate for short-term predictions 
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in some cases. Based on their Early Model Based Event Recognition using Surrogates 
(EMBERS), Ramakrishnan et al. (2014) use open source indicators such as tweets, 
news sources and blogs to predict civil unrest. Their research confirms the capability 
to forecast significant societal happenings following the described approach, as 
verified by an independent expert group. 
In the next sections, we examine the published security predictions for 2016 collected 
from public sources from October 2015 to January 2016. We provide a high-level 
overview of the underlying themes based on a manual categorisation approach and 
analyse the prediction pool by utilising co-occurrence networks and topic modelling 
with latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003). 
6.2 Overview of security predictions 2016 
The data on security predictions were collected through Internet search alerts, a 
manual review of press releases, vendor notifications and revisiting sources from 
previous years. Only those predictions considered to be relevant were included; 
relevance was defined as ‘informed opinions or assumptions on developments in the 
information security threat landscape throughout 2016 expressed as forecast or 
prediction’. Data collection was conducted on a best effort basis and we do not claim 
complete coverage. However, our prediction dataset covers an exhaustive 238 
individual predictions from 41 sources. 
In the first step of the analysis, we distinguished between predictions discussing an 
expected change in the security threat landscape (e.g. “Increased targeting of Apple 
devices by cyber criminals”) and those that provide general opinions on developments 
in the information security industry (e.g. “More Chief Information Security Officers 
will be hired”). For this research. we focused on security threat predictions rather than 
general developments. This reduced the dataset to 187 predictions. The next step was 
to categorise each prediction to align it with one of the 15 categories. These 15 high-
level categories were originally defined in 2013 by a working group of security 
professionals in the finance industry based on predictions made at that time and 
carried forward for consistency. As with any categorisation attempt, the problem of 
defining too few or too many categories is a valid topic of discussion. We provide an 
alternative view on this in a later section. Figure 33 provides an overview of the 
categories and their popularity in terms of the 2016 predictions, showing topical areas 
Chapter 6: Anticipating developments in threat landscapes 
135 
and noticeable developments expected in the security threat landscape in that year 
according to our sources. 
 
Figure 33 - Popularity of security predictions in 2016 by category 
Although this figure already provides us with an intuition as to the direction in which 
threats may develop in the future, it is important to consider the source of these 
predictions. Armstrong et al. (2015) advise that good results can be achieved by 
combining forecasts from eight to 12 experts whose knowledge of the problem is 
diverse and whose biases are likely to differ. Hence, it is crucial to investigate if these 
categories are supported by multiple predictions made by only one vendor or if 
broader consensus from multiple sources exists. Figure 34 shows a detailed 
breakdown of the prediction distribution by vendor, highlighting that threat 
developments in the category “Internet of Things” are a widespread concern across 
most sources. Likewise, only one source is driving concerns in the “Denial of Service” 
category. However, the predictions for 2016 appear to be a balanced distribution 
across categories and sources in general. 
Chapter 6: Anticipating developments in threat landscapes 
136 
 
Figure 34 - Matrix of the 2016 predictions by vendor 
The analysis of the 2016 predictions allows us to deduce that our sources indicate 
noticeable developments, particularly in the areas of “Internet of Things”, “Organised 
Crime Attacks” and “Malware”. However, how does this compare with the previous 
year? Figure 35 compares the predictions from 2014, 2015 and 2016 to understand 
the development trends over time. 
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individual predictions with a predefined category is rarely straightforward either, as 
sources may cover various aspects in one distinct prediction. Consequently, we are 
forced to apply a subjective ‘best fit’ approach. Recognising these challenges, we 
investigate an alternative view on the dataset that is largely unbiased but requires 
more effort to interpret the result. In the next section, we review the prediction dataset 
by applying text analysis approaches. 
6.3 Prediction text analysis 
In the first step, we define the key terms in our prediction dataset. “R” software 
provides a useful platform for this, as we can import our dataset and use the text 
mining module tm_map (Meyer et al., 2008). We apply corpus preparation tasks 
(remove punctuation, strip whitespaces, convert to lower case and remove stop words) 
except stemming (Porter, 1997) and create a (sparse) DTM. This allows us to calculate 
a correlation matrix for the key terms across the definition dataset (Figure 36). We 
can see that some relations are forming, such as Internet/devices, 
business/information/data/target and attackers/malware. 
 
Figure 36 - Correlation plot of the key prediction terms 
While this figure provides some basic insights, it is a rather limited view that does not 
lend itself to drawing deep conclusions about the underlying context. To gain a more 
meaningful view of the contextual relationships in our dataset, we used co-occurrence 
network analysis (Higuchi, 2015; Rice & Danowski, 1993). In textual analysis, co-
occurrence networks show words with similar appearance patterns and thus high 
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degrees of co-occurrence. The approach is based on the idea that a word’s meaning is 
related to the concepts to which it is connected. It also has the benefit that no coder 
bias is introduced other than to determine which words are examined (Ryan & 
Bernard, 2003). However, network graphs can become too crowded unless sensible 
restrictions are applied. By filtering out terms with a frequency below 15 when 
producing the co-occurrence network graph, we reduced the information presented 
while preserving the important context. 
Figure 37 presents a headline view of the important underlying concepts inherent to 
the words used in the prediction set. In addition to the minimum spanning tree, we 
added community detection to further emphasise the connected components. The 
node size illustrates the term frequency and detected communities are highlighted in 
different colours. Based on the dataset, we found that the ‘random walk’ or ‘walktrap’ 
algorithm (Pons & Latapy, 2005) provided the subjectively best community detection 
approach. Combined with minimum spanning tree, this explains not only the key 
concepts but also how words are grouped into communities. 
 
Figure 37 - Community-enhanced network graph of the 2016 security 
predictions  
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Looking at the randomly coloured communities, we see surprisingly coherent topics 
forming. Some are close to our manual approach such as “Internet of Things” 
(purple), “Ransomware” (pink) and “General Organised Crime” (green). However, 
we also note additional topics of interest not as obvious previously; our prediction 
sources highlight areas of concern with healthcare incidents and industry insurance 
policies (red), social media (dark purple), transport layer encryption (orange) and 
malicious vendor code (yellow). Despite this improved understanding of predicted 
developments in the 2016 threat landscape, an unbiased identification of all the 
underlying topics inherent to our dataset would be ideal. One of the ways in which to 
do this is to use topic models. For this research, we therefore utilise LDA, as described 
by Blei et al. (2003), to find our ‘latent’ prediction topics. Figure 38 summarises the 
approach adopted. 
 
 
Figure 38 - Overview of the study approach 
To understand the number of topics in our dataset, we utilised the harmonic mean 
approach (Ponweiser, 2012), which identified 17 topics to be the optimum. Hence, 
our manual categorisation approach with 15 topics was reasonable. Table 24 shows a 
sample of the LDA output for all 17 topics with the first six words associated with 
each topic. As this is an automated approach, not every topic makes immediate sense; 
nonetheless, the headlines paint a surprisingly clear picture, especially regarding 
Internet of Things, insurance risks, hackers targeting social campaigns and card 
payment issues. 
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Id Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 
1 Organisation Cyber Security Insurance Risk Policy 
2 Device Iot Connect Consumer Smart However 
3 Data Information Breach Personal Steal Health 
4 Campaign Hacker Email Online Social News 
5 Apps Vulnerability Number App Apple Android 
6 Card Payment Attacker Fraud Credit Process 
7 Security Cloud Network Party Application Access 
8 Large Next Become Protect Offer Start 
9 Certificate Traffic Encrypt SSL Trust Impact 
10 Business Base Shift Approach Protection Activity 
11 Malware Threat Time Opportunity Actor Common 
12 Attack System Threat Compromise Predict DDOS 
13 Internet Continue Change Provide Another Exploit 
14 Ransomware Target Criminal Ransom Hacktivist Engineering 
15 Year Expect Result High Researcher Global 
16 Require Victim System Enterprise Software Support 
17 Increase Cyber security Find Management Government Place 
Table 24 - Security prediction topics identified by LDA 
Uncertainty in threat developments is one of the largest challenges for security 
practitioners as we found in chapter 5. The options for anticipating potentially critical 
changes in the threat landscape that may impact security strategy are limited; yet, 
predictions about these developments tend to be discarded as marketing noise. In this 
section, we investigate how security professionals can use such data to reduce 
uncertainty and refine their security strategies. We showed possible approaches for 
conducting such an exercise with the example of an exhaustive collection of security 
predictions for 2016. We also illustrated how even a simple manual categorisation 
can lead to quick and useful results. Utilising more advanced text analysis and topic 
modelling approaches provided deeper insights into the heart of security predictions. 
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Understanding what was predicted to happen and knowing whether such predictions 
were realised are different things. Hence, we applied a questionnaire-based approach 
a year after the predictions were originally published to evaluate the validity of the 
threat topics predicted as well as reviewed secondary sources. This survey collected 
ex-post data on security threat developments in 2016 from respondents with varying 
expertise. Participants responded during February 2017 to ensure that developments 
in 2016 were still present in their minds, thereby reducing the temporal distance 
effects (Day & Bartels, 2008). For survey participant recruitment, we followed a 
cluster sampling approach, soliciting responses from professional networks in the 
information security field as well as online through Amazon Mechanical Turk. This 
approach was suitable for our study, as Behrend, Sharek, Meade, and Wiebe (2011) 
conclude that a crowdsourcing sample behaves similarly to participants from a 
traditional psychology participant pool. Particular attention was paid to the task 
design and remuneration offered, to ensure microworking tasks are meaningful and 
microworkers are sufficiently engaged (B. Liu & Sundar, 2018; Paolacci & Chandler, 
2014). To ensure the validity and reliability of the survey content, we enlisted the help 
of an experienced survey designer. In addition, we ran short test surveys to gather 
feedback. The focus of this pretesting was to confirm that the questions were easy to 
understand and instructions clear as well as to solicit feedback on the survey flow and 
response options. Following this, we ran a pilot study with selected participants 
including both cyber security experts and laypeople. For this pilot study, we selected 
known participants to ensure feedback was open and direct as well as considered in 
the context of the cyber security skill level. This helped us identify any remaining 
issues the main study would encounter and ensure the reliability of the results. 
For the survey, the 17 topics were transformed into ordinal questions to be rated by 
participants on a five-point Likert-type scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, 
agree, strongly agree). In addition, we added a categorical question for participants to 
rate their familiarity with information security. The topic output was presented in raw 
form as obtained from the LDA analysis (Figure 39) to minimise the potential 
influence of the research team on participants’ interpretation of the topic. However, 
based on feedback from pretesting, an interpretation was provided only for the first 
topic as an example. Following an introduction to the research, we stated the purpose 
of the survey and provided instructions for its completion. Participants were then 
asked to review a ranked list of words relevant to a security prediction topic. Based 
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on feedback, additional guidance was provided to clarify that those terms higher in 
the list were more relevant to the particular topic. It was also explained that the red 
bar signifies the relevance of the terms for this particular topic, whereas the blue bar 
expresses the overall relevance of the term in the context of the survey. For the list of 
terms in the first question (Figure 39), we added a sample interpretation as suggested 
by participants in the trial survey: 
“This topic could be interpreted as a notable prediction in 2016 for organisations 
to use cyber security insurance to manage their risks. Considering the list of 
words, do you agree or disagree that this was a notable development in 2016?” 
 
Figure 39 - Example of the presentation of a topic in the survey 
To present the questions in this form, we used LDAvis (Sievert & Shirley, 2014) to 
visualise the topic. Figure 39 illustrates how the topic model output was presented, 
showing the key terms as well as their frequency within the topic (red) and across all 
topics (blue). High-ranked terms such as ‘organisation’, ‘cyber’, ‘risk’ and 
‘insurance’ highlight the relevant threat developments for 2016 expected by 
participants. This approach identifies a genuinely informative structure in the 
underlying data and produces topics that connect with our intuitive understanding of 
the semantic content. Topics are typically interpretable and can be useful in many 
applications (Steyvers & Griffiths, 2007). Finally, all survey responses were reviewed 
and responses with irregular response patterns or failed attention checks were 
removed. 
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6.4 Survey analysis 
We divided the sample of 134 participants into four subgroups based on their 
experience of cyber security: no experience, novice, intermediate and expert (Table 
25). Most participants self-rated themselves as cyber security novices (61%), while 
only 5% stated that they had no experience of the topic. In summary, 95% of 
participants had some experience of cyber security. 
Experience Number Percentage 
No experience 7 5.2 
Novice 82 61.2 
Intermediate 31 23.1 
Expert 14 10.5 
Total 134 100 
Table 25 - Participant distribution by experience 
Topic Mean Median Mode SD 
Topic 1 3.791 4 4 0.893 
Topic 2 3.366 3 4 1.052 
Topic 3 4.030 4 4 0.941 
Topic 4 4.187 4 5 0.982 
Topic 5 3.582 4 4 0.895 
Topic 6 3.813 4 4 0.997 
Topic 7 3.515 4 4 1.095 
Topic 8 2.418 2 2 0.983 
Topic 9 3.694 4 4 0.860 
Topic 10 2.515 2 2 1.122 
Topic 11 3.940 4 4 0.964 
Topic 12 3.910 4 4 1.072 
Topic 13 3.261 3 4 1.025 
Topic 14 3.970 4 4 0.933 
Topic 15 2.813 3 2 1.209 
Topic 16 2.709 3 3 0.932 
Topic 17 3.799 4 4 0.899 
Table 26 - Average sample responses for each topic  
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The descriptive statistics in Table 26 show that participants agreed (rating of 4) with 
most of the presented predictions, with a limited number being rated as neutral (3) or 
disagree (2). Based on the mean agreement with a topic, Topic 4, Topic 3, Topic 14 
and Topic 11 - in that order - received the highest scores (i.e. showed the highest 
agreement with the prediction coming to pass in 2016), whereas Topic 15, Topic 16, 
Topic 10 and Topic 8 received the lowest scores. By subgroup, Topic 4 received the 
highest scores across all groups (excluding the smallest subgroup of ‘no experience’) 
with similar results for Topics 3 and 11 (Table 27). Topics 10, 8, 15 and 16 received 
the lowest scores across all groups with the exception of Topic 3 for the ‘no 
experience’ subgroup. 
 
Rank Total sample No 
experience 
Novice Intermediate Expert 
1 Topic 4 Topic 11 Topic 4 Topic 4 Topic 4 
2 Topic 3 Topic 1 Topic 3 Topic 12 Topic 11 
3 Topic 14 Topic 17 Topic 14 Topic 3 Topic 3 
4 Topic 11 Topic 12 Topic 11 Topic 14 Topic 1 
5 Topic 12 Topic 4 Topic 6 Topic 17 Topic 9 
6 Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 1 Topic 9 Topic 14 
7 Topic 17 Topic 14 Topic 12 Topic 11 Topic 6 
8 Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 17 Topic 6 Topic 7 
9 Topic 9 Topic 5 Topic 9 Topic 1 Topic 12 
10 Topic 5 Topic 6 Topic 5 Topic 5 Topic 17 
11 Topic 7 Topic 9 Topic 7 Topic 13 Topic 5 
12 Topic 2 Topic 16 Topic 2 Topic 7 Topic 2 
13 Topic 13 Topic 13 Topic 13 Topic 2 Topic 13 
14 Topic 15 Topic 15 Topic 15 Topic 16 Topic 15 
15 Topic 16 Topic 3 Topic 16 Topic 15 Topic 16 
16 Topic 10 Topic 10 Topic 10 Topic 10 Topic 8 
17 Topic 8 Topic 8 Topic 8 Topic 8 Topic 10 
Table 27 - Topics ranked by subgroup (from highest to lowest) 
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As expected, we found corresponding patterns when visualising the responses by 
subgroup and topic, including the shift left for Topic 3 in the ‘no experience’ subgroup 
(Figure 40).
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Figure 40 - Response distribution by subgroup and topic
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To better understand the relevance of the differences in the results, we tested for 
normality and statistical significance. We used Shapiro–Wilk tests to assess the 
normality of the data throughout the sample. The results showed that the p-values are 
below 0.05, allowing us to conclude that the data distribution is non-normal. As a 
consequence, we used non-parametric tests for further analysis, namely Mann–
Whitney U-tests to compare topics and maximum likelihood ratio chi-square tests to 
compare subgroups (McHugh, 2013). 
We first conducted a Wilcoxon rank sum test with a continuity correction to compare 
topics for the total sample. The results showed high statistical significance (p<0.001) 
between most topics, confirming that the differences were not merely due to chance. 
In other words, our participants made a conscious effort to rate each topic based on 
their judgment, leading to distinct results. We then repeated this for the subgroups 
and found comparable results for ‘novice’, ‘intermediate’ and expert’. Interestingly, 
the ‘no experience’ subgroup showed low statistical significance for their responses 
between topics, suggesting that participants needed to have a minimum level of 
familiarity with cyber security to make sense of the information presented. It appears 
this group struggled to connect the terms presented for each prediction with the real-
world context. By contrast, the more experienced subgroups were able to interpret the 
terms in the context, thus validating the proposed approach. To better understand the 
significance of the differences between subgroups (Table 27), we ran maximum 
likelihood ratio chi-square tests. As shown in Table 28, we found no statistically 
significant differences in the results. Indeed, only for Topic 3 did we approach weak 
significance (at the 0.1 level), as visually confirmed in Figure 40. 
 
 
Chi2 statistic p-value 
Topic 1 16.403 0.173 
Topic 2 4.867 0.962 
Topic 3 19.499 0.077 
Topic 4 14.230 0.286 
Topic 5 9.794 0.634 
Topic 6 7.537 0.820 
Topic 7 11.397 0.495 
Topic 8 13.687 0.321 
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Topic 9 13.356 0.147 
Topic 10 4.125 0.981 
Topic 11 7.166 0.846 
Topic 12 13.030 0.367 
Topic 13 17.550 0.130 
Topic 14 9.587 0.652 
Topic 15 8.701 0.728 
Topic 16 9.541 0.656 
Topic 17 7.704 0.564 
Table 28 - Maximum likelihood ratio chi-square subgroup test results 
These results indicated that none of the differences between the subgroups were 
statistically significant, excluding Topics 3 and 13. For Topic 3, the difference 
between the ‘no experience’ subgroup and the other subgroups is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. For Topic 13, the difference between the ‘novice’ and 
‘intermediate’ subgroups was statistically significant (p<0.05). In general, these U-
test results were consistent with those of the maximum likelihood ratio chi-square 
test, allowing us to conclude that participants’ responses were independent of their 
experience given a minimum level of familiarity with security. 
Next, we analysed which topics showed the strongest agreement among our 
participants. As the mean, standard deviation and entropy measures are inadequate to 
capture proximities in ordinal scales, we calculated Van Der Eijk (2001) Agreement 
A as well as Tastle and Wierman (2007) Consensus score (TW score hereafter) to 
investigate this further (Table 29). Both of these measurements were designed to 
analyse ordinal data by using Likert-type scales. Van der Eijk’s measurement ranges 
from ˗1 (disagree) to 1 (agreement). This scale thus represents a weighted average of 
the degree of agreement that exists in the simple component parts with the frequency 
distribution considered and does not suffer from the inconsistencies of more 
conventional measures (Krymkowski, Manning, & Valliere, 2009). The TW score is 
a probability distribution over a discrete set of choices with ordinal values that range 
from 0 (complete disagreement) to 1 (complete agreement). The scores for each topic 
were in line with the results illustrated in Figure 40; the total sample generally agreed 
on whether a security prediction was correct or not. 
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Topic Agreement A TW 
Topic 1 0.596 0.716 
Topic 2 0.388 0.605 
Topic 3 0.577 0.708 
Topic 4 0.593 0.652 
Topic 5 0.578 0.683 
Topic 6 0.534 0.664 
Topic 7 0.351 0.585 
Topic 8 0.5 0.647 
Topic 9 0.575 0.706 
Topic 10 0.323 0.571 
Topic 11 0.541 0.688 
Topic 12 0.5 0.635 
Topic 13 0.437 0.618 
Topic 14 0.59 0.715 
Topic 15 0.214 0.527 
Topic 16 0.47 0.665 
Topic 17 0.556 0.702 
Table 29 - Agreement measures for all 17 topics 
Figure 41 provides an overview of the 17 prediction topics by these two scores. Topics 
1, 14, 3, 9 and 17 were seen to have the strongest Agreement A and TW scores. At 
the other end of the scale, respondents had differing views on Topic 15, which also 
showed the highest standard deviation in our earlier tests. As all the scores showed 
agreement (for both measures), we observed general agreement among participants 
regardless of whether the rating was ‘prediction was correct’ or ‘prediction was 
incorrect’. 
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Figure 41 - Scatterplot for all topics: Agreement A and TW scores 
6.5 Review of the 17 prediction topics 
In this section, we provide a brief interpretation and review of the topics as well as 
present the key measurements for each prediction topic. 
Topic 1: Organisations will increasingly make use of cyber security insurance to 
manage their risks in that space 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.791 8 0.716 0.596 True 
We found that participants followed our sample interpretation of this topic. With 
several large-scale breaches reported in 2015, it appears that our sources predicted 
considerable demand for cyber insurance services in 2016. Although this is not a strict 
threat prediction, it is clearly relevant to practitioners and their security strategy. Our 
participant pool agrees that this prediction was accurate. It also appears to resonate 
with the reports in the press (Muncaster, 2017; Murgia & Ralph, 2016) and by 
research institutes (GlobalData, 2017). 
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Topic 2: Internet of Things and connected devices will be a relevant security threat 
area 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.366 12 0.605 0.388 True 
This topic was expected to be one of the easier predictions to interpret, and several 
comments agreed with our own thoughts (“Totally makes sense. Internet of Things 
was huge... and is still huge. This was predicted to be a big problem - and is”). Much 
to our surprise, however, the prediction did not rank very high, especially among our 
two most experienced subgroups. However, after reviewing the threat developments 
in 2016, this prediction was shown to be correct (ENISA, 2017; McLellan, 2016; 
Symantec, 2016; Woolf, 2016). 
Topic 3: Data breaches and stealing personal information or health records will be a 
relevant security threat area 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
4.030 2 0.708 0.577 True 
Data breaches and stealing personal data are likely to remain a threat for the 
foreseeable future (Morgan, 2016). This was also observed by our participants 
(“There were a few major data breaches in 2016, at least one of them reaching record 
proportions”). The mention of health records in this topic is noteworthy as it reflects 
the breach reality, at least in the first half of 2016 (McLellan, 2016). 
Topic 4: A relevant security threat area is developing at the intersection of hackers, 
campaigns, social media, news, candidates and elections 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
4.187 1 0.652 0.593 True 
This was the 2016 prediction about which our participants agreed most strongly. This 
strong agreement was likely to have been supported by the timing of the survey in 
early 2017 when the media frequently reported on irregular activities in the US 
presidential election in 2016 (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Gilsinan & Krishnadev, 
2017). Some of the comments by our participants pointed to a link with the US 
election as well. If this threat is related to hacking activities, it is definitively a real 
cyber security threat. Hence, based on our survey, general reporting and other sources 
(ENISA, 2017; McLellan, 2016; Symantec, 2016), this prediction was accurate. 
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Topic 5: Vulnerabilities in large numbers of mobile apps (Android, Apple) and 
malicious mobile apps will be a security threat for users 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.582 10 0.683 0.578 True 
We found agreement among our participants that this prediction topic was relevant in 
2016. Although security issues in the mobile space did not dominate security news 
compared with other topics, it was nonetheless a notable development (Murray, 
2017). Indeed, McLellan (2016) reports that “[m]obile malware is certainly still on 
the increase. In Q1 2016 alone, CERT UK saw 48 percent of the full-year 2015 
amount of unique mobile malware samples”. We also noted the corresponding 
remarks in the ENISA (2017) threat report. 
Topic 6: Attacks on credit cards and payment (or financial) processes with fraudulent 
intentions will be a relevant security threat in 2016 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.813 6 0.664 0.534 True 
This topic is as straightforward to interpret as cyber security-related financial fraud 
developments. Our participants agreed that this was a problem in 2016 but also 
commented that this was no surprise. The prediction was correct, as evidenced by the 
number of large-scale breaches (Buntinx, 2017; SC Magazine, 2016). Somewhat on 
the fringes of this prediction, we find noteworthy attacks on financial systems such 
as SWIFT (Finkle, 2016), reinforcing the need to focus on the predicted developments 
in this threat area. 
Topic 7: Cloud security and third-party network/application access control will see 
developing threats in 2016 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.515 11 0.585 0.351 True 
We observed general agreement by our participants that this prediction topic saw 
relevant developments in 2016. However, this degree of agreement was less clear than 
that for other topics. Publicly reported incidents in this space were scarce, with the 
most recognised the DropBox breach (Gibbs, 2016). Cloud-related breaches such as 
Yahoo (McGoogan, 2016) and Oracle (Kang, 2016) should be considered under this 
topic. 
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Topic 8: No interpretation 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
2.418 17 0.647 0.5 False 
In many cases, the output of topic models allows for the sensible interpretation of the 
underlying topic, but this is not always the case. The terms listed under this topic were 
too abstract to make a useful prediction. Participants did not see a relevant 
development, which is reflected in the scores. This is a limitation of the proposed 
approach. 
Topic 9: We will see security threats developing with abuse/impact on trust in 
certificates and traffic encryption 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.694 9 0.706 0.575 True 
We found general agreement that this prediction was accurate. In 2016, there was a 
steady stream of privacy-related discussions on wiretapping and traffic interception, 
the abuse of certificate trust (J. Chen, 2016) and the erosion of trust in certificate 
authorities (Burton, 2017). If the prediction was broadened to encompass the wider 
topic of encryption, it becomes even more relevant, with high-profile cases such as 
mobile device encryption (Schneier, 2016) and the ransomware epidemic that became 
widespread in 2016. 
Topic 10: Businesses with a customer base in Europe will shift their data protection 
approach 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
2.515 16 0.571 0.323 False 
Topic 10 was another difficult-to-interpret list of terms. It predicted that organisations 
would focus on changes in data ownership and data protection triggered by the 
upcoming General Data Protection Regulation for Europe. Participants felt that the 
topic mainly concerned generic business risk and did not describe a relevant security 
development in 2016. 
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Topic 11: Opportunistic malware attacks will remain a common attack vector for 
users 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.940 4 0.688 0.541 True 
As expected, malware continued to be a major threat in 2016, as evidenced by the 
high ranking of this topic. Indeed, ENISA (2017) states that “[m]alware clearly tops 
cyber-threats for yet another year” and delves into the various aspects of malware 
observed in 2016 (see Topic 14). 
Topic 12: We will see an increase in attacks on systems and infrastructure with the 
goal to compromise credentials and conduct DDoS 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.910 5 0.635 0.5 True 
Participants focused on the DDoS aspect of this topic in their comments because of 
the large-scale attacks regularly reported towards the end of 2016 related to the Mirai 
botnet (Nordrum, 2016). Denial of service was not only a continued threat in 2016; it 
reached new levels of capability. Similarly to the other top-ranked threats, this topic 
is also confirmed by ENISA (2017) and others to be a noteworthy development. 
Topic 13: The Internet will continue to change and provide new targets for 
exploitation 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.261 13 0.618 0.437 True 
This topic was interpreted as developing a threat landscape and attack vector for 
Internet-connected devices. Several terms such as ‘Chinese’, ‘power’, ‘federal’ and 
‘terrorist’ were often associated with threats to critical infrastructure. While 
participants acknowledged the threat, they expressed that there were no obvious 
developments. We would align this topic with the Internet of Things trend rapidly 
changing the shape of the Internet and providing a rich attack surface. However, this 
topic is not particularly relevant alone. 
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Topic 14: Criminals will use ransomware and engineer new ransom techniques 
(targeting small businesses and platforms) 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.970 3 0.715 0.59 True 
As discussed in Topic 11, malware was a key threat in 2016, and this was strongly 
driven by ransomware variants. Indeed, according to Mathews (2017), SonicWall 
reported 638 million attacks in 2016, 167 times the number in 2015. Similarly, our 
participants agreed that this was a relevant threat development. We also note limited 
evidence of new ransom techniques affecting mobile devices (Forrest, 2016), Internet 
of Things (Schneier, 2017) and enterprise platforms (Goodin, 2017). 
Topic 15: Hacking is expected to result in higher damage at the global level 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
2.813 14 0.527 0.214 False 
As with Topic 8, the output for this topic required too much interpretation to make a 
useful prediction. Participants did not see a relevant development, as reflected in the 
scores.  
Topic 16: Threat developments in 2016 will require enterprises to increase efforts and 
resources to support and maintain their systems and software to avoid becoming a 
victim 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
2.709 15 0.665 0.47 False 
While this topic was difficult to interpret, the general position of participants was that 
this was no more a challenge in 2016 than in previous years. 
Topic 17: Managing cyber security and anonymity online will be an increasing 
concern for governments 
Mean Rank/mean TW Agreement A Accurate 
3.799 7 0.702 0.556 True 
The underlying topic here is the challenges of managing cyber security at the 
governmental level. Lower ranked terms such as state, legislation, cyber crime, APT 
and anonymity provide an intuition as to what the prediction sources described. The 
additional comments in the survey showed that participants agree with the notion that 
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governments are increasingly addressing this area through rising funding and 
regulation. This broad topic is related to Topics 4 and 9. 
6.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we investigated an approach for security practitioners to address one 
of the largest challenges when making value-based decisions in information security: 
reducing uncertainty in an evolving threat landscape. We used LDA, a probabilistic 
topic modelling approach, to identify 17 latent security threat prediction topics from 
241 individual security predictions made for 2016. To verify the extent to which these 
predictions were realised, we gathered input from survey participants with varying 
security experience in early 2017. Presented with a description of these 17 topics, 
participants indicated whether there was indeed a notable development in that context 
in 2016. We found that participants saw relevant threat developments for 13 of the 17 
topics with varying degrees of agreement. Moreover, the results were largely stable 
across subgroups of participants with various levels of experience. To better 
understand the robustness of the results, we conducted additional consensus-based 
tests, which added further weight to the survey results taken from the questionnaire. 
The presented results allow us to conclude that the security predictions published for 
2016 did forecast notable developments in the field. According to the survey findings, 
the confirmed top predictions were related to hacking political campaigns (Topic 4), 
large-scale data breaches of personal data and health records (Topic 3), increasing 
threats from various types of malware (Topic 11), specifically ransomware (Topic 
14), and large-scale DDoS attacks (Topic 14). We further used secondary sources to 
review threat developments in this context and thus provide support to the 
conclusions. 
Our research findings are relevant to security practitioners and decision makers, who 
can use this approach to reduce uncertainty and improve the effectiveness of 
organisations’ security programmes. Our approach helps tune down noise and outliers 
in the annual security prediction cycle, while focusing on the underlying threat 
developments without investing time in extensive trend studies or expensive security 
strategy consultancy engagements. The approach can be used as a basis to further 
refine organisations’ security programmes by considering the circumstances and 
requirements applicable to the specific environment. By directing budget and efforts 
to the identified threat areas, investment in security can be optimised based on 
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anticipated real-world developments. Although a tailored list of threats for any 
particular organisation might be difficult to supply, understanding the direction in 
which subject matter experts are forecasting future threat trends is advantageous.  
Our approach makes conscious trade-offs and such limitations should be noted. The 
prediction corpus was condensed to a limited number of high-level topics by using 
LDA. As a consequence, the known limitations of LDA must be considered (Tang, 
Meng, Nguyen, Mei, & Zhang, 2014). Predefining the number of topics is a common 
challenge. We applied the harmonic mean approach proposed by Griffiths and 
Steyvers (2004), which is based on mathematical averages approximated from a 
specified multivariate probability distribution. For our dataset, we found 17 topics to 
be the optimum. In addition, the general question of whether a variant of LDA (e.g. 
hierarchical or enriched LDA) would produce better results in our case was not tested. 
Furthermore, we decided to present the topic/term list to participants without 
providing our interpretation to reduce the risk of influencing the rating. This required 
survey participants to draw their own conclusions, which is more demanding on their 
mental capacity and time, a common concern for interviews and survey tools. We 
used quality assurance questions in the survey design and added additional tests for 
subgroups and agreement scores to verify the robustness of our results. We took care 
to provide guidance on the time horizon participants should consider in their 
responses, but we cannot rule out a certain level of recency bias for some responses. 
To control for this, we provided media sources as corroborating data. Lastly, it must 
be noted that we describe a methodology and tool to achieve a reduction in uncertainty 
related to threat developments. We illustrate how this has been successfully applied 
and verified for one particular year. It is upon the practitioner to repeat this exercise 
on an annual basis to gain the then latest prediction output of course. 
In the next chapter, we extend the research findings of previous chapters, particularly 
chapter 2, chapter 5 and this chapter, to create a conceptual latent model for 
information security value. In particular, we collect quantitative data from 
practitioners on the key components of information security value as discussed in 
previous chapters. The survey data are then utilised to verify a conceptual model as 
well as latent variables and measurement variables through structural equation 
modelling. 
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7 ASSESSING THE LATENT STRUCTURAL 
MODEL OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
VALUE IN ORGANISATIONS 
Data is rapidly becoming one of the most important assets in global markets, and 
criminals are spotting opportunities to exploit new potential income sources. In 
response to this, organizations are dedicating increasing resources to information 
security programs. However, faced with unrelenting breach reports and rising costs, 
decision makers inevitably wonder which type of security investment is of real value 
to the organisation. In this chapter, we discuss a model describing the underlying key 
constructs for assessing information security value in an organisation. Based on latent 
variables and criteria identified as part of our research, we use a partial least squares 
structural equation modeling approach to verify the model’s soundness. We identify 
five crucial variables for value-focused information security investment. The 
relationships among these latent variables are investigated and validated through 
common validity measures. We provide additional background on the topic and the 
design process in section 7.1 and 7.2. We find the conceptual model to be sound and 
suitable as underlying structure for adoption in our MCDA model (chapter 8).  
As noted in chapters 2, 5 and 6, there are several common factors and relations in the 
context of information security value. In chapter 2, we investigated the components 
typically used to assess the economic value of information security investments in the 
academic literature. In chapter 5, we analysed senior practitioner interview data and 
obtained real-world input on the topic. Both these chapters illustrated the 
overwhelming complexity that security practitioners face when adding value to an 
organisation. Following the analysis of interviews discussing the value of information 
security and data extracted from the systematic literature on this topic, we defined a 
structural model and measurement variables. We then used this platform as the basis 
to design a survey instrument to assess our conceptual model through SEM, which is 
described in this chapter. 
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Throughout our research, we repeatedly heard that data are rapidly becoming one of 
the most important assets in global markets. Data are no longer just a by-product, but 
rather a driver of new and improved business models that generate high value. Hence, 
interest in this area is increasing rapidly—and not just for legitimate businesses (The 
Economist, 2017). Criminals are quick to spot opportunities and are adapting to these 
new value streams. Indeed, organised crime is embracing and exploiting billions of 
dollars of digital opportunities (Dethlefs, 2015; Hyman, 2013; Ponemon Institute, 
2017). With losses at this magnitude and still rising, governments and regulators are 
playing an active role in encouraging businesses to protect their information assets 
(Pawlak & Wendling, 2013). This is not lost on senior executives, leading the security 
of an organisation’s information assets to become a common agenda item in most 
boardrooms. As a result, security professionals are tasked with ensuring organisations 
are secure by addressing which of their assets should be protected, how they should 
be protected and how such protection adds value. However, although a substantial 
research body on information security risk management examines which assets to 
protect and how to protect them, research on the value of information security is 
scarce albeit rising (Anderson, 2001; Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2016; Rue & Pfleeger, 
2009) and the adoption of research findings by practitioners in the real world remains 
lacking. To improve the practical implementation of information security, we extend 
the body of knowledge by proposing an evidence-based model combining theoretical 
work with real-world experience. Recognising that information security is an 
interdisciplinary field with requirements along several corporate dimensions 
(managerial, organisational, cultural, technical, financial), we follow an exploratory 
convergent mixed method research approach (Creswell, 2013) to examine 
information security investment in this context. The background to this is described 
in the previous chapters, where we analysed the interview data obtained from senior 
practitioners and identify a range of key aspects they consider when investing in 
information security. We now combine those findings and the results of chapter 2 to 
create a new conceptual model. To verify the proposed model, we analyse the 
quantitative data gathered through a survey instrument designed for use with SEM. 
This approach allows us to investigate several key questions such as is there an 
underlying structural model for information security investment, what are the 
significant components and relationships in the model and what are the indicators of 
the components and how are they measured? Such a cross-sectional survey approach 
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is suitable for answering the key questions such as ‘what’, ‘how much’ and ‘why’ 
(Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). Figure 42 provides a schematic overview of the 
steps followed in this research to create the proposed model. 
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Figure 42 - Research approach for the structural model analysis 
7.1 Related work 
Early discussion on information security was mostly driven by technical aspects 
(Hitchings, 1995; von Solms, 1996), but it quickly moved onto governance topics 
(Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Shuchih Ernest & Chienta 
Bruce, 2006) as well as focusing on value (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič, 2008; Dhillon 
& Torkzadeh, 2006). Work on the economic aspects of information security 
(Anderson, 2001; Gordon & Loeb, 2002a; Hoo, 2000) was rapidly extended upon by 
research investigating the allocation and optimisation of security investment. For 
example, by taking into account the vulnerability of information and potential loss 
from a security breach, Gordon and Loeb (2002a) approach the topic as an optimal 
stopping problem and present a model to calculate optimal investment levels. Their 
model has been critically reviewed and extended by several researchers, including the 
original authors (Baryshnikov, 2012; Gordon et al., 2016; Matsuura, 2009; 
Willemson, 2010). Similarly, an ROI approach aligned with commonly used 
accounting principles was popular in the early days of research in this field (Al-
Humaigani & Dunn, 2003; A. Davis, 2005; Mizzi, 2010; Sonnenreich, Albanese, & 
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Stout, 2006). However, it also attracted criticism because of the ambiguity in the 
underlying data as well as general applicability of the metric to information security 
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002b; Wood & Parker, 2004). Indeed, the publication of research 
on this approach and other related accounting metrics such as NPV has declined over 
time, as shown in chapter 2. 
Cremonini (2005) improves on earlier approaches by introducing the concept of 
attacker returns. The author proposes coupling the ROI index with a corresponding 
ROA index that aims to measure attackers’ convenience (or inconvenience). The 
notion of ROA is also a key component of game theory-based models. Bistarelli et al. 
(2007) use the concept of defence trees as an extension of attack trees with 
countermeasures and economic quantitative indexes such as ROI and ROA to 
evaluate the effectiveness of investment. Cavusoglu et al. (2008) argue that a game-
theoretic approach is suitable as attackers modify their strategies in response to 
security investment by the defender. They show that sequential as well as 
simultaneous games in some circumstances lead to a higher payoff for the defender 
compared with a decision theoretic-based approach. Fielder, Panaousis, Malacaria, 
Hankin, and Smeraldi (2015) apply a hybrid game-theoretic–optimisation approach 
in the context of security spending, particularly by small and medium-sized 
enterprises. While they conclude that their approach works well in that context, they 
also highlight issues with optimal budget allocation caused by indirect costs. Carin, 
Cybenko, and Hughes (2008) combine several methods in their approach, using a 
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process for attack modelling. They find their 
methodology primarily suitable for approximating investment levels related to the 
protection of critical intellectual property in complex systems. H.-K. Kong, Kim, and 
Kim (2012) state that the financial focus on information security investment is 
inadequate and argue that any assessment should consider the multidimensionally of 
performance measures in an organisation. In particular, their modelling approach 
shows that technological and human aspects in the context of information security 
have a significant relationship with business performance. Hall, Sarkani, and 
Mazzuchi (2011) find the relation between organisational capabilities and 
information security to be crucial for a company’s performance. They argue that a 
focus on organisational capabilities that raise information security and help meet 
organisational objectives has a positive impact on performance and competitive 
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advantage. Weishäupl, Yasasin, and Schryen (2015) likewise take a resource-based 
view of the relationships between organisational resources and security investment. 
7.2 Model design 
Figure 43 shows the conceptual model proposed in this study, which includes five 
LVs: business environment (BusEnv), drivers (Drivers), threats (Threats), accounting 
aspects (Accnt) and security capabilities (SecCap). As discussed in chapter 3, 
information security investment is initiated by certain drivers and adjusted by 
challenges and constraints. Based on such drivers, challenges and constraints relevant 
to their environment, practitioners select the appropriate security capabilities, which 
are refined through organisation-specific factors such as the underlying business 
environment (i.e. corporate and security culture of an organisation) and accounting 
aspects. 
 
 
Figure 43 - Conceptual model 
In our proposed model, the lower order constructs were set up as type 2 constructs by 
applying a two-stage approach, as this provides the benefit of more parsimony in the 
higher order structural model (Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder, & Van Oppen, 2009). 
Readers familiar with the technology acceptance model (F. D. Davis, 1989) will note 
some resemblance to Davis’s perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use LVs. As 
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is common with SEM, we phrased the key research questions in the form of 
hypotheses and assessed significance in the context of the theorised model. 
7.2.1 Business environment 
The business environment represents sociotechnical considerations in the context of 
information security investment. Rather than relying on simple associative business 
attributes such as industry, firm size and geographic region, we focused on indicators 
related to people, the security culture and processes. This LV therefore represents the 
environment in which an organisation operates by understanding the corporate 
culture–information security relation (Gonçalves Fontes & José Balloni, 2007; 
Thomson & von Solms, 2006). It is a higher order construct reflectively modelled by 
using indicators related to the human capital resources and business processes 
relevant to information security considerations (Kraemer & Carayon, 2005; Van 
Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010). Hence, to understand the role the business environment 
plays in the extent to which information security adds organisational value, we 
propose the following hypotheses: 
• H1a: The business environment of an organisation significantly influences the 
investment drivers and security capabilities of an organisation. 
• H1b: The business environment of an organisation influences how security 
investment is viewed from an accounting perspective. 
• H1c: The business environment of an organisation influences how threats are 
perceived. 
7.2.2 Drivers 
This LV is a higher order construct consisting of the three lower order constructs 
identified as common reasons for investing in information security: legal and 
regulatory, incident impact considerations and competitive advantage. The research 
by Moore et al. (2015) states that ensuring compliance and reducing incident impact 
are important drivers of security investment. Further, the effect of IT competency on 
business success has been extensively researched (Bassellier, Reich, & Benbasat, 
2001); we see similar developments for information security competency being 
perceived as a competitive advantage. Indeed, although security requirements are 
increasingly defined as a part of contracts, surpassing expectations is seen as adding 
value and positively differentiating an organisation from its competition. To 
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understand the role played by the driving factors in relation to security capabilities 
and value perception, we thus propose the following hypotheses: 
• H2a: Information security investment drivers are positively associated with 
security capabilities. 
• H2b: Information security investment drivers are positively associated with 
security value. 
7.2.3 Threats 
Recognising threats to information security is critical for any risk discussion 
(Whitman, 2003), as most threat attributes (who/what, why, when, how) are highly 
uncertain. Understanding the threat landscape and ongoing developments relevant to 
the organisation’s industry enables security functions to direct their efforts (and 
investment) where they will add most value. To understand the role threats play as 
part of the information security function’s value considerations, we propose the 
following hypotheses: 
• H3a: Organisations’ threat landscape is positively related to security capabilities. 
• H3b: Organisations’ threat landscape affects security value. 
7.2.4 Accounting aspects 
This LV represents the financial and managerial accounting aspects considered by 
security practitioners as part of organisational spending. While information security 
professionals are not expected to use complex valuation models such as ROI, NPV 
and IRR in their calculations, basic accounting requirements still apply to investment 
in security. Security functions are also expected to adhere to the organisation’s 
guidelines on cash flow and expense type. Accountants assess the financial soundness 
of security investment and its contribution to the organisation’s well-being (Ferrara, 
2013; Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng, 2006). Hence, to understand how accounting aspects 
influence security capabilities and value delivery, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
• H4a: Organisations’ financial and management accounting practices affect 
information security capabilities. 
• H4b: Organisations’ financial and management accounting practices affect 
information security value. 
7.2.5 Security capabilities 
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We defined this LV as the ability of information security to deliver mission-aligned 
security services to the organisation. It is a higher order construct consisting of three 
lower order constructs representing risk control considerations, the cost aspects of 
controls and effectiveness (Baker & Wallace, 2007; Blatchford, 1995; Kankanhalli, 
Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003). Effectiveness and risk control describe how reliable such a 
control is against threats, how completely it mitigates a risk and how fully it solves a 
problem in the context of the associated costs. To understand the degree to which 
security capabilities play a critical role in value delivery, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
• H5: Organisations’ information security capabilities significantly contribute to 
information security value. 
Table 30 summarises the five LVs adopted in the present study. 
 
LV Conceptual description 
Business 
environment 
Represents the sociotechnical aspects in the context of 
security investment with a focus on people and processes at 
the intersection of technology 
Drivers Captures the underlying reasons why organisations dedicate 
resources to information security controls and programmes 
Threats Represents the relevant security threats in the context of the 
organisation and its security investment 
Accounting 
aspects 
Describes the financial and managerial accounting aspects in 
the context of security investment 
Security 
capabilities 
Represents the capability considerations relevant to 
delivering mission-aligned security services to the 
organisation 
Table 30 - Conceptual description of the LVs 
7.3 Primary data collection 
To take the conceptual model from theory to analysis, we designed a survey 
instrument to collect data. The survey was constructed to capture key information (on 
a nine-point Likert-type scale) with attention paid to its suitability for SEM analysis. 
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The validity and reliability of the instrument was verified by an expert survey designer 
with extensive experience of SEM. We also conducted test surveys among 
participants with cyber security expertise to confirm that the questions were easy to 
understand, the instructions were clear and the response options were suitable. This 
helped us identify any remaining issues. To recruit participants, we followed a cluster 
sampling approach to solicit responses from professional networks and peer groups 
in the information security and IT fields. In addition, the survey was opened to 
prescreened audiences engaged through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Behrend et al., 
2011). We received 293 responses, of which 43 were removed because of data issues, 
leaving 250 valid responses for our analysis. We used WarpPLS (Kock, 2011) for the 
PLS-SEM analysis. The core of PLS is a family of alternating least squares algorithms 
that emulate and extend principal component analysis as well as canonical correlation 
analysis (Henseler et al., 2016). Originally described by Wold in a series of academic 
contributions, this approach has since been modified and extended (Sanchez, 2015; 
Wold, 1974, 1982). The PLS approach has matured through this academic discourse 
(Henseler et al., 2014; Rigdon, 2016; Rönkkö & Evermann, 2013). Similar to 
covariance-based SEM, PLS models consist of two sets of equations commonly 
referred to as the inner (structural) and outer (measurement) models. The structural 
model describes the relationship between the LVs in the conceptual model, whereas 
the measurement model shows the relationships between each LV and its associated 
indicators (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). 
PLS-SEM is an appropriate choice for our research for four main reasons. As 
described by Hair Jr et al. (2016), it is particularly useful for studies of the sources of 
competitive advantage and key success factors, as it can predict and identify the target 
constructs. This is desirable because research on information security economics is 
relatively new and the theoretic fundamentals are still under development. Second, 
PLS-SEM is advantageous when the structural model is complex and the constructs 
have many or very few indicators. Third, it can work with non-normally distributed 
data (Roldán & J. Sánchez-Franco, 2012). Finally, PLS-SEM is applied in a range of 
research areas (Kaufmann & Gaeckler, 2015; Richter, Sinkovics, Ringle, & Schlägel, 
2016; Ringle, Sarstedt, & Straub, 2012) and has previously been used in the field of 
information security (H. Kong, Jung, Lee, & Yeon, 2015; Riek, Böhme, & Moore, 
2014). 
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To assess the optimal sample size, we based our calculations on a minimum path 
magnitude set at 0.197, significance level of 0.05 and statistical power of 0.9. Our 
sample thus fulfils the requirements for SEM-PLS based on the inverse square root 
method and gamma-exponential method calculations (Kock & Hadaya, 2016). The 
250 participants in the sample represent a diverse selection of professionals. Most 
work in management positions (59%) in medium-sized (43%) or large (44%) 
organisations and rate themselves as having moderate (58%) to high (34%) 
knowledge of information security. The most common responses on purchasing 
experience are intermediate (44%) and advanced (36%). Industry representation is 
balanced with the telecoms (26%) and finance industries (14%) the most common. 
The full survey demographics are presented in the Appendices. Figure 44 summarises 
the breakdown of the research participants. 
 
 
Figure 44 - Overview of survey participants 
7.4 Evaluation of the measurement model 
As outlined by Hair Jr et al. (2016), researchers must consider two broad types of 
measurement specifications when developing constructs: reflective (mode A) and 
formative (mode B). Following the guidelines of Jarvis, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 
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(2003), we defined the constructs in our model as reflective (see Figure 43). To 
evaluate the reflective measurement model, we assessed its internal consistency, 
reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Internal consistency is reported 
based on Dijkstra’s rho_α, as this is a better approximation of the true reliabilities 
than composite reliability (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha (Kock, 2017). We provide CR 
as an additional measure for reference. The results should be above 0.7, but in 
exploratory research values as low as 0.6 are also acceptable (Hair Jr et al., 2016). As 
shown in Table 31, all the values were well within the acceptable range without 
reaching the problematic 0.95 redundant measurement threshold. To establish 
convergent validity, we calculated the average variance extracted (AVE) of the LVs. 
To ensure the LV sufficiently explains the variance of its indicators, we require this 
measure to be above 0.5. Table 31 shows that this requirement was met for all the 
LVs. Indicator reliability was assessed through the outer loadings of the associated 
LV. Indicators with loadings above 0.7 are considered to be acceptable and should be 
retained (Hair et al., 2011). Table 32 provides an overview of the loadings and cross-
loadings, showing that reliability was established. To assess discriminant validity, we 
observed the Fornell–Larcker criterion, but referred primarily to the heterotrait-
monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT). HTMT has been shown to have higher 
reliability for detecting the lack of discriminant validity (Ab Hamid, Sami, & Sidek, 
2017; Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2015). Table 31 lists the Fornell–Larcker results 
in the lower triangle, illustrating overall validity with a minor exception between 
Drivers and BusEnv. However, as the HTMT results in Table 33 show, all the values 
were below 0.9, and even below the more conservative 0.85 threshold; hence, we 
considered discriminant validity to be established. 
 
 
rho_α CR AVE Drivers BusEnv Threats Accnt SecCap SecVal 
Drivers 0.879 0.867 0.686 0.828 
     
BusEnv 0.837 0.83 0.71 0.828 0.842 
    
Threats 0.862 0.831 0.622 0.523 0.63 0.789 
   
Accnt 0.794 0.793 0.562 0.731 0.723 0.514 0.749 
  
SecCap 0.879 0.867 0.687 0.643 0.786 0.644 0.345 0.829 
 
SecVal 0.816 0.816 0.69 0.404 0.48 0.419 0.135 0.734 0.83 
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Table 31 - Consistency and reliability measures 
 
Drivers BusEnv Threats Accnt SecCap SecVal 
IncCost 0.877 0.708 0.490 0.563 0.601 0.415 
L&R 0.777 0.586 0.398 0.611 0.468 0.302 
CompEdg 0.827 0.687 0.435 0.575 0.512 0.280 
PplRes 0.629 0.817 0.511 0.524 0.658 0.394 
BusProc 0.770 0.867 0.576 0.666 0.652 0.378 
T_AR 0.376 0.427 0.779 0.359 0.439 0.294 
T_LH 0.466 0.584 0.788 0.412 0.630 0.439 
T_EFF 0.379 0.476 0.799 0.410 0.464 0.196 
FA_HUR 0.551 0.561 0.312 0.764 0.201 0.049 
FA_EXP 0.515 0.516 0.436 0.718 0.285 0.110 
FA_PRE 0.604 0.563 0.415 0.765 0.273 0.051 
CntrlEf 0.573 0.745 0.608 0.367 0.887 0.623 
ContrlR 0.535 0.653 0.538 0.293 0.853 0.619 
CntrlCs 0.482 0.572 0.416 0.251 0.739 0.464 
SV_MR 0.353 0.422 0.383 0.134 0.631 0.841 
SV_MC 0.352 0.438 0.364 0.169 0.641 0.819 
Table 32 - Indicator loadings and cross-loadings 
 
Accnt BusEnv Drivers SecCap SecVal 
Accnt 
     
BusEnv 0.7338 
    
Drivers 0.7376 0.8326 
   
SecCap 0.2902 0.6736 0.6138 
  
SecVal 0.1331 0.4273 0.4122 0.7333 
 
Threats 0.5329 0.6364 0.5503 0.6612 0.4332 
Table 33 - HTMT results 
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7.5 Structural model evaluation 
Given the reliability of the outer model demonstrated above, we next analysed the 
structural model (inner model) to (i) assess how the LVs relate to one another and (ii) 
express these relationships through paths. To understand the significance of the 
relationships, we adopted a resampling approach. In particular, following the 
recommendation by Kock (2014b), we applied the WarpPLS default resampling 
method ‘Stable3’, which has been shown to yield results consistent with those 
obtained via bootstrapping (and in many cases more accurate estimates). The results 
are shown in Table 34 and Figure 45, where the path coefficients are noted as beta 
coefficients. As is common, the confidence level is set at 0.95. 
 
Figure 45 - Structural model results 
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SecCap 0.168 0.694 0.244 0.26 
 
SecVal 0.064 
 
-0.021 0.064 0.797 
Drivers   <0.001       
BusEnv           
Threats   <0.001       
Accnt   <0.001       
SecCap 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   
SecVal 0.152   0.369 0.152 <0.001 
Table 34 - Structural model path coefficients (top) and significance levels 
(bottom) 
The coefficient of determination (R2 value) measures how much of the variance in the 
endogenous constructs is explained by the exogenous constructs. The R2 values range 
from 0 to 1 with substantial, moderate and weak effect thresholds at 0.75, 0.5 and 
0.25, respectively (Hair et al., 2011). The adjusted R2 values for our model are Drivers 
(0.685), Threats (0.430), Accnt (0.542), SecCap (0.943) and SecVal (0.617) and thus 
fall mostly into the moderate to substantial brackets. Likewise, for the effect sizes, 
which are the absolute values of the individual contributions of the corresponding 
predictor LVs to the R2 coefficients of the criterion LV in each LV block (Kock, 
2014a), we find medium (>0.15) to large (>0.35) results, with few below the small 
(>0.02) threshold (Table 35). 
 
 
Drivers BusEnv Threats Accnt SecCap SecVal 
Drivers 
 
0.686 
    
BusEnv 
      
Threats 
 
0.432 
    
Accnt 
 
0.544 
    
SecCap 0.113 0.564 0.16 0.107 
  
SecVal 0.027 
 
0.01 0.014 0.593 
 
Table 35 - Effect sizes for the path coefficients 
To assess the predictive validity associated with the model, we observed Geisser’s 
Q2 (Geisser, 1974) values for the LVs. Acceptable predictive validity is represented 
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by a Q2 value above zero, which was the case for all our endogenous LVs: Drivers 
(0.687), Threats (0.435), Accnt (0.540), SecCap (0.740) and SecVal (0.568). In 
summary, our proposed model satisfied the consistency, reliability and convergent 
and discriminant validity requirements. Hence, we used the model to answer our 
research questions in the next section. 
7.6 Results and discussion 
First, we examine the influence of the business environment on information security 
investment and identify the significant effects on the LVs in the model. To test H1a, 
we investigate the relations BusEnv -> Drivers and BusEnv -> SecCap. With a β 
coefficient of 0.828 (p<0.001) and a large effect size (0.686), we find that the business 
environment significantly influences information security investment. Moreover, as 
this relation is the strongest observed in our model, it should be the first area for 
professionals aiming to improve their security functions to investigate. Similarly, the 
relation BusEnv -> SecCap shows a strong β coefficient (0.694, p<0.001) and a large 
effect size of 0.564. As security capabilities represent the ability of the security 
function to deliver business-aligned security services to the organisation, this strong 
relation is intuitive. Next, we investigate H1b to understand if security investment is 
treated differently from an accounting perspective depending on the business 
environment. We find a strong relation between BusEnv and Accnt (β=0.738, 
p<0.001), perhaps because as organisations increase in maturity, their accounting 
requirements become more refined. In other words, a small locally trading business 
is unlikely to have the same accounting processes as a highly regulated global 
enterprise. We conclude that the business environment shows a significant relation 
with accounting considerations in the context of information security investment. A 
similar explanation may be true for the BusEnv–Threats relationship (H1c). We find 
a high β coefficient (0.657) significant at the 0.1% level as well as a large effect size 
(0.432). This finding indicates a significant relation between threat considerations and 
the underlying business environment. As the business becomes more conscious of 
information security, it is reasonable to assume that the consideration of threats in the 
context of security investment rises as well. Based on the above-presented results, we 
therefore accept H1. 
To understand the relation between the drivers and security capabilities of an 
organisation (H2a), we next analyse these two LVs. We find the path Drivers -> 
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SecCap to be highly significant (p=0.003); however, with a β coefficient of 0.168, it 
is somewhat weaker than expected compared with the other parts of the model. 
Reminding ourselves that the model results are based on reported real-world data, we 
suspect that this result may indicate that current practices do not sufficiently consider 
business drivers when creating security capabilities in the organisation. We believe 
this offers an opportunity for security professionals to realign their strategy with 
business-specific security drivers. Observing the path Drivers -> SecVal, we note that 
the relation is not significant (β=0.064, p=0.152) and thus H2b is rejected. On closer 
inspection, however, we find mediating effects (i.e. an effect for a path with two 
segments) and note a total effect of β=0.199 (p< 0.001), suggesting that drivers indeed 
significantly affect security value but that such an effect is delivered through security 
capabilities. 
H3a proposes that an organisation’s threat landscape is positively related to its 
security capabilities. In other words, as the (perceived) threat level strengthens, so do 
security capabilities. We find this reflected in the results of the model with high 
significance observed on the path Threats -> SecCap (β=0.244, p<0.001). As a 
consequence, security programmes that do not consider relevant threats are likely to 
over- or under-deliver on security capabilities. H3b examines whether threats directly 
relate to security value; this does not appear to be the case. The path Threats -> SecVal 
does not reach significance (p=0.369). However, we observe a mediated effect 
through SecCap, resulting in a total effect of β=0.174 (p=0.003) on SecVal. These 
results allow us to conclude that understanding relevant threats is important when 
delivering security value through the organisation’s security capabilities. 
Although research has commonly assessed the profitability of information security 
investment (European Network and Information Security Agency, 2012; Wood & 
Parker, 2004), such valuation assessments remain uncommon in the real world, with 
basic accounting questions such as expenditure type, hurdle rate and insurance 
premium impact more frequently used. In H4a, we investigate the effect of these 
accounting processes on security capabilities. The path Accnt -> SecCap has a positive 
β of 0.26 with high significance (p<0.001) and a medium effect size (0.107). This 
finding indicates a positive effect on SecCap when accounting requirements form part 
of the security control investment process. The assumption here is that the 
requirement causes security practitioners to take a broader view of security control 
selection and thus results in an overall improved choice. Further, the low effect size 
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is intuitive as we would expect accounting aspects to have only limited impact on 
security capabilities. For H4b, the direct path Accnt -> SecVal does not reach 
significance (β=0.064, p=0.152). Instead, we find it to be mediated by SecCap, 
resulting in an indirect effect Accnt -> SecCap -> SecVal of β=0.272 (p<0.001). 
Finally, H5 proposes that security capabilities play a key role in securing the 
organisation and delivering value. The path SecCap -> SecVal β coefficient (0.797) 
is highly significant (p<0.001), and thus H5 is supported. It might seem clear that 
changes in security capabilities are strongly related to the achieved security value. 
Nonetheless, this would be an oversimplification. Indeed, the reasons behind this 
strong relation are the LVs and indicators in the model, which contribute to the overall 
effect confirmed in H5. 
In summary, we identify several indirect effects in the inner model that tie 
requirements across the various LVs to the value outcome. Consequently, this study’s 
results support the assumptions of the conceptual model on those aspects relevant to 
a value-oriented information security investment model. Table 36 summarises the 
results of the tested hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis Path β p-value Effect size Validation 
H1a BusEnv ≥ Driver 0.828 <0.001 0.686 Supported 
H1a BusEnv ≥ SecCap 0.694 <0.001 0.564 Supported 
H1b BusEnv ≥ Accnt 0.738 <0.001 0.544 Supported 
H1c BusEnv ≥ Threats 0.657 <0.001 0.432 Supported 
H2a Drivers ≥ SecCap 0.168 0.003 0.113 Supported 
H2b Drivers ≥ SecVal 0.064 0.152 0.027 Rejected 
H3a Threats ≥ SecCap 0.244 <0.001 0.160 Supported 
H3b Threats ≥ SecVal -0.021 0.369 0.010 Rejected 
H4a Accnt ≥ SecCap 0.260 <0.001 0.107 Supported 
H4b Accnt ≥ SecVal 0.064 0.152 0.014 Rejected 
H5 SecCap ≥ SecVal 0.797 <0.001 0.593 Supported 
Table 36 - Results of the tested hypotheses 
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We highlight several of the limitations of the study that need to be considered when 
interpreting the results. First, research on information security value in the 
organisational context is still in its infancy; it is not yet a topic commonly considered 
by practitioners and self-assessing one’s knowledge in a survey context is difficult. 
We addressed this limitation by targeting relevant peer groups and prescreening 
participants. Although we used several controls to maximise the quality of the survey 
data, it is nonetheless possible that survey participants over- or underestimated their 
level of knowledge. Second, the survey response represents the respondent’s thoughts 
at a point in time, which does not necessarily reflect the actual situation in the work 
environment. This is a well-known shortcoming of survey instruments and generally 
acceptable as long as accounted for (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). Lastly, our data 
analysis approach (i.e. PLS-SEM) inherits the limitations common to this approach. 
As described in section 7.2, the quantitative part of the study is based on findings 
obtained through a GT qualitative analysis and aims to discover knowledge. PLS is 
suitable for this task. To ensure the consistency, reliability and validity of our results, 
we used several methods common to SEM. However, we make no claim that this is 
the only or the best model in this context. 
7.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we proposed a conceptual model for assessing information security 
value in organisations. Based on the findings of previous chapters and survey results 
gathered for the quantitative analysis, we proposed a model consisting of five LVs 
that represent the key areas in this context. We then investigated how these LVs relate 
to each other and analysed which relationships are significant by using PLS-SEM, 
finding support for our proposed model. 
We highlight several findings that represent valuable contributions to both 
practitioners and researchers in this field. Our assumption that the underlying business 
environment plays a fundamental role in the delivery of value-oriented security 
services to an organisation was supported by highly significant path coefficients. 
Practitioners can immediately apply this insight by reflecting on the sociotechnical 
aspects of their environments and ensuring that their current security programmes are 
a good fit for their organisations. The misalignment of the business environment and 
drivers can result in considerably worse outcomes for security value as evidenced by 
the large effect size found in this study. For researchers, this finding provides a 
Chapter 7: Assessing the latent structural model of information security value in organisations 
177 
statistical basis for investigating the sociotechnical aspects of information security 
and its relation to business outcomes in more detail. The model further highlights the 
significance of understanding the threat attributes relevant to an organisation. While 
many practitioners will already include threat considerations in their control selection 
processes, our results provide additional guidance that the business environment must 
define which threat attributes are relevant and should be considered to deliver value-
oriented security capabilities. We further proposed accounting considerations to be a 
significant LV when defining security capabilities and security value delivery. This 
hypothesis was supported in the analysis, with a significant indirect effect on security 
value. This important insight suggests that the value of information security benefits 
from accounting scrutiny. While we did not find evidence that more advanced 
financial valuation methods (e.g. ROI, NPV) are common in this context, we do 
observe a positive impact on security capabilities where accounting aspects are 
considered. Security practitioners should thus identify those accounting requirements 
important to their finance departments and proactively optimise security capabilities 
to improve business-specific security value. Finally, we found significant support for 
our hypothesis that security capabilities are crucial to achieving business-aligned 
security value. This finding was evidenced by the highly significant path coefficient 
and large effect size in the security capabilities–value relation. The importance of this 
result is twofold. First and most obvious, we provide strong evidence that security 
capabilities have the largest direct effect on the value organisations gain from 
information security investment. Second, our model shows that the value outcome is 
strongly influenced by organisation-specific constructs that must be considered when 
creating security capabilities; a cookie-cutter approach to information security will 
not result in optimal value. 
In summary, this chapter proposed a conceptual and empirically tested model that 
outlines the underlying constructs to consider when assessing information security 
value in an organisation. We presented important insights and highlighted use cases 
for practitioners to apply our findings in their environments. In particular, the findings 
contribute significantly to our understanding of information security value chains 
within organisations. The presented model and proposed constructs provide a 
validated basis on which we can extend in the next chapter. The following chapter 
applies the latent construct findings to real-world information security investment 
decision scenarios. This provides additional information on each indicator and 
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presents a value-prioritised multicriteria decision model utilising stochastic 
multicriteria acceptability analysis (SMAA). 
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8 STRUCTURED MULTICRITERIA 
DECISION MAKING FOR VALUE-
PRIORITISED SECURITY 
INVESTMENTS 
The media and research regularly issue reports on organised crime exploiting billions 
of dollars of digital opportunities (Dethlefs, 2015; Hyman, 2013; Ponemon Institute, 
2017). We previously investigated the economic impact of such breach events in 
chapter 3. With losses at this magnitude and still rising, governments and regulators 
are taking an active role in encouraging businesses to protect their information assets 
(Home Office Science Advisory Council, 2018; Pawlak & Wendling, 2013). This 
pressure is increasingly felt by non-regulated industries as well, as requirements filter 
down through the supply chain. Boards find themselves in a situation where they need 
to ensure their organisations manage information security risks and compliance 
requirements appropriately, while also balancing organisational resource use and 
optimising value for stakeholders. This poses a tough challenge for security 
professionals who are tasked by the board to ensure the organisation is secure and, 
while doing so, justify how the programme adds value to its core business. While 
practitioners are generally comfortable with the ‘how’ to secure the organisation, the 
value justification tends to be more challenging. The approach often taken is one of 
‘needs must’ to achieve a minimum level of security and/or align the organisation 
with industry standard frameworks to respond to a breach (L. A. Gordon, M. P. Loeb, 
& W. Lucyshyn, 2003). These are viable approaches and do provide security benefits, 
but won’t lead to a security program that emphasises value for the organisation. Of 
course, each organisation is different and has different views on how security does 
add value to their business. For some organisations compliance with certain regimes 
is perceived to be most valuable, for others it is a sensible balance between security 
and business process optimisation and yet others aim to use security capabilities to 
unlock new markets and business opportunities. However, for most organisations it 
will be a cross section of all these that represents value in their business.  
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In this chapter, we present a multicriteria decision model that information security 
practitioners can use to deliver value in their security control investments. This model 
combines the insights from the expert interviews on the value aspects of information 
security (chapter 5), key components in this context derived from the academic 
literature (chapter 2) and latent constructs underlying security investment decisions 
with real-world criteria preference defaults relevant in this context (chapter 7) as well 
as utilises SMAA for making an alternative selection. 
8.1 Related work 
Decisions in the field of information security tend to be complex due to the diverse 
intersecting research areas that need to be considered (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; 
Dhillon, Oliveira, Susarapu, & Caldeira, 2016). This complexity increases further if 
we add the concept of information security value to the problem space. As discussed 
in earlier chapters, academic research proposes a variety of approaches and models 
that focus on different aspects of information security and value. For example, 
Gordon and Loeb (2002a) present a benefit maximisation approach that considers the 
vulnerability of information to a security breach and potential loss should such a 
breach occur. This model inspired further research (Baryshnikov, 2012; Farrow & 
Szanton, 2016; Matsuura, 2009; Willemson, 2010), including updated guidance by 
the original authors (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Zhou, 2018; Gordon et al., 2016). 
Arora, Hall, Pinto, Ramsey, and Telang (2004) propose a risk-based value approach 
utilising incident types and bypass rates as input criteria. Cavusoglu et al. (2008) 
follow a game-theoretic approach to determine security investments in which they 
consider attributes such as vulnerabilities, hacker utility and payoff from investments. 
The approach described by Cremonini (2005) also aims to improve ROI-based 
evaluations by integrating them with an ROA index, including attacker gains and 
control efficiency as attributes. 
There is considerable overlap between these models (Neubauer & Hartl, 2009; Rue 
& Pfleeger, 2009). At a general information security level, Dhillon and Torkzadeh 
(2006) utilise a value-focused thinking approach to identify fundamental means and 
values that are essential for protecting the information resources of a firm. Pettigrew 
and Ryan (2012) investigate how senior professionals approach key decisions related 
to information security value under uncertainty. Their open-ended interviews provide 
a condensed view of the fundamental aspects of the information security decision 
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space. Similarly, Moore et al. (2015) conduct in-depth interviews with senior security 
professionals to explore how firms identify, prioritise and invest to manage cyber 
security risks. Their conclusions highlight the challenges related to project resourcing, 
recruiting qualified personnel, overcoming uncertainty in the threat landscape and 
measuring value. In this work, we follow a Grounded Truth approach (chapter 5.2) to 
investigate the underlying categories, criteria and processes in information security 
investment decisions. It is a suitable approach for this research. Based on a 
constructivist paradigm, this theory acknowledges that meaning is constructed by 
individuals and is not simply something merely waiting to be discovered. A similar 
approach is followed by Dor and Elovici (2016), arriving at comparable results. 
Although presented in a different manner, the results of these studies confirm the 
common manifest/latent categories and criteria considered by decision makers, 
highlighting that the topic of information security value must be seen as a multicriteria 
decision making problem. 
Multicriteria decision making can be described as a collection of formal approaches 
adopted to explore complex decision matters considering multiple, typically 
conflicting, criteria of both a quantitative and a qualitative nature. It helps decision 
makers disaggregate complex problems into manageable chunks, allowing a more 
focused view on how certain options achieve or contribute to objectives, before 
reassembling it for decision guidance. Based on the work by Keeney and Raiffa 
(1976) as well as the seminal paper by Zionts (1979), multicriteria decision making 
is built on decision theory and notably driven by Operational Research. At a high 
level, multicriteria decision making consists of multicriteria decision analysis 
(MCDA; see Belton and Stewart (2002) for their integrated view of MCDA) and 
multi-objective decision making. MCDA is typically concerned with ranking, sorting 
or selecting finite alternatives based on criteria, whereas multi-objective decision 
making aims to maximise or minimise an objective function subject to constraints. 
Liou and Tzeng (2012) provide an excellent overview of recent development in this 
space; see also Greco et al. (2016) as well as (Marttunen, Lienert, & Belton, 2017) 
for an extensive survey on this matter. 
MCDA has been successfully applied to complex decision studies across a range of 
research areas: healthcare (Diaby, Campbell, & Goeree, 2013; Saint-Hilary, Cadour, 
Robert, & Gasparini, 2017), information security (Lv, Zhou, & Wang, 2011; Ou 
Yang, Shieh, Leu, & Tzeng, 2009), environmental research (Durbach & Davis, 2012; 
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Gbanie, Tengbe, Momoh, Medo, & Kabba, 2013; Greco, Ishizaka, Matarazzo, & 
Torrisi, 2017), sports science (J. Calder & Durbach, 2015) and policymaking (Beuthe, 
Eeckhoudt, & Scannella, 2000). Please refer to Mardani et al. (2015) for a more 
comprehensive literature review on this topic. 
8.2 Structuring the decision problem space 
According to Belton and Stewart (2002), the principal goal of MCDA is to help 
decision makers understand the problem and make the relevant values and judgements 
to guide them in identifying a preferred course of action through the process of 
synthesising and organising the relevant information. Gaining an appreciation of the 
problem is the first step. Understanding the problem space is crucial to making robust 
decisions. While the problem and its components may appear obvious at first glance, 
problem structuring is a fundamental and often overlooked precursory step in 
information security investment decision making for time-pressured decision makers 
in the field. The likely consequence of omitting this step is a suboptimal investment 
decision, or even a decision that addresses the wrong problem (Mitroff & 
Featheringham, 1974). 
Based on their "Through complexity to simplicity” principle, Belton and Stewart 
(2010) argue that problem structuring starts by surfacing and capturing the underlying 
complexities to allow decision makers to better understand and manage the problem 
at hand. In our research, we utilised a GT approach to discover the relevant underlying 
problem structure with the help of qualitative analysis (chapter 5). The GT approach 
allows for the collection of rich and vivid primary data from research subjects, which 
in turn emphasises the lived experience and is fundamentally well suited to locating 
meaning and connecting such meaning to the real world (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
By examining, re-examining and reflecting on the views shared in expert interviews, 
the relations and components relevant to information security value were identified. 
As a result, complexity was stripped away and the simplicity of the key underlying 
components was distilled to further define the problem space. Supported by in vivo 
coding relationship graphs and conceptual building blocks, this tailored approach 
resembles soft operational research problem structuring methods such as strategic 
options development and analysis (Eden, 2004; Georgiou, 2011). Our interview 
design guided participants towards responses with a “value-focused thinking” 
mindset (Keeney, 1994) instead of taking an alternative-focused or problem solving 
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position. This was an important aspect to our research, as our original intention was 
to explore the general information security value problem space rather than a specific 
security investment alternative. 
Our grounded truth work allowed us to form a conceptual model of information 
security value aspects and provided detailed qualitative results. To solidify our 
assessment of the key components, criteria and relations in this problem space, we 
followed an exploratory convergent mixed method approach (QUAL -> QUANT). 
By combining the results of the qualitative analysis with the key findings from our 
SLR on economic valuation methods (chapter 2), we created a survey to gather 
quantitative data on the topic (see chapter 7). While it would be too time- and 
resource-intensive to repeat the full process for every one-off decision, we found this 
approach to problem structuring highly useful for structuring the space for a repeated 
decision problem. As our goal is to explore the problem space to build a decision 
model valid for all information security investment decisions, the depth of the process 
and resources invested is justified. It provides a deep understanding of a general latent 
problem structure derived from primary and secondary data analysis. Hence, we can 
confidently build on this to further develop the decision model. 
The results of our extensive problem structuring efforts reveal their strengths when 
applied in the context of a one-off decision problem in an organisation. Such an 
application allows us to considerably streamline local problem structuring efforts, as 
the relevant criteria are already identified and an established baseline of weights 
provided, as discussed in the next section. However, the practitioner must still define 
some aspects of the concrete information security problem s/he is addressing in the 
complex one-off decision for the organisation. 
While our model provides the fundamental platform for real-world information 
security investment decision problems, organisation-specific requirements demand a 
local definition. At the local level, the practitioner must identify whether a specific 
need for security controls exists (e.g. resulting from regulatory requirements, risk 
management actions or strategic security planning) and select from the available 
alternatives. Simply put, the security practitioner has the responsibility to define if 
and where investment in security controls is needed. For most practitioners, this will 
be a familiar exercise, as this is part of their usual responsibilities in the context of 
security programme management and planning. 
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Once the requirement for a security investment is established, an initial analysis of 
the problem will open a range of possible alternatives from which to choose. For 
example, an organisation pursuing a security certification such as the UK’s 
CyberEssentials Plus (A. Calder, 2014) may identify the need to provide malware 
protection in their environment. Based on the security practitioner’s input, a 
prescreened set of alternatives, excluding those that do not meet certain minimum 
specifications, will be taken into the MCDA in our proposed model. While it may be 
possible to skip the prescreening step and simply include all the alternatives available, 
the resulting overhead would be unmanageable in most cases depending on the 
organisation’s comfort with such processes and whether the local problem structuring 
is conducted following a formal or informal approach (Belton & Stewart, 2010). 
Either way, the number of alternatives should be reduced to a sensible shortlist based 
on subject matter expert input. Figure 46 provides an overview of our workflow, with 
the bottom left part of the illustration representing the problem structuring approach 
discussed. 
 
 
Figure 46 - MCDA model overview 
For additional information on problem structuring as well as insightful views on 
current developments in problem structuring method (PSM) approaches, see the work 
of Marttunen et al. (2017). 
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8.3 Building the model 
With an understanding of the problem structure, we can continue building the model 
for information security investment decisions. At an abstract level, a model represents 
a transformation of a complex real-world phenomenon into a simplified construct. As 
stated by Moretti, Öztürk, and Tsoukiàs (2016), researchers build models to better 
understand and better represent a given situation. This allows agents to convert inputs 
into meaningful outputs through the structured application of appropriate formulas 
(logical or mathematical). As previously described, we followed a mixed method 
approach to condense the complex phenomena into a simplified construct that retains 
the important characteristics and features. 
Of the inputs to our decision model, criteria, alternatives and weights are the most 
important. In the MCDA context, an alternative (or option) is the object or action 
evaluated during a decision process. Criteria are the performance aspects of the 
decision that allow decision makers to evaluate an alternative in that context. The 
weight represents the relative importance of a criterion; it is a scaling factor that 
relates a criterion score to those of other criteria. A typical example for a decision 
problem in our case would be a set of information security controls ( 𝐴 =
{𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛 | 𝑎 ∈ ℝ} ), which is evaluated against a set of criteria ( 𝐶 =
 {𝑐1, . . , 𝑐𝑛| 𝑐 ∈ ℝ}) such as purchase cost and efficiency, where each criterion 𝑐𝑛 is 
given a certain importance (𝑊 = {𝑤 ∈ ℝ|𝑤 ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ = 1𝑛𝑗=1 }). 
We obtained the context-relevant criteria from the SLR and qualitative analysis of the 
semi-structured interviews. We then empirically tested our latent model and its 
variables by using PLS-SEM. From the set of 60 criteria identified during our 
qualitative research, 20 criteria were discarded during the PLS analysis, as survey 
participants did not consider them to be important (i.e. insignificant loadings). The 
remaining criteria were tested as part of the outer model, showing satisfactory 
reliability (loadings and cross-loadings) and discriminant validity (Fornell–Larcker, 
HTMT). Establishing the criteria in this way provides us with confidence about their 
key considerations (Belton & Stewart, 2002), particularly ‘value reference’, ‘non-
redundancy’, ‘judgmental independence’, ‘balancing completeness and conciseness’ 
and ‘operationality’. 
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In addition, we leveraged the results of our SEM calculations to obtain indicative 
objective weights (W) for each criterion based on rescaled outer construct weights. 
Since the dataset consists of 250 subject matter expert responses, we drew on an 
objective criteria weight baseline stemming from a representative sample set of real-
world experiences. Security decision makers can then apply this weight baseline to 
obtain a relative importance distribution representative of an average organisation. 
Decision makers can even change or supplement these weights following other 
methods to establish subjective weights for each proposed criterion (e.g. through the 
simple multi-attribute rating technique (SMART) or swing methods). However, this 
may require the guidance of an experienced decision analyst and introduces wider 
interpretation questions, as outlined by E. U. Choo, Schoner, and Wedley (1999). 
Interpretation issues, or more generally uncertainty, are common to most MCDA 
scenarios, but particularly so in the information security context as outlined in the 
findings of the qualitative interview analysis, cyber security interpretation analysis 
and analysis of cyber threat predictions. Research distinguishes between internal and 
external uncertainty in this context. Internal uncertainty commonly refers to aspects 
of the problem structure and inputs related to the problem. Stewart and Durbach 
(2016) advise that resolvable internal uncertainties (relating to imprecision or the 
ambiguity of meaning) are addressed as part of the problem structuring phase. Our 
model follows this recommendation. External uncertainties are concerned with issues 
outside the control of the decision maker and are more difficult to address. This type 
of uncertainty stems from a lack of knowledge about the consequences as well as 
randomness or unpredictability in relation to the processes and states of nature. It is 
best handled by responses of a technical nature such as market research and 
forecasting (Belton & Stewart, 2002). 
In our problem space, we encountered such uncertainty in various forms. For instance, 
uncertainty in the security threat landscape is a common challenge for practitioners. 
Misinterpreting or ignoring changes in this area can result in the misallocation of 
investment in security controls that are unable to address new threats. We proposed a 
novel way in which to reduce uncertainty in this area through our ‘wisdom of the 
crowd’ threat prediction modelling approach in chapter 6. This approach helps 
decision makers understand future threat developments as perceived by a suitably 
large pool of predictions contributed from a variety of sources (the ‘crowd’, cf. 6.2), 
thereby improving confidence in planning for suitable security investment options. 
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Related to this, the activities of threat sources (i.e. the likelihood of threat) as well as 
potential economic impact of such an activity are key external uncertainties. Although 
this is a topic of ongoing research, especially in the game theory and real options area 
(see chapter 2), we found no evidence of a suitable quantitative approach to address 
it. We thus follow the view of Stewart and Durbach (2016) that elegant mathematical 
models inaccessible to practitioners are of little practical value. Instead, we capture 
the criteria measurements related to these areas based on decision maker and subject 
matter expert views in qualitative form. 
To assemble the multicriteria decision model, we examine the criteria identified in 
the problem definition phase. As described previously, we identified 40 relevant 
criteria for assessing information security investment value. Based on feedback 
obtained leading up to the case studies, we consolidated two criteria (IC_IR, IC_PR) 
as they proved challenging to understand. All the criteria presented in Table 37 
provide the measurement solicitation question alongside the baseline weight. We also 
provide further details about the criteria in the context of information security 
investment decisions and highlight references in the literature that provide additional 
research relevant to the criterion. 
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Criteria Baseline 
Weight 
Decision Point Further Detail References 
FA_EXP 0.009 How well is the control 
investment aligned with 
companies' financial 
controller guidelines on 
expense type (CapEx/OpEx) 
or related accounting 
requirements? 
From a financial controller perspective, 
investments in security controls are no 
different to other operational investments made 
by the organisation. Security control 
investments must follow the same rules of 
corporate finance controlling. When evaluating 
security investments, practitioners need to 
consider how well the controls align with the 
guidelines and preferences issued by their 
finance departments to support organisations’ 
financial strategy and goals. 
(Jensen, Schwenk, 
Gruschka, & Iacono, 
2009; Lucas, 2014; Nepal 
& Jamasb, 2015) 
FA_HUR 0.004 How likely is it that the 
control investment fulfils the 
hurdle rate requirements the 
organisation imposes on 
investments? 
If the organisation imposes hurdle rate 
requirements on investments, how likely is it 
that the evaluated security control investment 
will pass the process? From chapter 5, we 
know that some organisations require security 
investment decisions to pass such hurdles and 
must, at least superficially, hold up to financial 
(Borking, 2010; Čapko, 
Aksentijević, & Tijan, 
2014; Gallaher, Link, & 
Rowe, 2008; Rowe & 
Gallaher, 2006) 
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key performance metric analysis. 
FA_PRE 0.005 What impact will an 
investment in this control 
have on cyber insurance 
premiums? 
Cyber insurance is becoming an increasingly 
important risk management tool for many 
organisations. While the insurance market in 
this space is still immature, underwriters are 
constantly refining their risk models to 
distinguish security controls that reduce impact 
effectively and thus lead to lower premiums. A 
negative impact in this context would result in 
an increase in premiums or prevent the 
organisation from obtaining cyber insurance. 
Investment in a control with a positive impact 
would reduce premiums or provide other 
insurance-related benefits. 
(Baer & Parkinson, 2007; 
Bailey, 2014; Biener, 
Eling, & Wirfs, 2015; 
Hulisi, Srinivasan, & 
Nirup, 2011) 
BP_CO 0.013 To what extent does the 
implementation of this 
security control need to be 
communicated or explained to 
end users and/or customers? 
Security controls that are too demanding or 
complex in their use for customers (internal or 
external) are less desirable as the required 
instructions may trigger information fatigue or 
overload. Information overload occurs when 
the information-processing requirements 
(Albrechtsen, 2007; 
D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 
2014; Eppler & Mengis, 
2004) 
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exceed the information-processing capacity. 
Not only is the amount of information 
(quantitative aspect) to be integrated crucial, so 
are the characteristics (qualitative aspect) of 
the information. As most customers and end 
users are not security experts, and usually do 
not need to be, overly complex or demanding 
use requirements will lead to poor value 
perception of the control. 
BP_CR 0.017 To what extent will the 
security control disrupt 
business processes or cause 
them to be more complex or 
complicated to deliver? 
Business stakeholders generally care about 
business-relevant aspects; examples of this are 
customer priorities, ease of product use, 
product adoption rates, generated revenue and 
legal compliance. Security controls must offer 
a balanced value proposition considering both 
business process requirements and security 
requirements. Those controls that provide 
maximum security value while minimising the 
negative impact on business processes will 
contribute more value to the organisation. 
(Post & Kagan, 2007; 
Roeckle, Schimpf, & 
Weidinger, 2000) 
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BP_OC 0.007 To what extent will 
investment in this control 
limit the organisation in 
regard to other business 
investments and 
opportunities? 
Investment in security controls may impact the 
organisation’s ability to invest in other projects 
or business opportunities. This is especially the 
case with comparably large security 
investments or where security controls account 
for a considerable amount of the available 
project budget. In this context, Srinidhi et al. 
(2008) explain that effective governance is 
underpinned by prioritisation and investment 
decisions about how much and where to invest. 
The diversion of funds away from productive 
assets reduces cash flow and increases the 
vulnerability of the firm to financial distress 
from cyber attacks in the long run. Security 
control investments (financial, resources or 
otherwise) should not prevent the organisation 
from pursuing other business opportunities. 
(Srinidhi et al., 2008, 
2015) 
BP_BP 0.018 How will this control 
investment impact user 
morale and productivity? 
Security controls may affect the ability of the 
workforce to deliver on their tasks or use a 
service. The needs of the information security 
(T. C. Herath & Rao, 
2009; Michaud, 2017; 
Post & Kagan, 2007; E 
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function to protect assets must be balanced 
with the ability of personnel to do their job. 
Security controls perceived as unnecessarily 
intrusive to workflows (get in the way of doing 
work), or that are meant to monitor and control 
employees, can result in lower morale and 
productivity. Those security controls that are 
less perceptible, while still delivering on their 
security benefits, can contribute more value to 
the organisation. 
Eugene Schultz, Proctor, 
Lien, & Salvendy, 2001) 
BP_SC 0.044 Will this control conflict with 
or complement currently used 
security controls? 
Most organisations have at least a basic set of 
security controls in place, either due to 
previous conscious investments or due to the 
default security features provided by their IT 
environment. Security controls are typically 
designed to provide particular security 
benefits; for example, firewalls provide 
preventative control for network-based threats, 
whereas network intrusion detection systems 
focus on detective capabilities. It is not 
(Casey & Stellatos, 2008; 
Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, 
& Cavusoglu, 2009; 
Kantarcıoǧlu & Clifton, 
2005) 
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uncommon for security controls to conflict. 
For example, data is encrypted to preserve 
confidentiality, which causes issues monitoring 
data flows for data loss prevention (DLP) 
reasons. Ideally, controls are deployed in a 
synergistic manner to complement each other 
and maximise their value to the organisation. 
BP_TR 0.043 How well will this control fit 
with the existing technology 
standards and infrastructure 
used by the organisation? 
It is important to consider how security 
controls interact with the environment for 
which they are intended. A control that 
depends on a certain underlying technology 
that is not available or in use by an 
organisation cannot provide the full benefits 
expected of it. Examples include encryption 
methods or libraries that cause performance 
issues for the product and malware protection 
solutions that do not work with parts of the 
corporate technology stack. Security controls 
that offer compatibility with the current as well 
as strategic technology stack of the 
(Carayannis & Turner, 
2006; P.-y. Chen, Kataria, 
& Krishnan, 2011; Gupta 
& Chow, 2008) 
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organisation offer higher value, both on 
security performance as well on reduced 
maintenance and support overheads. 
CC_IC 0.027 What is the expected 
implementation cost for this 
control (e.g. professional 
services, expenses, internal 
resource costs) 
The direct cost of implementing a security 
control can be substantial and is thus an 
important factor for the selection of controls. 
The internal and external costs related to 
implementation commonly include 
professional services costs, expenses, staff 
resource costs, downtime of services due to 
implementation, provisioning and hosting 
costs, staff training and communications and 
so on. Security controls with lower 
implementation costs are preferable over those 
with high costs as they require less upfront 
investment and reduce sunk costs in the early 
phases. 
(Arora, Hall, Pinto, et al., 
2004; Brecht & Nowey, 
2013; Čapko et al., 2014; 
Olifer, Goranin, 
Kaceniauskas, & Cenys, 
2017) 
CC_OB 0.042 What percentage of the 
overall security budget does 
the investment in the control 
In most organisations, budgets for information 
security are limited and must be strictly 
managed to ensure they are used where they 
(Anwar, Montanari, 
Gutierrez, & Campbell, 
2009; Brecht & Nowey, 
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represent? add the most value. The proportion of the 
overall available budget a security control 
consumes plays a key role in the desirability of 
the control. Following the principle of layered 
security, a varied set of security controls is 
often preferred over a single control. Investing 
in a single control that consumes most of the 
available budget limits the budget and thus the 
choice of other controls, increases the reliance 
on the control and consequently risks a 
considerable loss in security value if the 
control is underperforming.  
2013; Huang & Behara, 
2013; Tosh, Molloy, 
Sengupta, Kamhoua, & 
Kwiat, 2015) 
CC_OC 0.030 What is the expected annual 
cost to operate this control 
(ongoing operational cost)? 
In their control selection process, practitioners 
should consider the ongoing maintenance cost 
of the control. Although not necessarily a 
security consideration, practitioners should be 
conscious of the cost impact over multiple 
periods of the control’s lifespan. Those 
controls with higher annual costs are more 
susceptible to underdeliver on their value 
(Brecht & Nowey, 2013; 
Čapko et al., 2014; Olifer 
et al., 2017; Thomas, 
2009) 
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proposition if the threat landscape shifts or if 
they are not properly operated and maintained. 
Depending on the organisation’s accounting 
preferences, a control investment with a higher 
initial cost and low maintenance cost in 
subsequent periods may be preferred over a 
control with sustained high annual costs. 
CC_PP 0.026 What is the purchase price of 
the control? 
The initial purchase price is one of the key 
factors in security control decisions. It 
represents the monetary amount an 
organisation pays for the selected control, 
considering any charges for shipping, tax, 
customs, discounts due to early payment, 
payment method and mutual benefit deals. In 
the context of this criterion, security controls 
that have a lower purchase price are more 
desirable than those at a higher purchase price. 
(Brecht & Nowey, 2013; 
Čapko et al., 2014; 
Thomas, 2009) 
CE_BR 0.052 How difficult is it to 
circumvent or bypass the 
security control? 
The value a security control offers to the 
organisation diminishes if it can be easily 
circumvented. This may be due to technical 
(Boss, Kirsch, 
Angermeier, Shingler, & 
Boss, 2009; Cavusoglu, 
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shortcomings or the nature of the control (e.g. 
security awareness training). In practice, 
security controls that are harder to bypass are 
the preferred option. In many cases, 
practitioners can consult the testing results 
from trusted organisations to obtain 
information on the performance of certain 
technologies or products. 
Mishra, & Srinivasan, 
2005; Gu, Zhang, & Lee, 
2008) 
CE_DF 0.040 How likely is it that the 
security control will deter or 
discourage attacks or 
misbehaviour? 
Although it is a more common feature of 
physical security, information security controls 
may also be chosen for their dissuasive 
characteristics. The use of certain security 
controls can have a deterrent effect on potential 
threat agents. Such controls are desirable as 
they may reduce the amount of attacks or 
discourage malicious behaviour due to their 
deterrent character. This is common with 
physical security controls (CCTV, guards, 
fences) and applies to some information 
security controls as well. In some cases, this 
(D'Arcy, Hovav, & 
Galletta, 2009; T. C. 
Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Straub & Nance, 1990) 
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may require proactive messaging (e.g. DDoS 
protection, user behavioural monitoring, FIPS 
140-2 compliant encryption) to achieve the 
deterrent effect.  
CE_EC 0.019 How confident are we that 
this control performs 
effectively according to its 
intended purpose? 
A common assumption by non-practitioners is 
that security controls work as advertised and 
effectively deliver the benefits promised by the 
solution provider. Senior practitioners with 
experience in this field know that this is not 
always the case; controls vary widely in their 
ability to function effectively in an 
organisation’s environment. Technology-based 
security controls may suddenly stop working, 
affect the performance of infrastructure or 
platforms, underperform under heavy load, 
cause issues or delays to production services 
and so on. Security controls that efficiently 
deliver security benefits add more value than 
those controls that require constant monitoring, 
tuning and support to deliver the same benefits. 
(Hagen, Albrechtsen, & 
Hovden, 2008; 
Kankanhalli et al., 2003; 
Torres, Sarriegi, Santos, & 
Serrano, 2006) 
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CE_FP 0.045 What is the false positive rate 
(noise-to-signal ratio) of this 
control?  
Information security practitioners are rarely 
faced with simple good/bad scenarios. In many 
cases, it is difficult to clearly distinguish 
between legitimate activity (e.g. administrative 
activities) and malicious activity (e.g. 
credential abuse). This challenge is reflected in 
the performance of security controls as well. A 
high volume of type 1 errors affects trust in a 
control and consumes unnecessary and 
expensive (human) resources to verify results, 
thus reducing the overall value of the control. 
Depending on the type of control, this will 
have a negative impact on other areas such as 
staffing requirements, training requirements, 
business stakeholder management and security 
awareness training. Security controls with a 
low false positive rate add more value. 
(Axelsson, 1999; 
Cavusoglu et al., 2005; 
Joo, Hong, & Han, 2003) 
CE_PV 0.046 How quickly will the control 
provide its security benefits to 
the organisation? 
There can be a considerable difference in how 
quickly a security investment adds value to the 
organisation. Compared with technical controls 
(Q. Chen, Abdelwahed, & 
Erradi, 2014; Hawkins, 
2018; van Wieren, Doerr, 
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(e.g. firewalls, encryption, anti-virus software), 
controls that influence user behaviour or 
address security culture take more time until 
the benefits are realised. Generally, security 
controls that deliver value to the organisation 
sooner (higher velocity) are preferred as they 
reduce the exposure time window. 
Jacobs, & Pieters, 2016) 
CR_CR 0.046 How well does the security 
control address the identified 
compliance requirements? 
A common reason for investment in security 
controls is to address compliance requirements 
(e.g. PCI, FISMA, HIPAA) in the organisation. 
Those controls that address compliance 
requirements add more value to the 
organisation. Those that help address the 
requirements of multiple compliance regimes 
add additional value compared to those which 
cover only one. Even if an organisation is not 
required to comply with information security-
relevant legal and regulatory requirements, a 
forward-looking security practitioner will 
consider the shifting regulatory landscape and 
(Kwon & Johnson, 2014; 
Pinder, 2006) 
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organisation’s business strategy (e.g. new 
markets) to future-proof security investments. 
CR_IR 0.039 How well does the security 
control address an immediate 
security issue? 
Ideally, decisions to invest in security controls 
are proactive and planned to address risks 
before an impact occurs. However, 
investments in security controls can often be 
reactive and in response to urgent issues in the 
organisation’s security stance. This is often the 
case following compromises of security or 
where the organisation has become aware of an 
immediate change in the threat landscape. 
Security controls addressing an immediate 
need tend to be of higher value to the 
organisation. 
(L. A. Gordon et al., 2003; 
Rowe & Gallaher, 2006) 
CR_KR 0.052 To what extent does the 
security investment address 
the identified risks in the 
organisation? 
Over recent decades, information security has 
developed into an increasingly mature risk 
management discipline. Most organisations 
rely on some form of information risk 
management approach to assess and address 
the information security requirements in their 
(Baskerville, 1991; Bojanc 
& Jerman-Blažič, 2013; 
Straub & Welke, 1998) 
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environments. The result of these risk 
management processes usually leads to a 
prioritised list of known security risks that the 
organisation intends to manage. Investments in 
security controls that address known risks at 
the top of the list add more value to the 
organisation than those risks ranked lower. 
CR_UR 0.035 How well is the security 
investment expected to 
mitigate currently unknown 
risks in the organisation? 
A key deliverable of information security risk 
management is to direct resources to the 
highest value activities under imperfect or 
uncertain information scenarios. Consequently, 
there will be unknown or yet unidentified risks 
that are not directly addressed by existing 
control investments. However, certain security 
controls will, due to their inherent function and 
characteristic, provide benefits in scenarios 
that have not been directly considered. 
Examples of this may be extensive security 
awareness education or machine learning-
based solutions. Security controls that are 
(C. H. Loch, DeMeyer, & 
Pich, 2011; Mahmood & 
Afzal, 2013; L. Wang, 
Jajodia, Singhal, Cheng, 
& Noel, 2014) 
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likely to mitigate yet unknown risks can be of 
higher value. 
CE_AG 0.008 What impact will the security 
investment have on the 
organisation’s ability to be 
agile in its business approach? 
To allow the organisation to compete and 
survive in competitive and uncertain market 
environments, it must be agile when 
opportunities are identified and counteract 
negative market developments. To manage 
security risks and protect the organisation, 
security controls can inhibit the business’ 
ability to execute swiftly. Controls that do not 
offer the right balance between managing risk 
and enabling the organisation to best use those 
important assets tend to lose value for the 
organisation. 
(Harkins, 2016b; Imache, 
Izza, & Ahmed-Nacer, 
2012; Zaini & Masrek, 
2013) 
CE_CA 0.014 To what extent does the 
security investment result in a 
competitive advantage for the 
organisation? 
The past decade has seen a sharp rise in 
attention to and focus on information security 
and data protection by organisations, 
governments and the public alike. 
Organisations can use this attention to leverage 
their security investments as a business 
(Ahmad, Bosua, & 
Scheepers, 2014; Halaweh 
& Fidler, 2008; Harkins, 
2016a; Suh & Han, 2003) 
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advantage. Security controls can contribute to 
this by protecting the organisation’s crown 
jewels, fending off industrial espionage, 
providing benefits through customer security 
enhancements (trust) above competitors’ 
offerings and allowing the organisation to 
pursue new markets or business opportunities 
that have high entry requirements. 
CE_CE 0.017 What is the expected impact 
on customers and their 
experience in relation to the 
service or product protected 
by the control? 
Security controls can be a competitive 
advantage, but they can also have the opposite 
effect. Investing in security controls that make 
it more difficult for employees or customers to 
use the services protected by the control 
provides limited value. As a consequence, 
employees may waste time and resources 
finding ways in which to circumvent the 
control and customers may demand increased 
support or simply stop using the service.  
(Dhillon et al., 2016; 
Weir, Douglas, 
Carruthers, & Jack, 2009; 
Weir, Douglas, 
Richardson, & Jack, 2010) 
IC_CC 0.016 If an incident occurs, to what 
extent will the security 
In the case of a serious security incident, the 
costs related to the notification of data subjects 
(Hurtaud, Flamand, de la 
Vaissiere, & Hounka, 
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investment help reduce costs 
related to customer 
notifications? 
can be considerable, especially if a large 
amount of data/records have been affected. 
Investments in security controls that reduce the 
need for or cost of notification activities 
following an incident add additional value to 
the organisation. 
2015; Ishaq, 2016; 
Romanosky, 2016) 
IC_CL 0.022 If an incident occurs, to what 
extent will the security 
investment help reduce the 
loss of customers? 
As a result of a security incident, customers 
may lose trust in the organisation’s ability to 
protect their data and interests, resulting in a 
loss of customers (abnormal churn). Likewise, 
potential customers may be discouraged from 
signing up or converting to full customers, 
further amplifying the churn effect. Investment 
in controls that can reduce this impact provide 
more value to the organisation. 
(Ablon, Heaton, Lavery, 
& Romanosky, 2016; M. 
Lee & Lee, 2012) 
IC_MS 0.015 If an incident occurs, to what 
extent will the security 
investment help reduce the 
impact on market share/share 
price? 
Security incident costs are commonly reported 
in the context of market share and stock price 
impact. Those security investments that help 
reduce the loss of market share are preferred. 
Controls directly contributing to this attribute 
(Gatzlaff & McCullough, 
2010; Gordon, Loeb, & 
Lei, 2011; Kulikova, Heil, 
van den Berg, & Pieters, 
2012) 
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are often less technical in nature and more 
focused on building and communicating trust. 
They include controls related to incident 
response and crisis management, crisis 
management exercises and training, early 
compromise detection and so on.  
IC_PR 0.049 If an incident occurs, to what 
extent will the investment 
help reduce the cost related to 
public relations or the impact 
on the organisation’s 
reputation/brand? 
In the event of a major security incident, the 
organisation may come under close scrutiny by 
the public, with the media and experts 
volunteering their version of the situation. In 
most cases, organisations have an interest in 
controlling the message to reduce the (likely 
negative) impact on their brand and reputation. 
This often requires investing considerable 
resources in public relations 
experts/campaigns. Investment in controls that 
reduce the cost or time taken up by such post-
breach activities thus add value.  
(Gatzert, Schmit, & Kolb, 
2016; Hovav & Gray, 
2014; Kindervag, Shey, & 
Mak, 2015; West, 2016) 
LR_CP 0.015 To what extent will the 
security investment help 
Following an incident, business partners may 
claim breach of contract on data protection 
(Kindervag et al., 2015; 
Romanosky, Hoffman, & 
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reduce contractual penalties in 
the case of an incident? 
terms, while shareholders may claim that the 
company’s board of directors breached its 
fiduciary duties or wasted company resources. 
Security controls that reduce the legitimacy or 
impact of these claims and related costs offer 
more value to the organisation. 
Acquisti, 2014) 
LR_LC 0.014 To what extent will the 
security investment help 
reduce the cost related to legal 
counsel and proceedings? 
Where organisations suffer from major data 
breaches, especially if customer data is 
involved, there is a high likelihood of legal 
consequences (e.g. consumer class action 
lawsuits). Even if the organisation is not found 
to be guilty, legal and litigation costs can be 
considerable. Investment in controls that 
reduce the impact of such breaches, or their 
legal costs, are of higher value to the 
organisation. 
(Cooter & Rubinfeld, 
1989; Romanosky et al., 
2014; Takach, 2016) 
LR_LF 0.022 To what extent will the 
security investment help 
reduce the financial fines 
imposed by legal and 
Security incidents where regulated data is 
affected can lead to large regulatory fines. The 
magnitude of fines is often scaled in line with 
the organisation’s non-compliance with the 
(Goodman & Ramer, 
2007; Romanosky et al., 
2014; Takach, 2016) 
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regulatory bodies? regulatory requirements and lack of security 
controls implemented to protect data 
(negligence). Controls that help reduce fines in 
an incident scenario add more value to the 
organisation. 
LR_SA 0.015 To what extent will the 
security investment help 
reduce the impact of non-
financial legal and regulatory 
actions against the 
organisation? 
Non-financial penalties can be severe, 
including preventing the organisation from 
being able to handle regulated data (e.g. health, 
personal, financial) and revoking the license to 
operate. Settlement agreements may mandate 
strict security and audit requirements to be able 
to continue business. Investments in security 
controls that reduce the likelihood of such 
actions enable the organisation to continue 
trading in the case of a security breach. 
(Goodman & Ramer, 
2007; Romanosky et al., 
2014; Takach, 2016) 
PR_PM 0.025 How much project 
management overheads does 
this security investment 
require for its 
implementation? 
Many organisations utilise project management 
to oversee the implementation of changes in 
their business environment. Project 
management practices provide benefits in 
speed and raise the chance of implementation 
(Barclay & Osei-Bryson, 
2010; Snedaker & Rogers, 
2006; Whittaker, 1999; 
Zhou, Vasconcelos, & 
Nunes, 2008) 
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success but incur additional costs. In addition, 
project management offices can be under-
resourced compared with demand for their 
services. Security controls that are less 
dependent on project management resources 
tend to be more desirable, as they avoid 
potential bottlenecks and do not tie up project 
manager resources that may add more value in 
revenue-generating projects. 
PR_SC 0.026 To what extent does the 
security investment depend on 
dedicated security staff to 
deliver the desired benefits? 
Security controls vary widely in their 
requirements for specialist knowledge to be 
able to maximise the value they provide. Some 
controls can provide unusually high security 
benefits, but will only deliver when operated 
by large teams of skilled security professionals 
or highly specialised experts. This is a tangible, 
and costly, issue for many organisations due to 
the current worldwide shortage of information 
security professionals in the labour market. 
Investments in security controls that have 
(Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 
2015; Furnell, Fischer, & 
Finch, 2017; Hayes & 
Bodhani, 2013) 
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lower requirements for dedicated security staff, 
while still delivering the benefits desired, tend 
to result in higher value to the organisation. 
PR_TC 0.020 How much initial and 
ongoing training do 
employees need so that the 
organisation gains the desired 
value from this control? 
The training and education of employees that 
operate or interact with the security control can 
be a considerable cost factor for the 
organisation. Although many controls can be 
implemented without training security staff or 
employees, this may result in a reduction in the 
benefits provided by the control. In the worst 
case, the control could become a business 
inhibitor, as employees do not understand how 
to use a particular feature, or security staff 
might become frustrated with their lack of 
ability to properly operate the control and 
ignore it entirely. 
(Botta et al., 2007; 
Lockwood & Ansari, 
1999) 
T_AR 0.018 How resistant is the security 
control to the resources a 
typical threat source will 
bring to bear against the 
Security control investments should take 
resources (computer, human, environmental) 
and the commitment of those resources by a 
threat source into consideration. For example, 
(K.-K. R. Choo, 2011; 
LeMay, Ford, Keefe, 
Sanders, & Muehrcke, 
2011) 
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organisation’s assets? a threat source with high levels of resourcing 
(nation states) may be willing to initiate and 
sustain intensive threat events against the 
organisation. If the organisation’s relevant 
threat sources are less well resourced, the 
security control investment should reflect this. 
Depending on the threat sources the 
organisation identified to be in scope, security 
controls that have higher resistance against 
sustained and well-resourced threats add more 
value. Control investments should be aligned 
with current and expected threat sources to 
avoid overspending on capabilities that are not 
required to adequately protect the organisation. 
Relevant threat sources should be taken from 
organisations’ prioritised threat list used in risk 
management activities. 
T_EFF 0.013 To what extent will the 
security control reduce the 
speed at which a relevant 
The speed at which a threat source can achieve 
the maximum negative impact (e.g. steal or 
tamper with intangible assets, interrupt 
(Cremonini, 2005; 
Hutchins, Cloppert, & 
Amin, 2011; van Wieren 
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threat source achieves the 
maximum negative impact? 
services) is an important aspect to consider for 
two reasons. First, the longer an attack needs to 
be sustained, the higher is the resource cost for 
the threat source to achieve its desired goal. 
Second, a longer time to impact increases the 
chances of the organisation discovering the 
activity and/or allows time to organise an 
ordered response. Security controls that reduce 
the velocity with which a threat causes such an 
impact should be considered to be of higher 
value to the organisation. 
et al., 2016) 
T_LH 0.032 How probable is it that a 
relevant threat source would 
act against the organisation 
that this control would 
mitigate? 
Based on the threat source list for the assets in 
scope, an assessment should be made if it is 
probable that a threat source would act against 
the organisation’s assets that this control would 
mitigate. For example, an investment in 
phishing protection is unlikely to mitigate the 
actions taken by an insider. Security controls 
that address the threat events that an adversary 
may execute add higher value to the 
(Arora, Hall, Pinto, et al., 
2004; Hutchins et al., 
2011; E. Eugene Schultz, 
2002) 
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organisation. 
Table 37 - Complete overview of the decision criteria
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Soliciting criteria measurements from subject matter experts and decision makers is 
a key part of the MCDA process. To obtain useful measurements, the problem space 
and criteria must be well understood. Owing to the uncertainty inherent in many of 
our criteria, the most practical method for measurement solicitation in our case is a 
five-point Likert-type scale. The Likert scale is a psychometric scale common to a 
range of measurement solicitation scenarios such as surveys. It is an easily understood 
method of capturing the intensity of a decision maker’s views on a certain criterion. 
For those criteria where quantitative measurements tend to be more readily available, 
we propose collecting responses as cardinal measures (e.g. purchase price). 
Additional information on measurement type and utility direction is provided in the 
Appendices. 
Owing to the nature of the topic, the measurements for most criteria require solid 
knowledge about the problem space and specific organisational environment. 
Information security risk management is a complex topic, even without the added 
value dimension. We assume the decision maker to be an experienced security 
practitioner with a thorough understanding of the problem and the organisation to 
which the model is applied. However, on the matter of external uncertainties related 
to control efficiency, we suggest consulting resources that can provide assurance on 
alternative performance such as the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation 
Scheme (Dusart, Sauveron, & Tai-Hoon, 2008; Kizza, 2015). Practitioners may also 
consider assurance services12,13,14 and peer communities15 to research their choice of 
alternatives. 
Likewise, on the matter of the external threat landscape and unknown risks we refer 
to the previous chapter on understanding relevant developments in the threat 
landscape. Illustrated in Figure 46, we use SMAA to support our model with MCDA 
utilising the inputs described. Introduced in Lahdelma et al. (1998), SMAA represents 
a family of MCDA methods for problems where the uncertainty is so significant that 
it should be considered explicitly. Originally developed as a way in which to address 
                                                 
 
12 NSS Labs (https://www.nsslabs.com). 
13 ICSA Labs (https://www.icsalabs.com). 
14 Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization (https://www.amtso.org/). 
15 Gartner Peer Insights (https://www.gartner.com/reviews/). 
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the often cited Helsinki harbour decision problem (Hokkanen, Lahdelma, & 
Salminen, 1999), SMAA and its variations have subsequently been applied to a range 
of real-world decision problems (Lahdelma & Salminen, 2010). For example, 
Tervonen and Figueira (2008) provide a comprehensive overview of extensions to 
SMAA. 
Owing to its suitability for decision processes with uncertain or inaccurate preference 
and criteria information, SMAA is particularly attractive for information security 
decision making. Information security practitioners are faced with uncertainty at 
almost every step of the decision process (Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff, 2009) and thus a 
method that can handle inaccurate or uncertain model inputs is highly beneficial. It is 
able to achieve this through its inverse analysis of the space of feasible parameter 
values. Instead of requiring precise input parameters from decision makers, SMAA 
can compute multidimensional integrals over feasible parameter spaces to explore the 
entire weight space. As a result, it provides outputs that help decision makers identify 
the preferred alternative given the preference for certain criteria. However, simulation 
studies conclude that decisions based on the SMAA acceptability index are not 
recommended if the weight space is unconstrained (Durbach & Calder, 2016). In our 
model, we therefore constrain the weight 𝑤 of each criterion 𝑐 to improve the quality 
of the decision output. We apply the criteria weights (𝑤) obtained from the PLS-SEM 
model, relax the restrictions ((𝑤 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑤), (𝑤 + 0.5 ∗ 𝑤)) to allow for variation 
and set constraints on the weight space for the decision problem (𝑊′): 
𝑊′ = {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊|𝑤𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛} 
This is to further allow for uncertainty in the established preferences. If so desired, 
this can be relaxed further or restricted based on the preferences of a decision maker.  
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Figure 47 - Schematic overview of the criteria, weights and alternatives in an 
MCDA scenario (SMAA) 
The outputs of the analysis are rank acceptability, central weight vectors and 
confidence factors for the alternatives, allowing for a value-prioritised security 
investment selection (Figure 47). The acceptability index shows when an alternative 
would become the preferred choice based on different weight valuations. The central 
weight vector describes the preference distribution under which an alternative 
achieves preferred rank, whereas the confidence factor provides guidance on whether 
the criteria are sufficient to make an informed decision. 
8.4 Application of the model 
The application of the model to real-world information security problems is 
straightforward, as the problem structure is defined, relevant criteria established and 
preference baselines available. Possible alternatives under consideration need to be 
prescreened as appropriate for the organisation’s information security programme. 
That is, a shortlist of alternatives should be selected by information security 
practitioners based on the decision context. Although, from an implementation 
viewpoint, it is possible to include an exhaustive selection of alternatives in the model 
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(e.g. all malware protection solutions available in the market), this does not seem 
advisable due to the evaluation efforts required by the decision maker. 
Following this, the measurements of each criterion must be obtained. Ideally, decision 
makers would have quantitative measurements to support their decision processes. 
However, for most of the criteria considered in the context of information security, 
obtaining precise data is difficult or impossible (Algarni & Malaiya, 2016; Layton & 
Watters, 2014; Romanosky, 2016). To account for this, our model works with 
quantitative criteria measurements where such information is usually available 
(CC_IC, CC_OB, CC_OC, CC_PP) and qualitative inputs where not. Figure 48 
illustrates the first four criteria measurements for a six-alternative decision scenario. 
 
Figure 48 - Performance measurement sample 
We take the measurements as the input for the SMAA calculations, utilising the smaa 
package in the “R” software (R Core Team, 2018; Van Valkenhoef, 2018). The model 
input represents an 𝑁 × 𝑛 × 𝑚 parameter space, including the corresponding weights 
as shown in Table 38. The number of iterations (𝑁) is set to 10,000, which achieves 
sufficient accuracy for the SMAA results (Tervonen & Lahdelma, 2007). The weight 
space constraints (𝑊′) are calculated by using the hitandrun package (HAR), which 
generates a Markov chain whose stable state converges on the uniform distribution 
over a polytope (Tervonen, van Valkenhoef, Baştürk, & Postmus, 2013). This 
provides randomised constrained weights distributed around the criteria base weight 
for each iteration 𝑁 of the calculation. 
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𝒄𝟏,..,𝒏= Decision criteria 
𝒂𝟏,..,𝒎=Alternatives 
𝒘′𝟏,…,𝒏= criteria weight range (𝒘𝒋
𝒎𝒊𝒏 ≤
𝒘𝒋 ≤ 𝒘𝒋
𝒎𝒂𝒙) 
𝑵= Number of iterations 
 
      𝒄𝟏 ⋯ 𝒄𝒋 ⋯ 𝒄𝒏 
𝒂𝟏
⋮
𝒂𝒊
⋮
𝒂𝒎 [
 
 
 
 
𝒙𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒙𝟏𝒋 ⋯ 𝒙𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝒙𝒊𝟏 ⋯ 𝒙𝒊𝒋 ⋯ 𝒙𝒊𝒏
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝒙𝒎𝟏 ⋯ 𝒙𝒎𝒋 ⋯ 𝒙𝒎𝒏]
 
 
 
 
× 𝑵 
      𝒘′𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘′𝒋 ⋯ 𝒘′𝒏 
 
Table 38 - Simplified decision matrix 
We next apply the model to two case studies based on real-world decision problems 
information security practitioners have faced in large or global organisations. 
8.5 Case study 1 
The first case study considers a decision problem in a large organisation re-evaluating 
the protection of the computer assets in one of their business critical revenue-
generating production environment from malicious code. The environment runs on a 
mixed platform (Microsoft, Linux) with high requirements on availability and low 
latency. Owing to concerns about the latency impact, no malware protection has 
previously been used in this environment. Instead, risk owners have relied on 
compensating security controls such as network segregation to mitigate risks. 
However, the organisation recently suffered from a malware outbreak that caused a 
considerable negative impact in this environment and raised concerns over the lack 
of standard security controls and suitability of compensating controls. To address this 
risk, the information security function ran a project to research and propose possible 
alternatives based on practitioner experience and technology consulting services in 
line with the organisation’s requirements (Table 39) (This case study provides a 
sanitised and simplified version of the original alternative portfolio.) 
 
Alternative Description Detail 
AVSol1 Free anti-virus solution An anti-virus solution providing 
basic malware protection 
capabilities alongside limited 
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reporting and management 
functionality 
AVSol2 Established commercial 
anti-virus solution 
A commercial, enterprise-class 
malware protection solution 
offering advanced capabilities, 
reporting, management and support 
across multiple technology 
platforms. 
AVSol3 Innovative machine 
learning based anti-virus 
solution 
An innovative malware protection 
solution applying a machine 
learning-based protection approach 
AppWL Application whitelisting An application whitelisting 
solution that offers high malware 
protection capabilities by 
restricting computer to access only 
approved processes on the 
underlying platform 
HIPS Open source host 
intrusion prevention 
system 
A centrally managed, open source 
host-based intrusion detection and 
prevention system supporting 
multiple technology platforms 
Unchanged No change No additional action taken 
Table 39 - Case study 1: Snapshot of alternatives 
The measurements of each criterion for each alternative were obtained from subject 
matter experts working on the projects (see Appendix Chapter 8-2). By running the 
model with the relevant measurements plugged in, we obtain the rank acceptability 
index shown in Table 40 and Figure 49. AVSol2 is ranked first with a probability of 
0.7001 at the central weight vector shown in Figure 50 (confidence factor = 1.0 
(Figure 51)). As AVSol2 takes either rank 1 or rank 2 with a ~97% probability, it 
represents the best choice in this scenario from an information security value 
perspective based on the constrained central weight vector (Figure 50) providing an 
information security value-relevant preference baseline. 
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Rank 
Alternative 1 2 3 4 5 6 
AvSol1 0.2257 0.4228 0.2223 0.1090 0.0202 0.0000 
AvSol2 0.7001 0.2686 0.0313 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AvSol3 0.0000 0.0007 0.0071 0.1447 0.8475 0.0000 
AppWL 0.0017 0.0477 0.1147 0.7093 0.1266 0.0000 
HIPS 0.0725 0.2602 0.6246 0.0370 0.0057 0.0000 
Unchanged 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Table 40 - Case study 1: Rank acceptability table 
 
 
Figure 49 - Case study 1: Acceptability of alternatives 
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Figure 50 - Case study 1: Central weight vectors 
 
 
Figure 51 - Case study 1: Confidence factors 
Both AVSol1 and HIPS may be ranked first if the criteria weights for the model are 
adjusted as shown in the respective central weight plot lines, whereas AVSol3 and 
Unchanged cannot under the given conditions. Figure 52 shows an isolated central 
weight plot illustrating this point. If the decision maker’s preference changes such 
that criteria such as BP_TR, CC_OB, CC_OC, CC_PP and CE_DF have a higher 
preference, whereas CE_FP, CE_PV, CR_CR and CR_IR are adjusted to a lower 
preference, the HIPS alternative may rank first. This allows decision makers to further 
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analyse under which preference conditions an alternative becomes more or less 
attractive. 
 
Figure 52 - Case study 1: Central weight vectors, AVSol2 vs. HIPS 
The decision maker originally favoured the alternative AppWL due to its strong 
security and technical benefits. Based on the model output, this position was revisited. 
The relatively weak performance in the model was reviewed, which led to a 
reassessment of what the organisation considers to be important in this context. The 
decision maker realised that too much focus was being paid to the inherently strong 
features of application whitelisting, which led to overlooking less favourable criteria 
that would have resulted in lower-than-expected added value. The high ranking of 
AVSol1 was a surprise to the decision maker and encountered some criticism, mostly 
centred on the protective capability and manageability of the solution. However, 
following further discussion and review of the corresponding weight vector, it was 
conceded that the alternative might indeed be a valid choice in some scenarios. 
8.6 Case Study 2 
The second case study discusses a large organisation with less mature information 
security capabilities. Owing to a lack of security controls, the company suffered a 
second data leakage event in two years. The root cause of the data leak was established 
as employees being successfully ‘phished’ by cyber criminals. Following this, 
adversaries managed to extract sensitive information related to business strategy as 
well as sensitive data from the compromised employees. Senior management decided 
that appropriate action must be taken to avoid similar incidents in the future. To 
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address this, the information security practitioner proposed several possible solutions 
tailored to the organisational and decision context (Table 41). 
This case study represents a different type of decision making problem. Whereas case 
study 1 focused on choosing a solution for a defined technical problem, this case study 
illustrates how the model can be used to consider security control investments at a 
higher level. The decision maker can analyse a range of quite different security 
control options (technical, human, process) and compare these with the organisation’s 
information security value criteria. This approach is highly beneficial, as each control 
option offers a different value profile to the organisation and selecting the alternative 
providing the best value is challenging. (Again, this case study is sanitised and 
simplified for presentation purposes.) 
 
Alternative Description Detail 
ConfHrd Improvements in the 
security configuration of 
the organisation’s email 
environment 
Various configuration options 
to enhance the protection of the 
organisation’s email 
environment (SPF, DKIM, 
DMARC). DMARC is 
designed to fit into an 
organisation’s existing inbound 
email authentication process. It 
helps email receivers determine 
if the purported message 
represents what the receiver 
knows about the sender. If not, 
DMARC includes guidance on 
how to handle the suspicious 
messages 
E_ATP A commercial solution 
for advanced email 
threat protection 
A cloud-based email threat 
protection service with 
advanced safeguards to identify 
and stop unknown malware, 
harmful links, suspicious 
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emails and spam 
aware Security awareness with 
a focus on phishing 
attacks 
A commercial security 
awareness training solution that 
helps organisations educate 
their employees on the risks of 
phishing attacks. Phishing 
awareness training provides 
employees with knowledge on 
how to spot and report phishing 
attempts and helps staff keep 
their skills sharp through 
staged exercises 
DLP A commercial DLP 
solution 
DLP helps prevent sensitive 
information from leaving the 
organisation. DLP products 
mostly rely on rules to protect 
sensitive information so that 
employees cannot accidentally 
or maliciously share it with 
unauthorised parties and put 
the organisation at risk 
Unchanged No change No additional action taken 
Table 41 - Case study 2: Snapshot of alternatives 
As in case study 1, the measurements of each criterion for each alternative were 
established with the decision maker. Based on the input, the standard model identifies 
E_ATP as the likely choice with acceptability for rank 1 at a ~0.92 probability (Table 
42). This provides a strong indication that E_ATP represents the best choice in this 
scenario from an information security value perspective. The constrained central 
weight vector (Figure 54) illustrates the typical preference vector leading to this 
result. The relatively stark difference in the constrained weight plots for E_ATP and 
Aware is worth noting. This represents the difference in the nature of the control 
(technical vs. human) and indicates that the latter could become the preferred solution 
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if the decision maker’s preferences for certain criteria change. The decision maker 
may also decide that DLP is the best value alternative if the organisation is less 
concerned about potential workflow challenges or simply favours other criteria where 
this alternative is comparatively strong as shown in the central weight vector. 
The result made intuitive sense to the practitioner as E_ATP had previously been 
independently recommended to the organisation. The result for the Aware alternative 
was somewhat surprising as phishing awareness training was seen as a fundamental 
tool to protect the organisation from such attacks. Reviewing the criteria weight 
vectors for the alternatives provided useful insights into the outcome and sparked 
discussion on several criteria (e.g. what is important to the organisation, how much 
inconvenience is acceptable in the current security culture, what is the right balance 
between protection velocity and longevity). DLP was not previously perceived to be 
a top choice because of concerns about costs, overheads and intrusiveness. Following 
the exercise, DLP is being revisited to discuss in more detail its potential to add value. 
 
 
Rank 
Alternative 1 2 3 4 5 
ConfHrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0036 0.9964 0.0000 
E_ATP 0.9178 0.0822 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Aware 0.0012 0.2141 0.7847 0.0000 0.0000 
DLP 0.0810 0.7037 0.2117 0.0036 0.0000 
Unchanged 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Table 42 - Case study 2: Rank acceptability table 
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Figure 53 - Case study 2: Acceptability of alternatives 
 
 
Figure 54 - Case study 2: Central weight vectors 
 
 
Figure 55 - Case study 2: Confidence factors 
Although these case studies are only indicative, they illustrate the benefits of the 
model along several dimensions. We cannot claim that the decision maker enjoyed 
the process of providing measurements on 39 criteria for the alternatives portfolio. 
However, the feedback was positive insofar that the criteria were mostly easy to 
provide measurements for and it was helpful to approach each alternative from 
various value viewpoints. Some criteria were more difficult to provide measurements 
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for, but the simplified Likert scale approach avoided this becoming an obstacle. In 
general, providing measurements required limited time investment and left 
practitioners with more confidence in their understanding of the problem space. 
Although the model features a relatively long list of relevant criteria, which might 
make it seem less attractive, each criterion represents part of what information 
security value means to organisations. As we saw in case study 2, decision makers 
may be led to focus too heavily on certain criteria while ignoring, or at least 
undervaluing, other criteria. The model thus ensures that all value criteria are 
considered, but leaves enough flexibility through weight vectors for deliberate 
adjustments. It not only shows which alternative provides the best value to the 
organisation, but also presents the criteria weights that are the basis for that outcome. 
Owing to its transparency, we found the model robust in application. The output 
includes probabilities for all feasible solutions, which means that SMAA describes 
how robust the model is subject to different uncertainties in the input data (Lahdelma 
& Salminen, 2016). By adding a control alternative (‘Unchanged’), we can also 
observe the behaviour of each criterion/alternative combination compared with the 
status quo. As the implementation allows for rapid changes in weight constraints 
(including an unconstrained model), decision makers can then test the results against 
varying preferences to ensure the outcomes are suitable. As with most models, 
however. more real-world testing is required to study the long-term outcomes of such 
value-prioritised decisions (this was not possible under the time constraints of this 
research). 
8.7 Discussion 
As we derived our model from extensive research on what information security value 
means to practitioners and what components are considered in the academic literature, 
it incorporates highly relevant criteria on information security value. Unlike purely 
financial approaches, we take a wider view of what such value represents to an 
organisation. Similar to the definition of IT value by Parker, Benson, and Trainor 
(1988), we see the value of information security as its ability to enable and enhance 
business performance. It enables value-focused decision making that does not only 
consider the criteria common to decision processes in this area such as price, technical 
capability and user experience. It also includes the financial as well as non-financial 
aspects of the security investment decision. While the criteria related to direct costs 
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and financials comprise a substantial amount of the weight, we found that non-
financial criteria typically considered by information security practitioners outweigh 
them. Our model reflects this in the range of criteria condensed through empirical 
research as well as the criteria weight baseline derived from the primary inputs of 
practitioners. 
However, this also introduces challenges for decision makers. While measurements 
of financial criteria such as direct costs tend to be readily available (e.g. CC_OC, 
CC_PP), measurements of other criteria are harder to establish. During our research, 
we investigated quantitative measurement options for the criteria set; however, we 
concluded that these are often infeasible for real-world application because of the 
efforts required to obtain precise measures. For example, it may be feasible, but 
certainly not straightforward, for an organisation to approximate the direct cost 
incurred by a specific security incident, especially since the outcomes change 
depending on the context. As one information security practitioner astutely stated in 
our interviews, “The ranges are so wide that actually, there is very little point 
applying a sophisticated model to it”. 
Since the effort of obtaining such information is ill balanced with the expected 
benefits gained from using it in mathematical models, we opted for a qualitative 
approach based on simple Likert-type measurements. However, this approach 
introduces other challenges as the model interprets the Likert rating as a precise input. 
From a context perspective, this is not a problem, as the rating input is consistent 
across all the alternatives. Nevertheless, the decision maker should understand that 
the output is based on uncertain qualitative inputs and may not be as clear-cut as the 
charts suggest. 
We tested the use of wider Likert scales and visual analogue scales to assess their 
potential to improve the qualitative data input and found that the Likert scale was 
preferred by practitioners owing to its simplicity and ease of use. The final ranking 
results were similar between the simple measurements and visual analogue scales, 
which corresponds with the findings of Guyatt, Townsend, Berman, and Keller 
(1987). Considering the inherent uncertainty in this problem area, we found this 
approach to offer benefits due to its ease of use while providing a sufficiently accurate 
input. Yet, the model is designed with information security professionals in mind, and 
the usefulness of the model output depends on sensible inputs by practitioners who 
have the required knowledge and experience to provide meaningful measurements. 
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Although little mathematical or decision theory knowledge is required, they should 
have extensive subject matter expertise in information security and a good knowledge 
of the organisation. When required, the practitioner should also consult relevant 
industry data. 
Another important feature of the model is the criteria weight baseline, which enables 
information security practitioners to leverage the weights derived from real-world 
survey data and thus quickly and directly apply representative weights instead of 
conducting lengthy exercises establishing criteria weights from scratch. The model 
can be used in an unconstrained SMAA weight space as well, but we cannot 
recommend this approach. In their simulation experiment, Durbach and Calder (2016) 
find that the average accuracy of SMAA models is poor if no weight information is 
provided. Applying constrained weights considerably improves the output of the 
model as it refines the weight vector for each criterion according to the real-world 
experiences of the surveyed practitioners. Criteria weights can easily be changed by 
decision makers if needed in the context of the specific organisation or scenario. This 
can be useful if certain local criteria preferences, for example purchase cost, are well 
outside the global weight vector defined in the standard model. In this case, the 
baseline still provides useful anchor values. 
Based on our research, we found that time is often an overlooked aspect when 
considering information security value. It is present in financial calculations (e.g. 
NPV) and represented in risk discussions in the form of likelihood estimates, but it 
tends not to be included in the overall value proposition. Our model mentions several 
criteria that consider the time aspect in this context. We found that practitioners deem 
the velocity at which a control adds the desired value (CE_PV) to be an important 
value aspect. This is complemented by the resilience of the control against relevant 
threat actor actions (T_EFF). Investing in a control that offers its full value quickly 
may be undesirable if it is overcome by threat actors just as quickly. In many cases, 
controls require ongoing investment in people resources (PR_TC) to retain the value 
it originally offered the organisation. In a constantly evolving space such as 
information security, there is no room for a ‘set and forget’ approach. Considering 
the efforts required to keep the control at the anticipated level is important to 
understand its long-term value to the organisation. 
However, some time/value aspects are not considered in the model. For example, 
while we consider the current impact of controls on usability and business process 
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interruption (CE_AG, BP_BP), we do not explicitly consider the shifts in that space 
over time. Any practitioner that tried to establish, what was then considered 
‘intrusive’ security controls such as multifactor authentication a decade ago, 
understands the extent to which the notion of ‘acceptable security controls’ can 
change. Security controls once considered to be too intrusive, and as such adding poor 
value to organisations, may be more widely accepted and valued in the future. 
8.8 Chapter summary 
We presented a model for structured multicriteria decision making in the context of 
value-prioritised information security investments. The basis of this work is rooted in 
an extensive literature review as well as the primary data collected from senior 
practitioners on the topic of information security value aspects. We followed a mixed 
method research approach to incorporate our SLR output, analysis of the structured 
expert interviews and practitioner survey data to thoroughly structure the problem 
space. Based on a structured equation model, we then obtained a set of 39 criteria, as 
well as their outer weights, which are crucial in the context of information security 
value. For each criterion, detailed guidance and further references were provided to 
the practitioner to solicit measurements in context of the organisation and alternatives 
portfolio. Acknowledging the uncertainty inherent to this problem space, we used 
SMAA as the analysis methodology to arrive at a value-prioritised ranking of 
alternatives. Owing to its suitability for decision processes with uncertain or 
inaccurate preference and criteria information, SMAA is particularly attractive for 
information security decision making. Based on simple case studies, we then 
illustrated possible applications of the model and discussed the benefits and 
challenges in each scenario. The results were presented utilising the rank 
acceptability, central weight vector and confidence factor, clearly showing the impact 
of each criterion on the output. 
Our model provides several benefits to security practitioners. First, it offers a reliable 
criteria portfolio focusing on what is relevant in the context of information security 
value in an organisational context. Practitioners can simply use the criteria presented 
in this research to ensure they consider the relevant value aspects in their decisions. 
Second, our preference baseline offers a real-world representation of how an average 
practitioner weighs each criterion in his/her decisions. Decision makers can 
confidently apply the baseline without conducting another weight solicitation 
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exercise. When the baseline does not represent the preferences of an organisation, the 
weights can easily be adapted either individually or by configuring the weight 
constraints parameter. Third, the measurement input for the model is deliberately 
quick and simple. During our research, we heard many times that precise data are 
unavailable and that efforts to gather such data are better spent elsewhere. 
Consequently, we use simple qualitative measurements for a range of relevant criteria 
instead of requiring the tedious gathering of precise measurements that are not 
obtainable for most practitioners. Of course, where more precise data are available, 
practitioners can modify each criterion measurement scale to accommodate this 
increased accuracy. Fourth, the model output is transparent and allows decision 
makers to understand the underlying reasons for the final result. By using SMAA, 
practitioners can see clearly which criteria drive the ranking outcome. In turn, this 
also offers a sensitivity measure, as modifying the measurement or weight of a 
criterion provides feedback on the robustness of the model. 
The approach presented here helps practitioners understand the value aspects of their 
information security investments and allows for a value-prioritised decision process. 
Unlike other disciplines such as wealth management, information security cannot 
simply maximise output along one vector. Attempting to maximise the protection of 
the organisation while minimising costs will not contribute the desired value; 
organisations are not just in business to be secure. Rather, information security must 
consider a multiplicity of value vectors to balance the criteria presented in this 
research. Merton (1994) aptly states, “At times, the mathematics of the models become 
too interesting and we lose sight of the models’ ultimate purpose. The mathematics of 
the models is precise, but the models are not, being only approximations to the 
complex, real world”. 
It is tempting to produce elegant mathematical models that work well with random 
test data. However, without the means to collect the necessary data in the real world, 
such models are of limited use to practitioners in the field. Instead, we propose a 
model that provides clear benefits in value-prioritised decision making based on 
uncertain information. Over time, as relevant data become more readily available in 
this space, the model can be improved further by replacing qualitative with 
quantitative measurements. 
In the final chapter, we summarise the research and provide concluding thoughts on 
the research questions. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
Leading into this thesis, we argued that information security value is a challenging 
topic for practitioners. They need to understand the current and future threats to 
organisations’ information assets, prioritise those with the highest probability to be 
realised on the highest valued assets and investigate the value propositions of controls. 
We assumed this to be a highly complex undertaking due to the many possible factors 
to be considered and uncertainty about the key aspects of the decision process. 
During this research, we found this assumption to be entirely true. This manifested 
itself early in the research through the ambiguity in the terminology used by 
practitioners to reference the problem space. Some practitioners use the term ‘cyber 
security’ analogous to ‘information security’, whereas others see a distinct difference 
in what these terms represent. To address this, we analysed the authoritative definition 
sources in the literature and isolated key components in the definition sets in chapter 
3. Based on these findings, we produced an improved and representative definition of 
cyber security. In addition, we contributed an exhaustive set of authoritative sources 
for further research in this field. 
In chapter 2, we turn our focus to a systematic review of the literature on economic 
information security decision making processes. Based on a selection of highly 
relevant papers describing the approaches supporting decision processes for 
information security investments, we identified nine common approaches and 
extracted the key elements of each primary study. Research on approaches related to 
utility maximization, game theory and real options theory showed the highest 
representation, with making accurate estimates and complex application being the key 
challenges in most studies. In general, we noted a considerable overlap of elements 
across all approaches which we took forward for further analysis in chapter 7.  
To understand the value information security can add to organisations, we examined 
the impact of publicly reported information security incidents on the share prices of 
organisations in chapter 3. In particular, we investigated the impact of repeat data 
breaches by using the event study method. Our study found that a significant negative 
reaction follows the first reported data breach event, whereas inconclusive results 
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were drawn about subsequent events. However, the significant results for the 
combined event pool led us to conclude that information security breaches result in a 
negative economic impact for organisations. 
By extending our literature review on the key elements of information security value, 
we collected real-world data on this topic through semi-structured interviews with 
senior practitioners. Following a grounded theory approach, in chapter 5, we 
identified several of the key categories considered by practitioners when evaluating 
security investments and the value of information security programmes. This allowed 
us to construct a schematic overview of security investment evaluations in 
organisations. In addition, the detailed interview analysis was condensed into 15 
principles offering a condensed view on important findings. Illustrated through a 
relationship network of qualitative codes, we found that decisions on security 
investments are made in the context of a highly complex organisational system 
relying on a range of business environment factors. In other words, practitioners do 
not view security investments as an isolated activity but rather intertwined with the 
wider business requirements, challenges and drivers to deliver value in context. 
One of the most common challenges faced by practitioners in their strategic 
investment decisions is uncertainty about information security threat developments. 
Reducing uncertainty in this area would enable practitioners to improve decisions in 
the context of value-prioritised information security investments considerably, as 
resources would more often be spent in areas likely to encounter relevant events. To 
address this, we proposed an approach in chapter 6 to utilise publicised security threat 
predictions by subject matter experts to reduce threat landscape uncertainty. Based on 
a collection of security predictions for 2016, we used latent Dirichlet allocation to 
find 17 latent prediction topics. A year later, we revisited these prediction topics and 
conducted a survey collecting ex post data on security threat developments from 
respondents with varying expertise to evaluate the validity of the threat topics 
predicted. The survey results confirmed relevant threat developments for 13 of the 17 
predicted threat topics with varying degrees of agreement, largely stable across the 
subgroups of participants. Security practitioners can thus use this approach to reduce 
uncertainty about value-prioritised information security investment decisions. 
By combining these insights with those gained from chapters 2 and 5, we defined the 
structure and measurement variables in a conceptual model of information security 
investment decisions in chapter 7. We then used this to design a survey instrument to 
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assess our model by using PLS-SEM. We found significant support for the inner and 
outer models, describing the five LVs and their directional relationship. The results 
showed that the underlying business environment, driving factors and threat 
landscape play a fundamental role in the delivery of value-oriented security 
investments. These are mediated by security capabilities (i.e. a security programme 
or function). We further found that accounting considerations have a significant 
indirect effect on security value, suggesting that the value of information security 
benefits from accounting scrutiny. The SEM analysis provided strong evidence that 
security capabilities have a large direct effect on the value organisations gain from 
information security investment. It also showed that the value outcome is strongly 
influenced by organisation-specific aspects that must be considered when creating 
security capabilities, as a cookie-cutter approach to information security will not 
result in the optimal value. 
This finding was an important aspect of the last chapter, in which we presented an 
SMAA-based multicriteria decision model for information security practitioners to 
deliver value in their security control investments. As we derived our proposed model 
from extensive research on what information security value means to practitioners 
and which components are considered in the academic literature, it incorporates 
highly relevant criteria on information security value as well as their typical 
preferences derived from our structural outer model. We presented an end-to-end 
MCDA approach that incorporates the findings from our mixed method research, 
focusing on ease of use when practitioners make value-prioritised decisions. We then 
used SMAA due to its suitability for decision processes with uncertain or inaccurate 
preference and criteria information. This enabled us to present the results utilising 
rank acceptability, central weight vectors and confidence factors, allowing 
practitioners to clearly understand which criteria drive the outcome. Finally, we 
provided two case studies that illustrate the use of the model in different decision 
contexts. 
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9.1 Research questions 
As our research questions have been incorporated in the thesis structure, we addressed 
each question in previous chapters. In this section, we provide a brief conclusion 
recapitulating the detailed findings. 
As a reminder, we asked five research questions at the beginning of this thesis: 
I. What do we mean by cyber security and how does it differ from information 
security? 
II. Which information security value models are currently proposed to manage and 
evaluate information security investments in organisations? 
III. What are the key factors relevant to information security investments and are 
these similar across models? 
IV. How do information security practitioners view the topic of information security 
value? What factors are relevant in the real world? 
V. Which of the gaps identified in the research questions would, if addressed or 
resolved, lead to advancement in this space? 
RQ I was answered in chapter 3 in which we analysed the authoritative definitions of 
cyber security and provided an improved definition that combined some of the aspects 
of existing definitions. To understand the difference between the terms, we compared 
our findings with related work on information security definitions, finding that the 
scope of the term ‘cyber security’ is closer to that of systemic or macroeconomic 
concerns, whereas ‘information security’ is more focused at the organisational level. 
To answer RQ II, we conducted an SLR and found 25 relevant publications discussing 
nine high-level approaches, as described in chapter 2. We deconstructed these papers 
to obtain the key aspects mentioned by the original authors relevant to their 
approaches. This resulted in eight categories of key elements (benefit, cost, function, 
impact, resource, threat, volatility, vulnerability) with several element attributes in 
each category. The detailed element list also served as important input for RQ III. In 
addition, we observed trends over time to understand which approaches have received 
the most attention by the research community. 
Chapter 5 examined the key factors that practitioners consider in the context of 
information security value in their organisations. Our qualitative analysis and network 
relationship overview provided a detailed report on such factors and highlighted 
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conflicts and consensus in the responses between our research and those of existing 
studies. Chapters 5 and 7 also addressed RQ IV by examining which factors are 
relevant in the real world from the viewpoints of information security practitioners. 
Based on our interview data, we described the building blocks of an information 
security investment framework that our participants assembled for us as well as 
condensed our findings into 15 principles that summarise practitioners’ views on 
information security value. In chapter 7, we extended this by combining the findings 
of chapters 2 and 5 into a survey instrument that allowed us to collect quantitative 
data from a wider pool of practitioners. Based on these survey data, we tested our 
conceptual model by using SEM to sharpen our view of the relevant factors in this 
context further. 
Lastly, RQ V was addressed throughout this thesis. First, we identified and bridged 
the gap between the meanings of cyber security and information security. Second, we 
noted and addressed the absence of previous work that has systematically reviewed 
the information security economics space in the context of evaluation models. This 
was a considerable gap in the research and has been addressed by this thesis. Third, 
we observed the gap in the research on the impact of data breach events on 
organisations. While there are numerous studies and research reports on this topic as 
outlined in chapter 3, an investigation on the impact of repeat data breaches of the 
same organisation was absent. Fourth, in our interviews with senior practitioners, we 
identified several of the issues with current information security value assessment 
approaches, the most critical being the challenges of uncertainty and complexity. This 
matched the results of our SLR. We also described an innovative way in which to 
reduce uncertainty about threat developments in chapter 6. We further accounted for 
uncertainty in our decision model by utilising an analysis model suitable for such 
situations (SMAA) and addressed the complexity issue by providing an empirically 
tested structural model that offers the most important value criteria in this context to 
practitioners. In addition, our model provided a weight baseline (preferences) for each 
criterion based on the responses of over 200 practitioners (chapter 7), which can be 
readily applied in practice. Lastly, we showed that our model is simple to adopt, as it 
does not require practitioners to collect precise figures on impact. We considered 
feedback that such figures are rarely available and complex mathematical models 
requiring such input are of limited use for most practitioners. Our model provides 
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useful value-prioritised results based on easy-to-provide inputs, while being 
sufficiently flexible to integrate precise data when they are available. 
9.2 Contributions 
The contributions of the research are described in each chapter and are presented in 
this section in summarised form.  
In our first of its kind systematic literature review on information security economic 
evaluation approaches we highlight key components and challenges extracted from 
relevant academic papers. We categorise and summarise the key challenges and 
benefits mentioned in the studies to understand the shared features in this context. We 
also provide a detailed breakdown of those elements authors consider to be the most 
relevant for their approaches and analyse commonalities across approaches. In 
addition, by observing trends in research over time, we identify which approaches are 
favoured by researchers and which are most influential. This condensed view can be 
used by professionals and academics to support their research in this area. We present 
an overview of authoritative sources and definitions of cyber security in chapter 3 
which extends on current knowledge by contributing an improved definition building 
on these authoritative definitions. Both, the methodology and the improved definition 
are noteworthy contributions to the field. The approach is useful to practitioners and 
researchers alike as it provides a way to quickly come to an unbiased agreed definition 
of the term in questions. Specific for cyber security, this exercise can be repeated with 
relative ease, including additional definitions. The improved definition as presented 
by this research is useful for practitioners who require a clear definition of what cyber 
security means, either for business, government or legal reasons. Our definition 
consists of the most relevant components across 28 authoritative definitions and is as 
such highly representative. Chapter 4 contributes the first event study assessing 
impact of repeat data breaches providing early days insights into whether the market 
reacts differently in such situations. We observe statistically significant impact in our 
sample of companies being affected by data breaches more than once, leaving us to 
conclude that information security breaches result in a negative economic impact on 
organisations. Following this we conduct extensive qualitative analysis of important 
aspects and considerations security professionals consider in context of information 
security value to their organisations. We present a simplified but highly relevant 
framework of the organisational context in which investment decisions for 
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information security are made in a professional environment. We found that 
information security investments follow a decision support process initiated by 
‘driving factors’ and adjusted by ‘challenges and constraints’. Based on these driving 
factors and challenges, professionals select an appropriate security capability, which 
is then refined through corporate decision filters. Our detailed interview analysis leads 
to 15 principles offering a condensed view of our most important findings. In addition, 
we conduct a brief relationship network analysis of the coded responses to provide 
further detail on the hot topics in decision processes. Our analysis shows that 
decisions on security investments are made in the context of a highly complex 
organisational system relying on a range of unique business environment factors. 
Practitioners do not view information security investments as an isolated activity but 
rather intertwined with the wider business requirements, challenges and drivers to 
deliver value in this context. In chapter 6 we turn our focus to a novel approach for 
utilising security predictions towards decision support for information security 
programs. We illustrate how this has been successfully applied and verified for one 
particular year. Based on over 200 security predictions published in 2015, we use a 
topic modelling approach to identify 17 underlying predicted threat developments. To 
verify the extent to which these predicted threat topics were realized throughout 2016, 
we solicited backward looking opinions from respondents with varying experience of 
IT and information security in a survey at the start of 2017. In addition, we reviewed 
secondary sources to corroborate the survey results. Based on the presented findings, 
we conclude that the security predictions made in 2015 for 2016 did foresee notable 
developments in that year. This method provides an easy and cost efficient way to 
gain insights into anticipated thread landscape developments through topic modelling. 
Our results show that those threat developments covered by the collected security 
predictions were realised to a substantial extent. This finding indicates that security 
practitioners can use this approach to reduce uncertainty in the context of value-
prioritised information security investment decisions. In our structural equation 
modelling analysis (chapter 7) we illustrate how security capabilities have a large 
direct effect on the value organisations gain from information security investment. 
We also show that the value outcome is strongly influenced by organisation-specific 
aspects that must be considered when creating security capabilities, as a cookie-cutter 
approach to information security will not result in optimal value. The conceptual 
model which we derived from our framework in chapter 5 and output of chapter 2, 
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describes the underlying key constructs for assessing information security value in an 
organisation. Practitioners can immediately apply this insight by reflecting on the 
sociotechnical aspects of their environments and ensuring that their current security 
programmes are a good fit for their organisations. Misalignment of business 
environment and drivers can result in considerably worse outcomes for security value 
as evidenced by the large effect size. For researchers, this finding provides a statistical 
basis for investigating the sociotechnical aspects of information security and its 
relation to business outcomes in more detail. Lastly, in chapter 8 we combine our 
research findings and present an exhaustive set of relevant MCDA criteria with their 
corresponding weights in context of information security investment decisions. 
Acknowledging the uncertainty inherent to this problem space, we used SMAA as the 
analysis methodology to arrive at a value-prioritised ranking of alternatives. Our 
model provides several benefits to security practitioners. First, it offers a reliable 
criteria portfolio focusing on what is relevant in the context of information security 
value in an organisational context. Second, our preference baseline offers a real-world 
representation of how an average practitioner weighs each criterion in his/her 
decisions. Decision makers can confidently apply the baseline without conducting 
another weight solicitation exercise. Third, the measurement input for the model is 
deliberately quick due to simple qualitative measurements for a range of relevant 
criteria instead of requiring the tedious gathering of precise measurements that are 
not obtainable for most practitioners. Fourth, the model output is transparent and 
allows decision makers to understand the underlying reasons for the final result. This 
is crucial for practitioners to further improve and optimise decision outcomes based 
on shifting value views within the local and global information security environment. 
9.3 Future research 
The proposed model offers several avenues for improvement. It is derived from 
exhaustive qualitative and quantitative research at a particular point in time. Hence, 
future researchers should revisit the studies presented in chapters 5 and 7 to gain 
additional primary data, ideally from an even larger pool of participants. This would 
allow them to verify, optimise or improve the fundamental research findings on which 
our model is built. In particular, the key factors in this context and importance of such 
factors to practitioners may change over time and this could lead to a modification of 
the structural model. 
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Moreover, as with most models, additional real-world testing is required to examine 
the long-term outcomes of the value-prioritised decisions; this was not possible under 
the time constraints of this research. Similarly, additional research on threat 
predictions and developments is required to solidify the indicative positive results 
presented in chapter 6. This could be achieved by repeating the research for the 
coming year as well as extending the participant pool for the post hoc surveys. Lastly, 
the fast-moving area of cyber security offers rich research opportunities as mentioned 
in chapter 3. The term ‘cyber security’ continues to evolve as definitions are adjusted 
to reflect the current understanding of the space. This offers another opportunity to 
reassess current authoritative definitions and extend our work. 
We close with a quote from a senior information security practitioner that we found 
fitting: 
“We are in the relationship business; we have to convince people who don’t 
understand information security. Make it simple, make it understandable...tell them 
why and show them how you can make it better. There are certain investments you 
have to make, to make it better”. 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 3-1 
This section provides details on authoritative definitions and their sources. 
ID source title yea
r 
definition 
1 Committee 
on National 
Security 
Systems 
National 
Information 
Assurance 
(IA) Glossary 
200
9 
The ability to protect or defend the use of 
cyberspace from cyber attacks. 
2 National 
Initiative for 
Cybersecurit
y Careers 
and Studies, 
Explore 
Terms: A 
Glossary of 
Common 
Cybersecurit
y 
Terminology 
n/a Strategy, policy, and standards regarding the 
security of and operations in cyberspace, and 
encompass the full range of threat reduction, 
vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international 
engagement, incident response, resiliency, and 
recovery policies and activities, including 
computer network operations, information 
assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, 
and intelligence missions as they relate to the 
security and stability of the global information 
and communications infrastructure. 
3 International 
Telecommu
nication 
Union 
SERIES X: 
DATA 
NETWORKS
, OPEN 
SYSTEM 
COMMUNI
CATIONS 
AND 
SECURITY 
200
8 
Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, 
security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, 
training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organization and users assets. 
Organization and users assets include connected 
computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, 
applications, services, telecommunications 
systems, and the totality of transmitted and or 
stored information in the cyber environment. 
Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and 
maintenance of the security properties of the 
organization and users assets against relevant 
security risks in the cyber environment. The 
general security objectives comprise the 
following: Availability Integrity, which may 
include authenticity and non-repudiation 
Confidentiality 
4 Gartner Definition: 
Cybersecurit
y 
201
3 
Cybersecurity is the governance, development, 
management and use of information security, OT 
security, and IT security tools and techniques for 
achieving regulatory compliance, defending 
assets and compromising the assets of 
adversaries. 
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5 The 
Institution of 
Engineering 
and 
Technology 
Resilience 
and Cyber 
Security of 
Technology 
in the Built 
Environment 
201
3 
Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and 
maintenance of the security objectives of the 
organisation and users assets against relevant 
security risks in the cyber environment 
6 British 
Standards 
Institute 
Guidelines 
for 
cybersecurity 
201
2 
Preservation of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information in the Cyberspace. In 
addition, other properties, such as authenticity, 
accountability, non-repudiation, and reliability 
can also be involved. 
7 Australian 
Government 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy 
200
9 
Measures relating to the confidentiality, 
availability and integrity of information that is 
processed, stored and communicated by 
electronic or similar means 
8 Federal 
Chancellery 
of the 
Republic of 
Austria 
Austrian 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy 
201
3 
Cybersecurity describes the protection of a key 
legal asset through constitutional means against 
actor-related, technical, organisational and 
natural dangers posing a risk to the security of 
cyber space (including infrastructure and data 
security) as well as the security of the users in 
cyber space. Cybersecurity helps to identify, 
assess and follow up on threats as well as to 
strengthen the ability to cope with interferences 
in or from cyber space, to minimise the effects as 
well as to restore the capacity to act and 
functional capabilities of the respective 
stakeholders, infrastructures and services.  
9 Government 
of Belgium 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy 
201
2 
Cybersecurity is the desired condition in which 
the security of cyberspace is in proportion to the 
cyber threat and the potential impact of cyber 
attacks. Cybersecurity is freedom from danger or 
damage caused by disruption or failure of IT or 
by abuse of ICT. The consequences by abuse, 
disruption or failure can include limiting the 
availability and reliability of IT, breach of 
confidentiality of information or damage to the 
integrity of that information (Change unlawful, 
delete or add).  
10 Government 
of Finland 
Finland's 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy 
201
3 
Cybersecurity means the desired end state in 
which the cyber domain is reliable and in which 
its functioning is ensured. In the desired end state 
the cyber domain will not jeopardise, harm or 
disturb the operation of functions dependent on 
electronic information (data) processing. 
Reliance on the cyber domain depends on its 
actors implementing appropriate and sufficient 
information security procedures (communal data 
security). These procedures can prevent the 
materialisation of cyber threats and, should they 
still materialise, prevent, mitigate or help tolerate 
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their consequences. Cybersecurity encompasses 
the measures on the functions vital to society and 
the critical infrastructure which aim to achieve 
the capability of predictive management and, if 
necessary, tolerance of cyber threats and their 
effects, which can cause significant harm or 
danger to Finland or its population. 
11 French 
Network and 
Information 
Security 
Agency 
Information 
systems 
defence and 
security 
France’s 
strategy 
201
1 
The desired state of an information system in 
which it can resist events from cyberspace likely 
to compromise the availability, integrity or 
confidentiality of the data stored, processed or 
transmitted and of the related services that these 
systems offer or make accessible. Cybersecurity 
makes use of information systems security 
techniques and is based on fighting cybercrime 
and establishing cyber defence.  
12 Federal 
Ministry of 
the Interior 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy for 
Germany 
201
1 
Cybersecurity is the desired objective of the IT 
security situation, in which the risks of global 
cyberspace have been reduced to an acceptable 
minimum. Hence, cybersecurity in Germany is 
the desired objective of the IT security situation, 
in which the risks of the German cyberspace have 
been reduced to an acceptable minimum. 
Cybersecurity is the sum of suitable and 
appropriate measures. Civilian cybersecurity 
focuses on all IT systems for civilian use in 
German cyberspace. Military cybersecurity 
focuses on all IT systems for military use in 
German cyberspace.  
13 Government 
of Hungary 
National 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy of 
Hungary 
201
3 
The ongoing and systematic application of 
political, legal, economic, educational, 
awareness-raising and technical tools suitable for 
managing cyberspace risks, transforming the 
cyberspace into a reliable environment by 
ensuring an acceptable level of such risks for the 
smooth functioning and operation of social and 
economic processes 
14 The 
Netherlands, 
Ministry of 
Security and 
Justice 
The National 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy 
(NCSS) 2 
201
3 
The continuous and planned taking of political, 
legal, economic, educational, awareness-raising 
and technical measures to manage risks in 
cyberspace that transforms the cyberspace  into a 
reliable environment for the smooth functioning 
and operation of societal and economic processes 
by ensuring an acceptable level of risks in 
cyberspace.  
15 New 
Zealand 
Government 
New 
Zealand’s 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy 
201
1 
The practice of making the networks that 
constitute cyber space as secure as possible 
against intrusions, maintaining confidentiality, 
availability and integrity of information, 
detecting intrusions and incidents that do occur, 
and responding to and recovering from them. 
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16 Norwegian 
Ministries 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy for 
Norway 
201
2 
Protection of data and systems connected to the 
Internet 
17 Kingdom of 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Developing 
National 
Information 
Security 
Strategy for 
the Kingdom 
of Saudi 
Arabia 
201
1 
The ability to protect or defend the use of 
cyberspace from cyber-attacks. 
18 Republic of 
South Africa 
Cybersecurit
y Policy of 
South Africa 
201
0 
Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, 
security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, 
training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organisation and assets.  
19 Republic of 
Turkey 
National 
Cyber 
Security 
Strategy and 
2013-2014 
Action Plan 
n/a Protection of information systems that make up 
the cyber space from attacks, ensuring the 
confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of the 
information being processed in this space, 
detection of attacks and cybersecurity incidents, 
putting into force the countermeasures against 
these incidents and then putting these systems 
back to their states previous to the cybersecurity 
incident. 
20 National 
Institute of 
Standards 
and 
Technology 
Framework 
for 
Improving 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Cybersecurit
y 
201
4 
The process of protecting information by 
preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks 
21 Spanish 
Cyber 
Security 
Institute 
National 
Cyber 
Security, a 
commitment 
for 
everybody 
201
2 
Cybersecurity consists of the application of an 
analysis and management process for risks 
associated with use, processing, storage and 
transmission of information and data, as well as 
risks associated with the systems and processes 
used, based on internationally accepted standards. 
The protection of goods, assets, services, rights 
and freedoms, within state jurisdiction. 
22 Republic of 
Poland 
CYBERSPA
CE 
PROTECTIO
N POLICY 
OF THE 
REPUBLIC 
OF POLAND 
201
3 
A set of organizational and legal, technical, 
physical and educational projects aimed at 
ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of 
cyberspace 
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23 Government 
of Jamaica 
NATIONAL 
CYBER 
SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
201
5 
The implementation of measures to protect ICT 
infrastructure including critical infrastructure 
from intrusion, unauthorized access and includes 
the adoption of policies, protocols and good 
practices to better govern the use of cyberspace. 
24 Craigen, 
Dan 
Diakun-
Thibault, 
Nadia 
Purse, 
Randy 
Defining 
Cybersecurit
y 
201
4 
Cybersecurity is the organization and collection 
of resources, processes, and structures used to 
protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled 
systems from occurrences that misalign de jure 
from de facto property rights. 
25 Merriam-
Webster 
Definition of 
Cybersecurit
y 
201
5 
Measures taken to protect a computer or 
computer system (as on the Internet) against 
unauthorized access or attack. 
26 Oxford 
Dictionary 
Definition of 
Cybersecurit
y 
201
5 
The state of being protected against the criminal 
or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the 
measures taken to achieve this 
27 Amoroso, 
Edward 
Cyber 
Security 
200
7 
Cybersecurity involves reducing the risk of 
malicious attack to software, computers, and 
networks. This includes the tools used to detect 
break-ins, stop viruses, block malicious access, 
enforce authentication, enable encrypted 
communications, and on and on 
28 EastWest 
Institute 
Critical 
Terminology 
Foundations 
2 
201
4 
Cybersecurity is a property of cyberspace that is 
an ability to resist intentional and/or unintentional 
threats and respond and recover 
29 New 
Definition 
 
201
5 
The approach and actions associated with 
security risk management processes followed by 
organisations and states to protect confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of data and assets used 
in cyber space. The concept includes guidelines, 
policies and collections of safeguards, 
technologies, tools and training to provide the 
best protection for the state of the cyber 
environment and its users.” 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 5-1 
 
# Question 
1 How experienced would you say you are when it comes to Information 
Security investment decision processes? 
 
2 What aspects or factors do you usually consider when making information 
security investment decisions? (e.g. legal, economic, cultural,…) 
 
3 What are the value factors you're looking for in each area? i.e. what are 
attributes that add value to an investment from an InfoSec perspective? 
 
4 How do you quantify the value of these investments to the organization? 
 
5 What cost factors (direct or indirect) do you consider when making 
investment decisions for information security? 
 
6 What are the key challenges when deciding which Information Security 
investment to go with? e.g. information on risk reduction, breach 
probability, etc.  
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7 If at all, how do you reduce uncertainty on those challenges to improve 
confidence in the investment decision? 
 
8 Do you calculate/project cost of compromise? What cost components do 
you include? 
 
9 Are you using any ‘return on investment’ type calculations for InfoSec 
spending? Which ones and why those? 
 
10 Following from (9) – do you use them always or just sometimes? Are there 
any particularly useful aspects or challenges? 
 
11 If you are using an Information Security Governance framework or ISMS 
- Does your framework cover economic aspects of InfoSec? E.g. does it 
provide guidance for financially sensible security investments? 
 
12 Do you believe investment decisions in Information Security will come 
under greater scrutiny in future? 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 7-1 
Education 
 
Freque
ncy 
Perce
nt 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ
e Percent 
Val
id 
High school degree 4 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Some college without 
degree 
36 14.4 14.4 16.0 
Associate degree 23 9.2 9.2 25.2 
Bachelor degree 149 59.6 59.6 84.8 
Graduate degree 38 15.2 15.2 100.0 
Total 250 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Job_Level 
 
Freque
ncy 
Perce
nt 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ
e Percent 
Val
id 
Other 2 .8 .8 .8 
Owner/Executiv
e 
12 4.8 4.8 5.6 
Senior 
Management 
52 20.8 20.8 26.4 
Middle 
Management 
90 36.0 36.0 62.4 
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Intermediate 
role 
79 31.6 31.6 94.0 
Entry Level role 15 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 250 100.0 100.0  
 
 
InfoSec_knowledge 
 
Freque
ncy 
Perce
nt 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ
e Percent 
Val
id 
Basic knowledge 20 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Moderate 
knowledge 
144 57.6 57.6 65.6 
High knowledge 86 34.4 34.4 100.0 
Total 250 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Purchasing_knowledge 
 
Freque
ncy 
Perce
nt 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ
e Percent 
Val
id 
Basic 20 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Intermedi
ate 
110 44.0 44.0 52.0 
Advance
d 
91 36.4 36.4 88.4 
Expert 29 11.6 11.6 100.0 
Total 250 100.0 100.0  
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Industry 
 
Freque
ncy 
Perce
nt 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ
e Percent 
Val
id 
Advertising 4 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Business Support 17 6.8 6.8 8.4 
Construction 6 2.4 2.4 10.8 
Education 18 7.2 7.2 18.0 
Entertainment 12 4.8 4.8 22.8 
Finance 34 13.6 13.6 36.4 
Government 14 5.6 5.6 42.0 
Healthcare & 
Pharma 
21 8.4 8.4 50.4 
Insurance 3 1.2 1.2 51.6 
Manufacturing 25 10.0 10.0 61.6 
Nonprofit 1 .4 .4 62.0 
Retail 13 5.2 5.2 67.2 
Real Estate 6 2.4 2.4 69.6 
Telecoms 66 26.4 26.4 96.0 
Transportation 4 1.6 1.6 97.6 
Utilities 4 1.6 1.6 99.2 
Unemployed 2 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 250 100.0 100.0  
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 7-2 
Overview of latent variables and indicators 
LV Indicator Indicator Description 
Accnt FA_EXP The extent to which expenditure type considerations impact 
security investments 
Accnt FA_HUR The extent to which hurdle rate considerations impact security 
investments 
Accnt FA_PRE The extent to which insurance premium considerations impact 
security investments 
BusProc BP_CO Impact considerations of communications in relation to security 
BusProc BP_CR Conflicting business process requirements affecting security 
BusProc BP_OC Conflict of security investments with other business 
opportunities 
BusProc BP_BP Impact of security on business processes and user acceptance 
BusProc BP_SC Impact on preexisting controls 
BusProc BP_TR Conflicts in the underlying technical environment impacting 
security 
CntrlCst CC_IC Consideration of the internal and external cost for 
implementation 
CntrlCst CC_OB Consideration of the total budget available 
CntrlCst CC_OC Consideration of the cost to operate a security control 
CntrlCst CC_PP Consideration of the initial cost of the control 
CntrlEff CE_BR Considerations on the extent to which the control can be 
bypassed 
CntrlEff CE_DF Considerations on the deterrence benefits of the control 
CntrlEff CE_EC Considerations on whether the control is working effectively 
CntrlEff CE_FP Considerations on the accuracy of the control (false positive 
rate) 
CntrlEff CE_PV Considerations of the velocity of security benefits 
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CntrlRsk CR_CR The extent to which the investment will address compliance 
requirements 
CntrlRsk CR_IR The extent to which the investment will fix an immediate issue 
CntrlRsk CR_KR The extent to which the investment will address known risks 
CntrlRsk CR_UR The extent to which the investment will address yet unknown 
risks 
CompEdge CE_AG The impact on business agility 
CompEdge CE_CA The impact on competitive advantage 
CompEdge CE_CE The impact on customer experience 
IncCost IC_CC Considerations related to customer notifications and expenses 
IncCost IC_CL Considerations related to the impact on customer retention 
IncCost IC_MS Considerations related to the impact on market share 
IncCost IC_PR Considerations related to public relations efforts and cost 
IncCost IC_RI Considerations related to the impact on reputation 
L&R LR_CP Considerations related to contractual penalties 
L&R LR_LC Considerations related to legal counsel and proceedings 
L&R LR_LF Considerations related to regulatory or legal fines 
L&R LR_SA Considerations related to non-financial regulatory sanctions 
PPLRes PR_PM Considerations on human resource requirements to deliver 
projects 
PPLRes PR_SC Considerations on qualified staff overhead 
PPLRes PR_TC Considerations on educational cost for human resources 
Threats T_AR Consideration on how well a threat source is resourced 
Threats T_EFF Consideration on the efficiency/time to impact of the threat 
Threats T_LH Consideration on how likely an attack/event by a threat source 
is 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 8-1 
 
Criteria Directio
n 
Measurement type 
FA_EXP ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount)  
FA_HU
R 
ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not likely, Somewhat unlikely, Unsure, somewhat 
likely, very likely) 
FA_PRE ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (considerably increase or no insurance possible, some 
increase, unaffected, some reduction, considerable reduction) 
BP_CO ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (A great amount, Much, Somewhat, Little, Not at all) 
BP_CR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (A great amount, Much, Somewhat, Little, Not at all) 
BP_OC ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (A great amount, Much, Somewhat, Little, Not at all) 
BP_BP ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Negative, slightly negative, No impact, slightly 
positive, Positive) 
BP_SC ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Strongly conflict, conflict, neither, complement, 
strongly complement) 
BP_TR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
CC_IC descend Cardinal, e.g. 1000 - 3400, 45000 - 80000, … 
CC_OB descend Cardinal, e.g. 6 or 25 
CC_OC descend Cardinal, e.g. 1000 - 3400, 45000 - 80000, … 
CC_PP descend Cardinal, e.g. 15400, 796000, … 
CE_BR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Very Easy, Easy, Average, Difficult, Very Difficult) 
CE_DF ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Unlikely, Somewhat unlikely, Unsure, somewhat 
likely, very likely) 
CE_EC ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
CE_FP ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Very High, High, Average, Low, Very Low) 
CE_PV ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Uncertain, Years, Months, Weeks, Days) 
CR_CR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
CR_IR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
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Criteria Directio
n 
Measurement type 
CR_KR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
CR_UR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
CE_AG ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Very Negative, Negative, Neutral, Positive, Very 
Positive) 
CE_CA ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
CE_CE ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Very negative, Negative, None, Positive, very 
positive) 
IC_CC ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
IC_CL ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
IC_MS ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
IC_PR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
LR_CP ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
LR_LC ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
LR_LF ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
LR_SA ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
PR_PM ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (A great amount, Much, Somewhat, Little, None) 
PR_SC ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Considerably higher specialist staff requirements, 
Higher staff requirements, Average staff requirements, Low staff 
requirements, No specialist staff required) 
PR_TC ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (A great amount, Much, Somewhat, Little, None) 
T_AR ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (No resistance, below adequate, Adequate resistance, 
above adequate, Well above required) 
T_EFF ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not at all, Little, Somewhat, Much, A great amount) 
T_LH ascend Likert type 1 - 5 (Not probable, somewhat improbable, neutral, 
somewhat probable, Very probable) 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 8-2 
ID AVSol1 AVSol2 AVSol3 AppWL HIPS Unchang
ed 
FA_EX
P 
5 4 4 4 4 5 
FA_H
UR 
5 3 3 3 4 5 
FA_PR
E 
3 4 4 4 4 1 
BP_C
O 
4 3 3 2 2 5 
BP_CR 3 3 2 2 2 5 
BP_O
C 
5 4 4 4 4 5 
BP_BP 3 3 3 2 3 4 
BP_SC 4 4 4 4 4 3 
BP_TR 2 3 2 3 3 5 
CC_IC 5000 - 
10000 
15000 - 
20000 
15000 - 
20000 
20000 - 
30000 
20000 - 
30000 
0 
CC_O
B 
0 8 12 10 3 0 
CC_O
C 
0 35000 - 
50000 
80000 - 
120000 
55000 - 
70000 
5000 - 
15000 
0 
CC_PP 0 70000 - 
80000 
80000 - 
120000 
900000 - 
110000 
0 0 
CE_BR 3 4 4 5 3 1 
CE_D
F 
2 3 4 5 4 1 
CE_EC 3 4 3 4 3 1 
CE_FP 4 4 3 2 3 5 
CE_PV 5 5 4 4 4 1 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
288 
CR_CR 4 5 4 5 4 1 
CR_IR 4 4 4 4 4 1 
CR_KR 5 5 5 5 5 1 
CR_U
R 
2 3 4 4 4 1 
CE_A
G 
3 3 3 3 3 2 
CE_CA 3 3 4 4 4 1 
CE_CE 3 3 3 2 2 3 
IC_CC 2 2 2 2 2 1 
IC_CL 2 2 2 2 2 1 
IC_MS 2 2 2 2 2 1 
IC_PR 2 3 3 3 3 1 
LR_CP 2 3 3 3 3 1 
LR_LC 2 2 2 2 2 1 
LR_LF 3 3 3 3 3 1 
LR_SA 3 3 3 3 3 1 
PR_P
M 
4 3 3 2 2 5 
PR_SC 4 3 2 2 2 5 
PR_TC 4 3 3 2 2 5 
T_AR 2 3 4 4 4 1 
T_EFF 2 3 4 5 4 1 
T_LH 3 4 4 5 4 1 
 
 
